Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Chemical Weapons

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
International Conflict and Security Law

  • 1508 Accesses

Abstract

There is wide agreement that using chemical weapons in warfare is abhorrent and must be prohibited. Chemical weapons have nonetheless, even recently, been used. This chapter argues that chemical weapons are prohibited on the basis of both the international humanitarian law (IHL) principles pertaining to means of warfare as well as arm control law. This is evidenced in the almost universally ratified Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 (CWC 1993) and a corresponding rule of customary international law. Biological weapons are similarly prohibited, primarily as a result of their inherent indiscriminate character.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 349.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 449.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 449.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Spiers 2010, p. 11. For a discussion of the ius ad bellum aspects of the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies, see Weller 2018, pp. 637–661.

  2. 2.

    UNSC 2017.

  3. 3.

    Merkin 1991, p. 175.

  4. 4.

    See generally Jefferson Lab undated.

  5. 5.

    Article 2(1) CWC 1993.

  6. 6.

    Article 2(2) CWC 1993.

  7. 7.

    See Article 23(a) Hague Regulations; Rule 72, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp. 251–254.

  8. 8.

    See generally Rule 76, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp. 265–267.

  9. 9.

    Coleman 2005, p. 6.

  10. 10.

    Coleman 2005, p. 7, see also Merkin 1991, p. 177.

  11. 11.

    Coleman 2005, p. 18.

  12. 12.

    Coleman 2005, pp. 22–24.

  13. 13.

    For example during a German attack on Russian forces at Riga in September 1917. See Coleman 2005, p. 24.

  14. 14.

    Coleman 2005, pp. 44–45.

  15. 15.

    Merkin 1991, p. 181.

  16. 16.

    Coleman 2005, p. 152.

  17. 17.

    Coleman 2005, p. 60.

  18. 18.

    Coleman 2005, p. 60.

  19. 19.

    Boothby 2016, pp. 110–111; Coleman 2005, pp. 59–79; Marauhn 2016, p. 27. Chemical agents were however used on a large scale by the Nazis in their concentration camps.

  20. 20.

    Coleman 2005, p. 89.

  21. 21.

    Coleman 2005, pp. 90–93.

  22. 22.

    Marauhn 2016, p. 27 ; Coleman 2005, pp. 101–103.

  23. 23.

    Marauhn 2016, p. 27; Oygarden 2014, p. 15; Ali 2001, p. 44.

  24. 24.

    Spiers 2010, pp. 104–106; Coleman 2005, pp. 110–111; Ali 2001, p. 52, See also Human Rights Watch 1993.

  25. 25.

    Marauhn 2016, p. 27.

  26. 26.

    See OPCW News: 14 October 2013, ‘Syria’s Accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention Enters into Force’ https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2013/10/syrias-accession-chemical-weapons-convention-enters-force.

  27. 27.

    UNSC 2017.

  28. 28.

    Human Rights Watch 2017.

  29. 29.

    Arms control law is a “branch of public international law [and] consists of the rules and principles of international law related to the control of armaments—‘control’ being understood as encompassing the whole range of prohibitions of armaments quantitative and qualitative arms limitations as well as obligations to disarm.” Den Dekker 2008, p. 75.

  30. 30.

    See generally Boothby 2016, Chaps. 5, 6 and 7, pp. 46–91. See also Tsagourias and Morrison 2018, p. 174 and Van Den Boogaard 2018, p. 524.

  31. 31.

    The Martens Clause was first included in the preamble to the 1907 Hague convention concerning land warfare and subsequently in most IHL instruments. See for example O’Connell 2013, pp. 33–34. The Martens Clause is commonly understood to mean that “[i]f an act of war is not expressly prohibited by international agreements or customary law, this does not necessarily mean that it is actually permissible.”

  32. 32.

    International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, p. 257, para 78. Available here: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.

  33. 33.

    Cassese 2008, p. 41.

  34. 34.

    Kalshoven 2007, pp. 395–396: “…as yardsticks, they should be able to support a fairly straightforward determination of the legal issue. As guidelines, they need to provide little more tha[n] a set of basic, perhaps mutually conflicting, considerations that must be weighed in arriving at such a decision.”

  35. 35.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, p. 242 and 248. See also generally Van Den Boogaard 2013 and Zwanenburg 2008, pp. 114–119.

  36. 36.

    Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 135, entered into force 21 October 1950 Common Article 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 1978.

  37. 37.

