Abstract
The increasing autonomy of artificial intelligence systems (AI-systems) has put the debate about a possible ‘accountability gap’ in liability law center stage. The debate is about a possible failure of incumbent liability regimes to pinpoint the accountable agent, if in the wrongdoing an AI-system is involved. A recent attempt to address this ‘accountability gap’ is a proposal of the European Parliament, which advances laws on civil liability for the entities that control AI-systems. These newly created entities, which have no blueprint yet in liability law, are called ‘Operators’. By branching out on the healthcare applications of AI-systems, this chapter analyzes the concept of operator’s civil liability. It starts with a description of the liability concepts presented in the proposed legislation, and how they fit doctrinally with the laws and regulations of the current medical liability regime. Complementing the doctrinal analysis, this chapter employs a law and economics analysis, which showcases that the accountability gap is a serious challenge also from a consequentialist point of view. Lastly, this chapter proposes a few legal alternatives that depart from the incumbent concept of strict liability.
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Notes
- 1.
European Parliament Resolution 2020b. This proposal can be seen as a continuation and manifestation of other related documents issued by expert bodies of EU institutions, such as the “Liability for artificial intelligence and other emerging digital technologies” by the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies—New Technologies Formation and the “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence” by the High-Level Expert Group on AI. This chapter was basically concluded before publication of the draft AI Act by the European Commission, COM (2021) 206 final, but we could conclude that this latter proposal does not relate to civil liability.
- 2.
Article 3 of the proposal.
- 3.
Teubner 2018, p. 107.
- 4.
Karnow 1996, p. 191.
- 5.
Ibid.
- 6.
Matthias 2004, p. 175.
- 7.
Floridi and Sanders 2004, p. 364.
- 8.
Recital 3 of the proposal.
- 9.
Article 3 of the proposal.
- 10.
Ibid.
- 11.
Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, pp. 29–33.
- 12.
See Point 8 of the Introduction to the proposal.
- 13.
Shademan et al. 2016, p. 341.
- 14.
Shishhegar et al. 2018, p. 1.
- 15.
It is however found in the “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence” by the High-Level Expert Group on AI.
- 16.
Recital 11 of the proposal.
- 17.
Recital 14 of the proposal.
- 18.
- 19.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88, Article 9.
- 20.
Koch 2011, pp. 1–39.
- 21.
Article 7 of the PLD.
- 22.
Proposal for a Council Directive on the liability of suppliers of services, COM (90) 482 final—SYN 308 of 20 December 1990.
- 23.
For a systematic analysis of member state laws on medical liability, see Koch 2011.
- 24.
Koch 2011, pp. 10–21.
- 25.
Koch 2011, pp. 8–10.
- 26.
Koch 2011, pp. 10–21.
- 27.
Van Dam 2013, p. 300.
- 28.
Ibid.
- 29.
Ficuciello et al. 2019, p. 30.
- 30.
Recital 17 of the proposal.
- 31.
See Article 8 of the proposal for negligence-based liability rules.
- 32.
Besides defect, harm, and causal link, the negligence-based regime requires a higher threshold for liability, specifically a breach of duty of care, which in turn offers less protection for the victim compared to the PLD regime which would allocate liability regardless of any specified breach in the duty of care.
- 33.
Karnow 1996, p. 191.
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
Matthias 2004, p. 175.
- 37.
Article 3 of the proposal.
- 38.
Ibid.
- 39.
- 40.
Alpaydin 2016, pp. 1–28.
- 41.
Annany and Crawford 2018.
- 42.
Recital 3 of the proposal.
- 43.
- 44.
See, e.g., van Dam 2013.
- 45.
- 46.
- 47.
Engstrom 2013.
- 48.
Teubner 2018, pp. 129–149.
- 49.
Ibid.
- 50.
Simon 1960, pp. 17–55.
- 51.
- 52.
Galasso and Luo 2019, pp. 493–504.
- 53.
- 54.
In 2017 the European Parliament was open to this attribute of electronic entities; Res. P8_TA(2017)0051. The sometimes-furious responses (e.g. Robotics, Open letter to the European Commission Artificial Intelligence and robotics, http://www.robotics-openletter.eu/) appear to have wiped the whole idea off the table. The Commission’s White Paper of February 2020 remains silent; EC White Paper of 19 February 2020, COM (2020) 65 final.
- 55.
- 56.
For the facilitative effect of corporate law for industrialization in a comprehensive political setting see, for example, Pistor et al. 2002.
- 57.
Design regulations are also discussed for 3D-printing, which is another disruptive digital technology. See Heine and Li 2019.
- 58.
See Fosch-Villaronga 2019 for a risk-based approach to regulation of healthcare robots.
- 59.
The economic effects of granting limited liability are yet not fully understood and are dependent on specific contexts. A recent study by Koudijs and Salisbury 2020 on the effect of limited liability in marital property law sheds more light on the “social innovation” of limited liability.
- 60.
For a similar argument, see Galasso and Luo 2019, pp. 97–98.
- 61.
Here it might be interesting to learn from the literature on catastrophe insurance by smart public-private insurance schemes. This literature puts less the deterrence aspect into focus (a catastrophe is to a large degree an unavoidable random shock), but the compensation of victims. See, e.g., Bruggeman et al. 2010.
- 62.
For a recent discussion on AI and legal personality, see Chesterman 2020.
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Prifti, K., Stamhuis, E., Heine, K. (2022). Digging into the Accountability Gap: Operator’s Civil Liability in Healthcare AI-systems. In: Custers, B., Fosch-Villaronga, E. (eds) Law and Artificial Intelligence. Information Technology and Law Series, vol 35. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-523-2_15
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