    As Dinstein notes: “there are several cardinal principles lying at the root of the law of international armed conflict. Upon examination, none is more critical than the principle of distinction.” Dinstein 2008, p. 1.

  38. 38.

    ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rules 1-24, pp. 1–76.

  39. 39.

    ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 71, pp. 244–250.

  40. 40.

    For a short explanation: Doswell 2015: What makes weather so unpredictable? Available online https://www.quora.com/What-makes-weather-so-unpredictable-Why-is-it-so. See also this explanation of the so-called ‘butterfly effect’: Wikipedia undated.

  41. 41.

    See for example World Health Organisation 1970, see also UNGA undated.

  42. 42.

    International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, para 78 on p. 257.

  43. 43.

    1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight, Preamble.

  44. 44.

    Boutruche 2008, pp. 103–106.

  45. 45.

    Aubert describes how this principle may be put into practice using the example of incendiary weapons: “[i]nstinctively, man is afraid of fire. The injuries caused by incendiary weapons (burns and lesions due to the release of toxic gases) are particularly painful and, to be treated, they require greater hospital facilities than is the case for bullet or shrapnel wounds.” Aubert 1990, p. 489.

  46. 46.

    Haines 2014, pp. 285–286.

  47. 47.

    Boutruche 2008, p. 108.

  48. 48.

    Ali 2001, p. 52.

  49. 49.

    Coleman 2005, p. 18.

  50. 50.

    Pechura and Rall 1993, pp. 131–145. Causing permanent blindness was also one of the major drivers for prohibiting laser weapons in Protocol IV to the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention of 1995.

  51. 51.

    Uribe 2013: “Nerve agents such as sarin cause an overstimulation of the nerve cells and prevent the proper operation of glands and muscles. Symptoms can appear within seconds or even hours and include blurred vision, excess salivation, vomiting, difficulty thinking, muscle twitches, convulsions, paralysis and respiratory failure.” Available at: https://www.undispatch.com/syrians-now-face-the-long-term-effects-of-exposure-to-chemical-warfare/.

  52. 52.

    See for example World Health Organisation 1970.

  53. 53.

    Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2018, ‘Phosgene’. Available at: https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/phosgene/basics/facts.asp.

  54. 54.

    Jones and Greenberg 2007, pp. 727–728.

  55. 55.

    The ICRC Customary Law Study cites the military manuals of Australia, France and Germany in support of this conclusion, noting that “[t]he prohibition on the use of chemical and biological weapons in the Geneva Gas Protocol was originally motivated by this rule”. ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 70, p. 237.

  56. 56.

    See also Article 55 (1) API: “Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.”

  57. 57.

    This treaty however has limited relevance, since it merely prohibits the use of the environment as a weapon. Nonetheless, the ENMOD Convention has a lower threshold for effects on the natural environment, because the damage can be alternatively widespread, long-lasting or severe. See Article 1: “[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.”

  58. 58.

    Rule 44, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp. 147–151.

  59. 59.

    See for example Dinstein 2016, p. 244. See also International Law Commission undated.

  60. 60.

    Dinstein notes that in his opinion, “the bar set up by API is too high”. Dinstein 2016, p. 250.

  61. 61.

    “In cases not covered by international agreements, the environment remains under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”

  62. 62.

    The draft principles were adopted during the 77th Session of the ILC in Geneva in April–June 2019. See http://legal.un.org/docs/index.asp?symbol=A/CN.4/L.937.

  63. 63.

    Rule 3, ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp. 11–14.

  64. 64.

    OPCW undated-a, Concerns, https://www.opcw.org/our-work/eliminating-chemical-weapons. See also Edwards 2011, ”MoD investigates former chemical weapons factories for contamination” The Guardian.

  65. 65.

    Rogers 2004, p. 176.

  66. 66.

    Merkin 1991, p. 178. See also Coleman 2005, p. 151.

  67. 67.

    Oeter 2013, p. 163.

  68. 68.

    Raičević 2001, p. 621.

  69. 69.

    Oeter 2013, p. 164.

  70. 70.

    Scharf 1999, p. 481.

  71. 71.

    See for example UNGA undated.

  72. 72.

    For a commentary of the CWC 1993, see generally Krutzsch et al. 2014.

  73. 73.

    See OPCW undated-b, https://www.opcw.org/about-us/member-states. It may be noted that Israel did sign the CWC 1993.

  74. 74.

    Article VIII (1) CWC 1993.

  75. 75.

    Krutzsch et al. 2014, p. 8.

  76. 76.

    According to the OPCW, 97% of the chemical weapons stockpiles declared by possessor States have been verifiably destroyed. See OPCW undated-b, https://www.opcw.org/about-us/member-states. See also OPCW 2016.

  77. 77.

    For an analysis: see Akande 2013, https://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-icc-prosecute-for-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/.

  78. 78.

    ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, rule 74, pp. 259–263.

  79. 79.

    ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Vol II, Practice, p. 1662: Mendoza Declaration on Chemical and Biological Weapons, Mendoza, 5 September 1991; Cartagena Declaration on the Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Cartagena, 5 December 1991.

  80. 80.

    ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Vol II, Practice, p. 1663. See for instance the military manuals of Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Germany, Italy, Kenya, South Africa, Spain and Yugoslavia.

  81. 81.

    ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. 94-1-AR72, Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, p. 124: “there undisputedly emerged a general consensus in the international community on the principle that the use of [chemical] weapons is also prohibited in internal armed conflicts”

  82. 82.

    See for example Boothby 2016, p. 123: “[i]t is now clear that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is a rule of customary law, and therefore binds all States including those not party to the CWC [1993].” See also Oeter 2013, p. 162, Krutzsch et al. 2014, p. 3, Dinstein 2016, p. 92 and Asada 2016 p. 188.

  83. 83.

    S/RES/2118(2013) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7038th meeting, on 27 September 2013, p. 2.

  84. 84.

    See for example Blake and Mahmud 2013, available at: https://www.uclalawreview.org/a-legal-%E2%80%9Cred-line%E2%80%9D-syria-and-the-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-civil-conflict/ and Van Schaack 2016, available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/32309/chemical-weapons-returns-syria/.

  85. 85.

    See for example Melzer and Gaggioli Gasteyger 2015, pp. 63–92.

  86. 86.

    Geiss 2010, p. 342.

  87. 87.

    Article 2(7) CWC 1993. Pepper spray and tear gas are two types of chemicals that would fall within the scope of this article.

  88. 88.

    Thus, in the view of the US, the use of riot control agents would be permitted to quell an uprising of prisoners of war; in situations in which civilians are used to provide cover for an attack; for rescue missions; to prevent prisoners from escaping and “to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organisations” See US Government 1975.

  89. 89.

    Cathcart 2015, 447–448: “caution dictates that any uses of [riot control agents] that could be reasonably perceived as a ‘method of warfare’ should be avoided.”

  90. 90.

    Wheelis 2002, pp. 971–975, Bartlema 1965, p. 476.

  91. 91.

    Smith 2002, available at https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/old-tactics-new-threat-what-todays-risk-smallpox/2002-09. A similar tactic seems to have been used by British Colonial troops fighting native American tribes. Bartlema 1965, p. 476.

  92. 92.

    The parties to the 1929 Gas Protocol declared to “agree to extend [the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons] to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare (…)”.

  93. 93.

    Boothby 2016, p. 111.

  94. 94.

    See for example UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/72/71, 4 December 2017: “Welcoming the reaffirmation made in the Final Declarations of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Review Conferences that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling are effectively prohibited under Article I of the Convention”.

  95. 95.

    See Rule 73 of the ICRC Customary IHL Study, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, pp. 256–248. See also Boothby, claiming that the customary rule extends also to the possession of such weapons.

  96. 96.

    Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The treaty was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975. As of July 2019, 182 State have ratified the treaty.

  97. 97.

    See https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/.

  98. 98.

    Boothby 2016, note 64 on p. 114.

  99. 99.

    Marauhn 2016, pp. 41–42.

References

  • Akande D (2013) Can the ICC Prosecute for Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria? EJIL:Talk! Blog, 23 August 2013, https://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-icc-prosecute-for-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Ali J (2001) Chemical weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: a case study in noncompliance. The Non Proliferation Review, 8.1:43–58

    Google Scholar 

  • Asada M (2016) A path to a comprehensive prohibition of the use of chemical weapons under international law: from The Hague to Damascus. Journal of Conflict & Security Law 21:153–207

    Google Scholar 

  • Aubert M (1990) The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Problem of Excessively Injurious or Indiscriminate Weapons. International Review of the Red Cross 30:477–497

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartlema HC (1965) Biologische oorlog. De Militaire Spectator, 134:451–501

    Google Scholar 

  • Blake J, Mahmud A (2013) A legal ‘red line’?: Syria and the use of chemical weapons in civil conflict, 61 UCLA Law Review, 15 October 2013, available at: https://www.uclalawreview.org/a-legal-%E2%80%9Cred-line%E2%80%9D-syria-and-the-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-civil-conflict/. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Boothby WH (2016) Weapons and the law of armed conflict, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Boutruche T (2008) The principle of the prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. In: Beruto GL (ed) Proceedings of the 30th Sanremo Round Table, the conduct of hostilities – revisiting the law of armed conflict, 100 years after the law of armed conflict, 30 years after the 1977 Additional Protocols. International Institute of Humanitarian Law, pp 102–108

    Google Scholar 

  • Cassese A (2008) The Martens Clause: half a loaf or simply pie in the sky? In: Gaeta P, Zappalà S (eds) The human dimension of international law - Selected Papers of Antonio Cassese. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 39–69

    Google Scholar 

  • Cathcart B (2015) Legal dimension of special operations and information operations. In: Gill TD, Fleck D (ed) The handbook of the international law of military operations. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 444–455

    Google Scholar 

  • Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018) Phosgene. Available at: https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/phosgene/basics/facts.asp. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Coleman K (2005) A history of chemical warfare. Palgrave Macmillan, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Den Dekker G (2008) The Law of Arms Control and Depleted Uranium Weapons. In: MacDonald A, Kleffner JK, Toebes BCA (eds) Depleted uranium weapons and international law: a precautionary approach. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, pp 75–97

    Google Scholar 

  • Dinstein Y (2008) Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed Conflicts. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 38:1

    Google Scholar 

  • Dinstein Y (2016) The conduct of hostilities under the law of international armed conflict, 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Doswell C (2015) What makes weather so unpredictable? https://www.quora.com/What-makes-weather-so-unpredictable-Why-is-it-so. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Edwards R (2011) “MoD investigates former chemical weapons factories for contamination”. The Guardian, 24 July 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jul/24/mod-chemical-weapons-factories-contamination. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Geiss R (2010) Poison, Gas and Expanding Bullets: the Extension of the List of Prohibited Weapons at the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court in Kampala. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 13:337–352

    Google Scholar 

  • Haines S (2014) The developing law of weapons, humanity, distinction and precautions in attack. In: Clapham A, Gaeta P (eds) The Oxford handbook of international law in armed conflict. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 337–352

    Google Scholar 

  • Henckaerts J-M, Doswald-Beck L (2005) Customary international humanitarian law, volume I: Rules; Vol II: Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Human Rights Watch (1993) ‘Genocide in Iraq’ Human Rights Watch (July 1993), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Human Rights Watch (2017) ‘Death by Chemicals’ Report on the Syrian Government’s Widespread and Systematic Use of Chemical Weapons (1 May 2017), available https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/05/01/death-chemicals/syrian-governments-widespread-and-systematic-use-chemical-weapons. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • International Law Commission (ILC) (undated) Draft principles of protection of the environment, http://legal.un.org/docs/index.asp?symbol=A/CN.4/L.937. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Jefferson Lab (undated) The element of chlorine, https://education.jlab.org/itselemental/ele017.html. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Jones E, Greenberg N (2007) Long-term psychological consequences among chemical warfare survivors of World War I and their current relevance. Psychiatric Annals 37:724–728

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalshoven F (2007) The Conventional Weapons Convention: functions of underlying legal principles. In: Kalshoven F (ed) Reflections on the law of war: collected essays. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 393–397

    Google Scholar 

  • Krutzsch W et al (2014) The Chemical Weapons Convention – objectives, principles, and implementation practice. In: Krutzsch W et al (eds) The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Krutzsch W et al (eds) (2014) The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Marauhn T (2016) The prohibition to use chemical weapons. In: Gill TD (ed) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 17:25–44

    Google Scholar 

  • Melzer N, Gaggioli Gasteyger G (2015) Conceptual distinction and overlaps between law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities. In: Gill TD, Fleck D (eds) The handbook of the international law of military operations. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 63–92

    Google Scholar 

  • Merkin DB (1991) The efficacy of chemical-arms treaties in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war. Boston University International Law Journal, 9:175–196

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connell ME (2013) Historic development and legal basis. In: Fleck D (ed) The handbook of international humanitarian law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–42

    Google Scholar 

  • Oeter S (2013) Methods and means of combat. In: Fleck D (ed) The handbook of international humanitarian law, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 115–230

    Google Scholar 

  • OPCW (undated-a) Concerns, https://www.opcw.org/our-work/eliminating-chemical-weapons. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • OPCW (undated-b) Member States, https://www.opcw.org/about-us/member-states. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • OPCW (2013) OPCW News: 14 October 2013, ‘Syria’s Accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention Enters into Force’ https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2013/10/syrias-accession-chemical-weapons-convention-enters-force. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • OPCW (2016) Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Twenty-First Session (2016), https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-21/en/c2104_e_.pdf. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Oygarden RH (2014) Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A discussion of the UN Security Council’s response to the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war 1980–1988 (Universitas Bergensis 2014) http://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/9153/128400983.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Pechura CM, Rall DP (1993) Veterans at risk: the health effects of mustard gas and lewisite. National Academies Press, Washington, DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Raičević N (2001) The history of prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in international humanitarian law. Facta Universitatis, Law and Politics Series, 1:613–631. Available at: http://facta.junis.ni.ac.rs/lap/lap2001/lap2001-05.pdf . Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Rogers APV (2004) Law on the battlefield, 2nd edn. Manchester University Press, Manchester

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharf MP (1999) Clear and present danger: enforcing the international ban on biological and chemical weapons through sanctions, use of force, and criminalization. Michigan Journal of International Law, 20:477–521

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith S (2002) Old tactics, new threat: what is today's risk of smallpox? Virtual Mentor. 2002;4(9): doi: https://doi.org/10.1001/virtualmentor.2002.4.9.mhst1-0209. https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/old-tactics-new-threat-what-todays-risk-smallpox/2002-09. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Spiers EM (2010) A History of chemical and biological weapons. Reaktion Books Ltd, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsagourias NK, Morrison A (2018) International humanitarian law: cases, materials and commentary. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • UNGA (undated) UNGA Resolution 2603 A (XXIV) Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/257/37/IMG/NR025737.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • UNSC (2017) ‘Seventh report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism’ S/2017/904. Available at: http://undocs.org/S/2017/904. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Uribe C (2013) Syrians now Face the Long-term Effects of Exposure to Chemical Warfare (UN Dispatch) Available at: https://www.undispatch.com/syrians-now-face-the-long-term-effects-of-exposure-to-chemical-warfare/. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • US Government (1975) USA Executive Order No 11,850, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,187 (Apr. 8 1975): 143 Cong. Rec. S3657. https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11850.html. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Van Den Boogaard JC (2013) Fighting by the principles: Principles as a source of international humanitarian law. In: Matthee M, Toebes B, Bruss MMTA (eds) Armed conflict and international law: In search of the human face. Liber amicorum in memory of Avril McDonald. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, pp 3–31

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Den Boogaard JC (2018) New Weapons. In: Djukic D, Pons N (eds) The companion to international humanitarian law. Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 523–524

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Schaack B (2016) Chemical weapons use return to Syria”, Just Security blog, 8 August 2016. Available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/32309/chemical-weapons-returns-syria/. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Weller M (2018) The Iraq War – 2003. In: Ruys T, Corten O, Hofer A (eds) The use of force in international law, a case-based approach, Oxford University Press, pp 637–661

    Google Scholar 

  • Wheelis M (2002) Biological Warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa. Emerging Infectious Diseases. [author, insert name publication] 8:971–975. https://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3201/eid0809.010536

  • Wikipedia (undated) Butterfly effect, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butterfly_effect. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • World Health Organisation (WHO) (1970) ‘Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons’, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/39444/1/24039.pdf. Accessed 15 March 2021

  • Zwanenburg MC (2008) The use of depleted uranium and the prohibition of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. In: MacDonald A, Kleffner JK, Toebes BCA (eds) Depleted uranium weapons and international law: a precautionary approach. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, pp 111–124

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Jeroen C. van den Boogaard

  2. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Jeroen C. van den Boogaard

Authors
  1. Jeroen C. van den Boogaard
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jeroen C. van den Boogaard .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

    Sergey Sayapin

  2. School of Law, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

    Rustam Atadjanov

  3. National Law School of India, Pune, India

    Umesh Kadam

  4. Law and Social Sciences, University of Derby, Derby, UK

    Gerhard Kemp

  5. School of Law, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

    Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar

  6. Bristol Law School, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK

    Noëlle Quénivet

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2022 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

van den Boogaard, J.C. (2022). Chemical Weapons. In: Sayapin, S., Atadjanov, R., Kadam, U., Kemp, G., Zambrana-Tévar, N., Quénivet, N. (eds) International Conflict and Security Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-515-7_14

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-515-7_14

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-514-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-515-7

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation