Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and Their Compatibility with International Humanitarian Law: A Primer on the Debate

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 21 (2018)

Part of the book series: Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law ((YIHL,volume 21))

Abstract

Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are platforms that can perform military tasks and take decisions relating thereto on their own—using artificial intelligence. While such technology has not yet been developed, research is headed this way. Are these systems capable of complying with current rules under international humanitarian law (IHL)? Which factors of substantive legal provisions pose particular challenges and what parameters would LAWS have to meet in order to act lawfully? Core principles of IHL under treaties and custom are identified, explained and applied. As regards distinction, it is argued that research here offers the most promising advancements. However, the rule rests upon subjective determinations and ever-present doubt. One may also differentiate when examining proportionality: expected collateral damage is relatively objective and can already be calculated by software. In contrast, military advantage anticipated proves too complex and subjective. Furthermore, the open wording of this rule and its dependence on moral standards leads makes adherence to IHL currently impossible. It is suggested that extralegal issues should also be given sufficient consideration; details are however beyond the scope here. It is finally concluded that for the time being as well as the foreseeable future, LAWS are incompatible with IHL. Thus, humans must stay in or on the loop and retain (meaningful human) control in order to ensure observance of the law of armed conflict. Any technological achievement may nevertheless enhance the human-machine interface in the sense that humans and systems are partnered; thereby allowing for utilizing progress while securing lawful conduct at the same time.

Matthias Brenneke (currently Junior Lawyer at MANNER SPANGENBERG Partnerschaft von Rechtsanwälten mbB; formerly Legal Advisor at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Kuala Lumpur) is seeking bar admission at the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg. He would like to thank Prof Dr. Terry Gill as well as the peer reviewers for their critical and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. This chapter was written in a personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect the views of any institution the author is or has been affiliated with.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For precise definitions and nuances of AI, see UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2018.

  2. 2.

    For an overview of the pursuit of delegating jobs from humans to machines, see Singer 2009, pp. 42–62.

  3. 3.

    Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature 26 June 1945, USTS 993 (entered into force 24 October 1945), Article 38(1).

  4. 4.

    See, representatively, Anderson and Waxman 2013; Asaro 2012, pp. 691, 709; Sharkey 2012, pp. 796–798; Foy 2014, pp. 63–69; Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2017) Report of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN Doc. CCW/ GGE.1/2017/CRP.1, para 16; and various position by states.

  5. 5.

    ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep 226 (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), para 86.

  6. 6.

    See, representatively, Henderson et al. 2017; Margulies 2017; UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 75–81; Human Rights Watch 2012, pp. 42–45; Egeland 2016, pp. 107–116; Schmitt 2013, pp. 33 f.; Singer 2009, pp. 407–411; France 2018.

  7. 7.

    Singer 2009, p. 123, quoting Thomas Adams.

  8. 8.

    UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 58, 62; Asaro 2012, p. 692; Meier 2017, pp. 447–456. There have also been warnings against a lowered threshold of going to war in general, see, e.g., China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3; Singh Gill 2018, para 40.

  9. 9.

    For implications, see Birnbacher 2016.

  10. 10.

    ICRC 2013, p. 8.

  11. 11.

    Common Article 2 Geneva Conventions, e.g. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC I), Article 2; ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1 (Tadić), para 70.

  12. 12.

    For an overview, see Kleffner 2013, pp. 44 f.

  13. 13.

    See, e.g., GC I, above n 11, Article 3.

  14. 14.

    Tadić, above n 11, para 562.

  15. 15.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1949, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I).

  16. 16.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978).

  17. 17.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005.

  18. 18.

    See AIV/CAVV 2015, Annex II.

  19. 19.

    NATO Standardization Office 2016, paras 0202–0208.

  20. 20.

    Considering that the question of definition and levels of autonomy is covered in almost every academic contribution and every national view about LAWS, recourse in this section will be had only to selected documents. See, representatively, Singh Gill 2018, paras 1–9.

  21. 21.

    McFarland 2015, pp. 1318–1324; Williams 2015, pp. 39–52.

  22. 22.

    ICRC 2016, p. 71.

  23. 23.

    US Department of Defense 2012, pp. 13 f.

  24. 24.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 235.

  25. 25.

    This is the distinguishing feature according to ICRC 2016, p. 71.

  26. 26.

    Thurnher 2016, p. 181.

  27. 27.

    UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para 40.

  28. 28.

    UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2014, pp. 2 f.; Grut 2013, p. 6.

  29. 29.

    Wagner 2016, para 4.

  30. 30.

    Backstrom and Henderson 2012, p. 488; Wagner 2016, para 5.

  31. 31.

    ICRC 2016, p. 71.

  32. 32.

    Wagner 2011, pp. 158 f.

  33. 33.

    E.g. Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 2.

  34. 34.

    Singer 2009, pp. 74 f.

  35. 35.

    Russian Federation (2018) Russia’s Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic Functions of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Context of the Purposes and Objectives of the Convention, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.6, paras 9, 11 f.; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, paras 42–56.

  36. 36.

    European Union 2018, p. 2; France and Germany 2018, p. 2; Kingdom of the Netherlands 2018, p. 2; Austria, Brazil, Chile (2018) Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-binding Instrument that addresses the Legal, Humanitarian and Ethical Concerns posed by Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.7; China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3; United Kingdom (2018) Human Machine Touchpoints: The United Kingdom’s perspective on human control over weapon development and targeting cycles, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.1, paras 6, 8, 10, 15; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, paras 1, 8.

  37. 37.

    Moyes 2016, pp. 49–51. See also Canellas and Haga 2015; AIV/CAVV 2015, pp. 34–37.

  38. 38.

    AIV/CAVV 2015, p. 33; ICRAC 2018.

  39. 39.

    Van den Boogaard 2015, p. 282.

  40. 40.

    Boothby 2016, pp. 332 f.; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 271.

  41. 41.

    For a thorough discussion of LAWS and the distinction regarding civilian objects/military objectives, see Homayounnejad 2018, Chapter 6.5.3, pp. 200–219 (preliminary pagination).

  42. 42.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rules 1 and 7.

  43. 43.

    Foy 2014, p. 56.

  44. 44.

    Ibid.; p. 57.; Grut 2013, p. 11; Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 30; Thurnher 2016, p. 188; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 262.

  45. 45.

    Grut 2013, p. 11; Toscano 2015, p. 210; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 263; Schulzke 2011, p. 300.

  46. 46.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, p. 11; Toscano 2015, p. 210.

  47. 47.

    Schulzke 2011, pp. 300 f.

  48. 48.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, p. 12; Toscano 2015, pp. 210 f.

  49. 49.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, p. 12.

  50. 50.

    Sharkey 2010, p. 378; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 262; Herbach 2012, p. 18; Singer 2009, pp. 80 f.

  51. 51.

    Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 31.

  52. 52.

    Foy 2014, p. 59.

  53. 53.

    Toscano 2015, pp. 210, 216.

  54. 54.

    Egeland 2016, p. 101; Amoroso and Tamburrini 2017, p. 6.

  55. 55.

    Thurnher 2016, p. 188; Schulzke 2011, p. 300; Singer 2009, p. 409; Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 192 f. Sharkey argues that LAWS simply cannot properly discriminate since they do not take context into account, see Sharkey 2012, p. 788.

  56. 56.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, pp. 11, 13; Toscano 2015, p. 210; van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 263 f.; Thurnher 2016, p. 188. Foy raises doubts whether such scenarios are realistic, see Foy 2014, p. 57.

  57. 57.

    Schmitt 2013, pp. 11, 18.

  58. 58.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, pp. 11, 13; Toscano 2015, p. 210; van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 263 f. Thurnher 2016, p. 188.

  59. 59.

    Hauptman 2013, p. 184. Distinguishing between conventional wars and (counter-)insurgency: Schulzke 2011, p. 300; Herbach 2012, p. 18.

  60. 60.

    Toscano 2015, p. 210; Hauptman 2013, p. 193.

  61. 61.

    Foy 2014, p. 59; Sharkey 2010, p. 379.

  62. 62.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 5.

  63. 63.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 610, para 1913.

  64. 64.

    AP I, above n 15, Article 50(1) sentence 2; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 6, Section “Situations of doubt as to the character of a person”.

  65. 65.

    Schmitt 2013, pp. 16 f.; Singer 2009, p. 203.

  66. 66.

    Egeland 2016, p. 117; Foy 2014, p. 58.

  67. 67.

    Meaning that everything could be assigned a value of either 0 or 1.

  68. 68.

    Schmitt 2013, p. 17. He also emphasizes that the problem of doubt only arises in the context of combatant/non-combatant, but not regarding civilian objects/military objectives.

  69. 69.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, p. 13; Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 221–223.

  70. 70.

    Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 262 f.

  71. 71.

    Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 195, 197 f.

  72. 72.

    ICRC 2009, pp. 16, 46.

  73. 73.

    Ibid., p. 47.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., pp. 56 f.; Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 196 f.

  75. 75.

    Wagner 2011, p. 160. One may also recall the bombing of the bridge at the Grdelica Gorge on 12 April 1999 that hit a civilian passenger train, see for this ICTY 2000, paras 58–62.

  76. 76.

    AP I, above n 15, Article 41(1). Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of the War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907, International Peace Conference, The Hague, Official Record 206 (entered into force 26 January 1910), Article 23(c); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 47.

  77. 77.

    For medical personnel: AP I, above n 15; Article 15. GC I, above n 11, Articles 24–26; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC II), Article 36; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 8 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV), Article 20; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 25. For military chaplains: AP I, above n 15, Article 15; GC I, above n 11, Article 24; GC II, n 77, Article 36; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 27.

  78. 78.

    Amoroso and Tamburrini 2017, p. 6; Liu 2012, pp. 645 f.; van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 259, 263. Toscano stated that measurements such as body temperature and heart rate would help the problem, see Toscano 2015, p. 216. However, such advance of technology would only help but not solve the issue and its achievement is currently doubtful.

  79. 79.

    Homayounnejad 2018, p. 199.

  80. 80.

    Arkin 2008, p. 122; Egeland 2016, p. 106.

  81. 81.

    UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para 67; Human Rights Watch 2012, pp. 34 f.; Sharkey 2012, p. 788; Liu 2012, pp. 643–646; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 259.

  82. 82.

    GC I, above n 11, Article 22(1); GC II, above n 77, Article 35(1); AP I, above n 15, Article 13(2)(a).

  83. 83.

    See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 4; AP I, above n 15, Article 43(3).

  84. 84.

    Homayounnejad 2018, p. 187.

  85. 85.

    UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para 69; Arkin 2008, pp. 124, 126; Schulzke 2011, pp. 300 f.

  86. 86.

    Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 263 f.

  87. 87.

    Schulzke 2011, pp. 301 f.

  88. 88.

    Toscano 2015, pp. 210–216; Homayounnejad 2018, p. 226. Van den Boogaard 2015, p. 262 points out recognition via distinctive emblems and transmitted signals.

  89. 89.

    United States (2018) Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4, paras 7–37.

  90. 90.

    Human Rights Watch 2012, pp. 30 f.

  91. 91.

    Singer 2009, p. 76.

  92. 92.

    Sharkey 2010, pp. 379 f.; Sharkey 2012, pp. 788 f.

  93. 93.

    Toscano 2015, p. 222; McFarland 2015, p. 1338.

  94. 94.

    Egeland 2016, p. 102; Toscano 2015, pp. 215 f.; Schulzke 2011, p. 300.

  95. 95.

    Foy 2014, p. 58.

  96. 96.

    Wagner 2011, p. 161.

  97. 97.

    Thurnher 2016, p. 188; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 263.

  98. 98.

    Foy 2014, p. 59; Singer 2009, pp. 80 f.

  99. 99.

    Homayounnejad 2018, p. 191.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., pp. 223 f.

  101. 101.

    This view is explicitly shared for example by China, see China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3. China’s approach has nonetheless been viewed as ambiguous, see Kania 2018.

  102. 102.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 14 (emphasis added).

  103. 103.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 683, para 2206 and p. 685, para 2219.

  104. 104.

    Aiming directly at civilians or civilian objects is prohibited, see AP I, above n 15, Articles 51(2) and 52(1).

  105. 105.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 625, para 1977.

  106. 106.

    Ibid., p. 625, para 1978, and pp. 683 f.; para 2208; Oeter 2013, p. 198.

  107. 107.

    Oeter 2013, p. 197.

  108. 108.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 679, para 2187.

  109. 109.

    Ibid., p. 684, para 2209 and p. 685, para 2218.

  110. 110.

    Oeter 2013, p. 197.

  111. 111.

    Ibid. For the principle of distinction, see below, Sect. 3.3.1.

  112. 112.

    Grut 2013, p. 12; Homayounnejad 2018, p. 272.

  113. 113.

    Foy 2014, p. 56. In the same sense, van den Boogaard 2015, p. 258.

  114. 114.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, pp. 12 f.; Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 240, 264 f.; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, para 14. See also above, Sect. 3.3.1.

  115. 115.

    Foy 2014, p. 60; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 254; Schmitt 2013, p. 19; United States (2018) Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4, para 23.

  116. 116.

    Thurnher 2016, p. 189.

  117. 117.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 255; Schmitt 2013, p. 20.

  118. 118.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 256; Thurnher 2016, p. 189. Only regarding military advantage because of the dependence on context, Schmitt 2013, p. 21.

  119. 119.

    Schulzke 2011, p. 302.

  120. 120.

    Toscano 2015, pp. 211 f.; 217, calling for a “failsafe mechanism”.

  121. 121.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 256.

  122. 122.

    Schulzke 2011, p. 303.

  123. 123.

    Ibid., p. 302; Homayounnejad 2018, p. 272.

  124. 124.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 256.

  125. 125.

    Schmitt 2013, p. 20.

  126. 126.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 256 f.

  127. 127.

    Arkin 2008, p. 126.

  128. 128.

    ICTY 2000, para 48.

  129. 129.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, pp. 12 f.

  130. 130.

    Van den Boogaard 2015, p. 261.

  131. 131.

    Ibid., pp. 261, 264 f.

  132. 132.

    Grut 2013, p. 13; Homayounnejad 2018, p. 239.

  133. 133.

    Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 32; Homayounnejad 2018, p. 237.

  134. 134.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 684, para 2212.

  135. 135.

    Grut 2013, p. 12.

  136. 136.

    Ibid.; UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para 70.

  137. 137.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 97; Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 23(1); GC IV, above n 77, Article 28; AP I, above n 15, Article 51(7).

  138. 138.

    O’Connell 2013, p. 12.

  139. 139.

    UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 70 f.

  140. 140.

    Egeland 2016, p. 117; Singer 2009, p. 409.

  141. 141.

    Foy 2014, p. 56.

  142. 142.

    Toscano 2015, p. 217.

  143. 143.

    Foy 2014, p. 60.

  144. 144.

    Ibid., p. 59; Wagner 2011, p. 163.

  145. 145.

    Foy 2014, p. 60.

  146. 146.

    Ibid.

  147. 147.

    Ibid.

  148. 148.

    Sharkey 2010, p. 380.

  149. 149.

    Egeland 2016, p. 104. Also van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 264, 266.

  150. 150.

    Egeland 2016, p. 104.

  151. 151.

    Wagner 2016, para 19.

  152. 152.

    Toscano 2015, p. 211; Foy 2014, pp. 56, 60; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 255 f.; Thurnher 2016, p. 189; Schmitt 2013, p. 20.

  153. 153.

    Schmitt 2013, p. 20.

  154. 154.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 254.

  155. 155.

    Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 272 f. He points out that some scholars generally dismiss that the protection of own forces would count as military advantage while others argue that either strict burdens regarding concreteness and directness of such advantage must be met or that these aspects may not form the only aspects in the assessment.

  156. 156.

    Ibid., p. 272.

  157. 157.

    Ibid., pp. 271–275.

  158. 158.

    Ibid.

  159. 159.

    See, e.g., UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para 72; Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 32. Rather stressing the need for MHC, Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 240, 247.

  160. 160.

    ICTY, Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion, 5 December 2003, Case No. IT-98-29-T, para 58 (footnotes omitted).

  161. 161.

    Grut 2013, pp. 12 f.

  162. 162.

    Asaro 2012, p. 701.

  163. 163.

    Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 33.

  164. 164.

    Sharkey 2012, pp. 789 f.

  165. 165.

    Wagner 2011, p. 162. Neither does the Oxford Dictionary provide any clarification since it defines “excessive” as “more than is necessary, normal, or desirable; immoderate”. See English Oxford Dictionary (2018) Definition of excessive in English. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/excessive. Accessed 11 April 2019.

  166. 166.

    Egeland 2016, p. 104.

  167. 167.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 254; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 266; Sharkey 2010, p. 380; Wagner 2011, pp. 163 f.; Krupiy 2015, pp. 161, 171, 193, 194.

  168. 168.

    Herbach 2012, p. 18.

  169. 169.

    Egeland 2016, p. 117; Wagner 2011, p. 163; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 267.

  170. 170.

    Wagner 2011, p. 163.

  171. 171.

    Foy 2014, p. 61.

  172. 172.

    Ibid.

  173. 173.

    Toscano 2015, p. 211; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 267.

  174. 174.

    Grut 2013, p. 13; Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 32; Wagner 2011, pp. 163–165; Wagner 2016, para 19.

  175. 175.

    Wagner 2016, para 19.

  176. 176.

    Grut 2013, p. 13.

  177. 177.

    Krupiy 2015, p. 172.

  178. 178.

    Foy 2014, p. 61.

  179. 179.

    Liu 2012, p. 643; Toscano 2015, p. 211; Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 32; Herbach 2012, p. 19; Wagner 2011, p. 165; Thurnher 2016, p. 189; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 283; Sharkey 2010, p. 378; Schmitt 2013, p. 19; Foy 2014, pp. 59 f.

  180. 180.

    Hauptman 2013, p. 179; Liu 2012, p. 643; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 283. Sharkey agrees with this opinion and mainly bases his view on reasons of accountability while admitting that advanced systems may assist human decision-making, see Sharkey 2012, pp. 789 f. and Sharkey 2010, p. 380.

  181. 181.

    Thurnher 2016, p. 189; Schmitt 2013, p. 21.

  182. 182.

    Grut 2013, p. 13.

  183. 183.

    Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 282 f.

  184. 184.

    See above, Sect. 3.3.2.1.

  185. 185.

    See above, Sect. 3.3.1.

  186. 186.

    Singh Gill 2018, para 21.

  187. 187.

    United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, para 15.

  188. 188.

    See above, Sect. 3.3.1.

  189. 189.

    NATO Standardization Office 2016, paras 0102 f.

  190. 190.

    See also below, Sect. 3.3.4.3.

  191. 191.

    China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3. China’s overall position has however been interpreted as ambiguous, see Kania 2018.

  192. 192.

    Van den Boogaard 2015, p. 279; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 260. Van den Boogaard points out that Article 57 AP I is (partly) phrased in a way addressing humans.

  193. 193.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rules 15–21.

  194. 194.

    AP I, above n 15, Article 57(1).

  195. 195.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rules 16–21; AP I, above n 15, Article 57(2), (3).

  196. 196.

    Egeland 2016, p. 106; Herbach 2012, pp. 5, 18 f.

  197. 197.

    Toscano 2015, p. 212; Herbach 2012, p. 1; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 260 f.; Schmitt 2013, pp. 23–25; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 280. Schmitt and Thurnher conclude that the standard is one of reasonableness; Herbach speaks of practicability.

  198. 198.

    ICRC 2016, pp. 79 f.; Moyes 2016, p. 48.

  199. 199.

    UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para 69; Arkin 2008, pp. 124, 126; Schulzke 2011, pp. 300 f.; Toscano 2015, pp. 212, 230; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 260.

  200. 200.

    Egeland 2016, p. 106; Herbach 2012, pp. 15–17; van den Boogaard 2015, p. 280.

  201. 201.

    Herbach 2012, pp. 11 f.

  202. 202.

    Egeland 2016, p. 106.

  203. 203.

    Ibid.

  204. 204.

    See above, Sects. 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.

  205. 205.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 262; Schmitt 2013, p. 25; Thurnher 2016, p. 190; Herbach 2012, pp. 13 f.

  206. 206.

    Herbach 2012, pp. 17–19.

  207. 207.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 260 f.; Schmitt 2013, pp. 23 f.; Thurnher 2016, p. 190.

  208. 208.

    Herbach 2012, p. 8. He also opines that in-the-loop systems are the only current possibility since on-the-loop types do not always guarantee sufficient human action (ibid., p. 17). Homayounnejad proposes that LAWS able to learn independently could be programmed in a fashion that they are allowed to only learn “offline”, meaning not while deployed. This would yield a possibility to ensure supervision of such processes by humans. Another useful suggestion is the limitation of LAWS to strict target parameters. See Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 263, 265–267.

  209. 209.

    See, generally, O’Connell 2013, pp. 34–38; Corn 2013.

  210. 210.

    AP I, above n 15, Article 52(2); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 7; O’Connell 2013, pp. 34–38.

  211. 211.

    Foy 2014, p. 54; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 259; Schmitt 2013, p. 22.

  212. 212.

    Hauptman 2013, p. 171; Toscano 2015, p. 209.

  213. 213.

    Human Rights Watch 2012, pp. 34 f.; Foy 2014, p. 54; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 258; Schmitt 2013, p. 22.

  214. 214.

    Oeter 2013, p. 125, referring to the St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, opened for signature 11 December 1868, 138 CTS 297 (entered into force 11 December 1868).

  215. 215.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 70; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above n 5, paras 78 f.

  216. 216.

    Hauptman 2013, p. 172; van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 257 f.

  217. 217.

    Liu 2012, pp. 636–639; Sharkey 2012, p. 797.

  218. 218.

    Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 257 f.

  219. 219.

    UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 106–108. For detailed recommendations for conducting LAWS reviews, see Backstrom and Henderson 2012.

  220. 220.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, pp. 421–423, paras 1463, 1466; ICRC 2006, p. 933.

  221. 221.

    AP I, above n 15, Article 36.

  222. 222.

    Grut 2013, p. 9. Accepting the obligation under CIL at least regarding means: Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 271. The ICRC considers weapon reviews to be a (logical) part of CIHL, see ICRC 2006, p. 933.

  223. 223.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 71.

  224. 224.

    ICRC 2006, pp. 955 f.; Singh Gill 2018, para 39.

  225. 225.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 273 f.

  226. 226.

    Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 23; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 272; Sandoz et al. 1987, pp. 427 f., paras 1476–1478. In para 1476, Jean de Preaux opined: “if man does not master technology, but allows it to master him, he will be destroyed by technology.”

  227. 227.

    ICRC 2006, pp. 951 f.

  228. 228.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 273, 276.

  229. 229.

    ICRC 2006, pp. 938–945.

  230. 230.

    Toscano 2015, p. 208. See also above, Sect. 3.3.4.2.

  231. 231.

    AP I, above n 15, Article 51(4)(c); Toscano 2015, pp. 206 f.; Backstrom and Henderson 2012, p. 486; Egeland 2016, p. 96; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 250.

  232. 232.

    For the principle of distinction, see above, Sect. 3.3.1.

  233. 233.

    Toscano 2015, pp. 206–208.

  234. 234.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, pp. 10 f.; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 276; Thurnher 2016, p. 187. Not tied to Article 36 AP I but in general, this is disputed, see UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 89–97; Asaro 2012, pp. 696–700; van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 278, 279. See also above, Sect. 3.3.2.3.

  235. 235.

    See above, Sect. 3.3.1.

  236. 236.

    Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above n 5, paras 78, 84, 87.

  237. 237.

    AP I, above n 15, Article 1(2).

  238. 238.

    For overviews, see von Bernstorff 2009, para 13; Evans 2013, pp. 712–718, 722–725.

  239. 239.

    Evans 2013, p. 725.

  240. 240.

    Egeland 2016, p. 107.

  241. 241.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 275 f.; Schmitt 2013, p. 32.

  242. 242.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 275; Schmitt 2013, p. 32.

  243. 243.

    ICRC (2018) Ethics and autonomous weapon systems: An ethical basis for human control? UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.5, para 8.

  244. 244.

    Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 276; Schmitt 2013, p. 32.

  245. 245.

    ICRC (2018) Ethics and autonomous weapon systems: An ethical basis for human control? UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.5, para 73.

  246. 246.

    UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 89–97; Holy See 2017; Estonia, Finland (2018) Categorizing lethal autonomous weapons systems—A technical and legal perspective to understanding LAWS, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.2, paras 11–13.

  247. 247.

    Human Rights Watch 2012, pp. 34 f.; Asaro 2012, p. 700; ICRC 2018, paras 89, 97.

  248. 248.

    As Homayounnejad 2018, p. 275 frankly formulated: “context is king, […]”.

  249. 249.

    Singer 2009, p. 396: “[a] computer has no anger to make it lash out like at My Lai, but it also has no pity, no disgust, and no sense of guilt. [Everything is] just a series of zeros and ones.” Furthermore at p. 433: “In making war less human, we may also be making it less humane.” For ethical considerations, see Holy See 2017; Estonia, Finland (2018) Categorizing lethal autonomous weapons systems—A technical and legal perspective to understanding LAWS, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.2, paras 11–13.

  250. 250.

    Anderson and Waxman 2013, pp. 4 f.; IHRCRC and GJC 2012, pp. 131–140.

  251. 251.

    European Union 2018, p. 2; France and Germany 2018, p. 2; Kingdom of the Netherlands 2018, p. 2; Austria, Brazil, Chile (2018) Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-binding Instrument that addresses the Legal, Humanitarian and Ethical Concerns posed by Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.7; China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3; United Kingdom (2018) Human Machine Touchpoints: The United Kingdom’s perspective on human control over weapon development and targeting cycles, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.1, paras 6, 8, 10, 15; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, paras 1, 8; Singh Gill 2018, para 11.

  252. 252.

    Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2018) Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, para 26(b).

  253. 253.

    Russia agrees in principle but questions a universal standard, states should rather make such determinations independently, see Russian Federation 2018, paras 9, 11, 12. The United States has also commented rather critically, see United States 2018b Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, paras 42–53.

  254. 254.

    Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2018) Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, paras 32–35, 46–49.

  255. 255.

    This is also supported by many stakeholders, see, e.g., European Union 2018, p. 2; Kingdom of the Netherlands 2018, p. 2; Republic of Korea 2018, p. 2; China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3; Russian Federation (2018) Russia’s Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic Functions of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Context of the Purposes and Objectives of the Convention, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.6, paras 2, 12; United States (2018) Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4, paras 3, 35, 40; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, para 40; Singh Gill 2018, paras 21, 36, 41.

References

Articles, Books and Other Documents

  • AIV/CAVV (2015) Autonomous Weapon Systems: The Need for Meaningful Human Control, No. 97 AIV / No. 26 CAVV. https://aiv-advies.nl/download/606cb3b1-a800-4f8a-936f-af61ac991dd0.pdf. Accessed 16 April 2019

  • Amoroso D, Tamburrini G (2017) The Ethical and Legal Case Against Autonomy in Weapons Systems. Global Jurist 17(3):1–20

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson K, Waxman M (2013) Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can. http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Anderson-Waxman_LawAndEthics_r2_FINAL.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • Arkin RC (2008) Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture. Part I: Motivation and Philosophy. 3rd ACM/IEEE Conference on Human-Robot Interaction. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6249424. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • Asaro P (2012) On banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights, automation, and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making. International Review of the Red Cross 94(886):687–709

    Google Scholar 

  • Austria, Brazil, Chile (2018) Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-binding Instrument that addresses the Legal, Humanitarian and Ethical Concerns posed by Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.7

    Google Scholar 

  • Backstrom A, Henderson IS (2012) New capabilities in warfare: an overview of contemporary technological developments and the associated legal and engineering issues in Article 36 weapons reviews. International Review of the Red Cross 94(886):483–514

    Google Scholar 

  • Birnbacher D (2016) Are autonomous weapons systems a threat to human dignity? In: Bhuta N et al. (eds) Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 105–121

    Google Scholar 

  • Boothby WH (2016) Weapons under the Law of Military Operations. In: Gill TD, Fleck D (eds) The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 332–353

    Google Scholar 

  • Canellas MC, Haga RA (2015) Toward Meaningful Human Control of Autonomous Weapons Systems through Function Allocation. IEEE International Symposium on Technology in Society (ISTAS) Proceedings. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7439432. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7

    Google Scholar 

  • Corn GS (2013) Principle of Humanity. In: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Egeland K (2016) Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Humanitarian Law. Nordic Journal of International Law 85:89–118

    Google Scholar 

  • Estonia, Finland (2018) Categorizing lethal autonomous weapons systems – A technical and legal perspective to understanding LAWS, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.2

    Google Scholar 

  • European Union (2018) Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Group of Governmental Experts: Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/CCACABC4BCDB60B6C12582F8005C41D5/$file/2018_GGE+LAWS+2_6b_European+Union.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • Evans TD (2013) At War with the Robots: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Martens Clause. Hofstra Law Review 41(3):697–733

    Google Scholar 

  • Foy J (2014) Autonomous Weapons Systems: Taking the Human out of International Humanitarian Law. Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 23:47–70

    Google Scholar 

  • France (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.3

    Google Scholar 

  • France and Germany (2018) Meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Geneva, 9 to 13 April 2018: Statement by France and Germany. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/895931D082ECE219C12582720056F12F/$file/2018_LAWSGeneralExchange_Germany-France.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2017) Report of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN Doc. CCW/ GGE.1/2017/CRP.1

    Google Scholar 

  • Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2018) Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3

    Google Scholar 

  • Grut C (2013) The Challenge of Autonomous Lethal Robotics to International Humanitarian Law. Journal of Conflict & Security Law 18(1):5–23

    Google Scholar 

  • Hauptman A (2013) Autonomous Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict. Military Law Review 218:170–195

    Google Scholar 

  • Henckaerts JM, Doswald-Beck L (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Henderson IS, Keane P, Liddy J (2017) Remote and autonomous warfare systems: precautions in attack and individual accountability. In: Ohlin JD (ed) Research Handbook on Remote Warfare. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp. 335–370

    Google Scholar 

  • Herbach JD (2012) Into the Caves of Steel: Precaution, Cognition and Robotic Weapon Systems under the International Law of Armed Conflict. Amsterdam Law Forum 4:3–20

    Google Scholar 

  • Holy See (2017) The Humanization of Robots and the Robotization of the Human Person: Ethical Reflections on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and Augmented Soldiers. The Caritas in Veritate Foundation Working Papers. http://www.fciv.org/downloads/WP9-Book.pdf. Accessed 17 April 2018

  • Homayounnejad M (2018) Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems Under the Law of Armed Conflict. Forthcoming (as of December 2018; on file with the author)

    Google Scholar 

  • Human Rights Watch (2012) Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • ICRAC (2018) Guidelines for the human control of weapons systems. Working Paper for CCW GGE. https://www.icrac.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Sharkey_Guideline-for-the-human-control-of-weapons-systems_ICRAC-WP3_GGE-April-2018.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • ICRC (2006) A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977. International Review of the Red Cross 88(864):931–956

    Google Scholar 

  • ICRC (2009) Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation of Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • ICRC (2013) The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Interplay Between the Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement Paradigms. Expert Meeting. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4171.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • ICRC (2016) Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications of Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of Weapons. Expert Meeting. https://shop.icrc.org/icrc/pdf/view/id/2378. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • ICRC (2018) Ethics and autonomous weapon systems: An ethical basis for human control? UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.5

    Google Scholar 

  • ICTY (2000) Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • IHRCRC, GJC (2012) Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan. https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • Kania E (2018) China’s Strategic Ambiguity and Shifting Approach to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Lawfare Blog. https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-strategic-ambiguity-and-shifting-approach-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • Kingdom of the Netherlands (2018) Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS: Statement of the Netherlands delivered by H.E. Robbert Gabriëlse, Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/30165DBD739441F9C125827200572DDC/$file/2018_LAWSGeneralExchange_Netherlands.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • Kleffner JK (2013) Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law. In: Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 43–78

    Google Scholar 

  • Krupiy T (2015) Of Souls, Spirits and Ghosts: Transposing the Application of the Rules of Targeting to Lethal Autonomous Robots. Melbourne Journal of International Law 16:145–202

    Google Scholar 

  • Liu HY (2012) Categorization and legality of autonomous and remote weapons systems. International Review of the Red Cross 94(886):627–652

    Google Scholar 

  • Margulies P (2017) Making autonomous weapons accountable: command responsibility for computer-guided lethal force in armed conflicts. In: Ohlin JD (ed) Research Handbook on Remote Warfare. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp. 405–442

    Google Scholar 

  • McFarland T (2015) Factors shaping the legal implications of increasingly autonomous military systems. International Review of the Red Cross 97(900):1313–1339

    Google Scholar 

  • Meier MW (2017) The strategic implications of lethal autonomous weapons. In: Ohlin JD (ed) Research Handbook on Remote Warfare. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp. 443–478

    Google Scholar 

  • Moyes R (2016) Meaningful human control over individual attacks: Speaker’s summary. In: ICRC (ed) Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications of Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of Weapons. Expert Meeting. https://shop.icrc.org/icrc/pdf/view/id/2378. Accessed 11 April 2019, pp. 46–52 (on behalf of Article 36, UK)

  • NATO Standardization Office (2016) Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting. Ed A Version 1, AJP-3.9. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/628215/20160505-nato_targeting_ajp_3_9.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • O’Connell ME (2013) Historical Development and Legal Basis. In: Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1–42

    Google Scholar 

  • Oeter S (2013) Methods and Means of Combat. In: Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 115–230

    Google Scholar 

  • Republic of Korea (2018) Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Statement by H.E. Ambassador Inchul Kim. Agenda Item 5. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C4C9A800486BA81DC125827200572EE6/$file/2018_LAWSGeneralExchange_RoK.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • Russian Federation (2018) Russia’s Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic Functions of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Context of the Purposes and Objectives of the Convention, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.6

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandoz Y, Swinarski C, Zimmermann B (1987) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Martinus Nijhoff/ICRC, Geneva

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt MN (2013) Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics. Harvard National Security Journal Features. https://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf. Accessed 17 April 2019

  • Schmitt MN, Thurnher JS (2013) “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict. Harvard National Security Journal 4(2):231–281

    Google Scholar 

  • Schulzke M (2011) Robots as Weapons in Just Wars. Philosophy & Technology 24:293–306

    Google Scholar 

  • Sharkey NE (2010) Saying ‘No!’ to Lethal Autonomous Targeting. Journal of Military Ethics 9(4):369–383

    Google Scholar 

  • Sharkey NE (2012) The evitability of autonomous robot warfare. International Review of the Red Cross 94(886):787–799

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer PW (2009) Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. Penguin Books, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Singh Gill A (2018) Chair’s summary of the discussion of the 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. In: Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2018) Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, pp. 11–22

    Google Scholar 

  • Thurnher JS (2016) Means and Methods of the Future: Autonomous Systems. In: Ducheine PAL et al. (eds) Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, pp. 177–200

    Google Scholar 

  • Toscano CP (2015) Friend of Humans: An Argument for Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems. Journal of National Security Law & Policy 8:189–246

    Google Scholar 

  • UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47

    Google Scholar 

  • UN Institute for Disarmament Research (2014) Framing Discussions on the Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies. http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/framing-discussions-on-the-weaponization-of-increasingly-autonomous-technologies-en-606.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • UN Institute for Disarmament Research (2018) The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Artificial Intelligence: a primer for CCW delegates. http://www.unidir.ch/files/publications/pdfs/the-weaponization-of-increasingly-autonomous-technologies-artificial-intelligence-en-700.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • United Kingdom (2018) Human Machine Touchpoints: The United Kingdom’s perspective on human control over weapon development and targeting cycles, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.1

    Google Scholar 

  • United States (2018) Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4

    Google Scholar 

  • United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4

    Google Scholar 

  • US Department of Defense (2012) Autonomy in Weapon Systems. Directive 3000.09. http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2019

  • Van den Boogaard J (2015) Proportionality and Autonomous Weapons Systems. Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 6:247–283

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Bernstorff J (2009) Martens Clause. In: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner M (2011) Taking Humans out of the Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law. Journal of Law and Information Science 21:155–165

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner M (2016) Autonomous Weapon Systems. In: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams AP (2015) Defining Autonomy in Systems: Challenges and Solutions. In: Williams AP, Scharre PD (eds) Autonomous Systems: Issues for Defence Policymakers. NATO Communications and Information Agency, The Hague, pp. 27–62

    Google Scholar 

Cases

  • ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep 226

    Google Scholar 

  • ICTY, Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion, 5 December 2003, Case No. IT-98-29-T

    Google Scholar 

  • ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1

    Google Scholar 

Treaties

  • Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of the War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907, International Peace Conference, The Hague, Official Record 206 (entered into force 26 January 1910)

    Google Scholar 

  • Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950)

    Google Scholar 

  • Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950)

    Google Scholar 

  • Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950)

    Google Scholar 

  • Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 8 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950)

    Google Scholar 

  • Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978)

    Google Scholar 

  • Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978)

    Google Scholar 

  • St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, opened for signature 11 December 1868, 138 CTS 297 (entered into force 11 December 1868)

    Google Scholar 

  • Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature 26 June 1945, USTS 993 (entered into force 24 October 1945)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hamburg, Germany

    Matthias Brenneke

Authors
  1. Matthias Brenneke
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Matthias Brenneke .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Criminal Law Section, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Terry D. Gill

  2. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Robin Geiß

  3. Department of Law/Public Law, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Heike Krieger

  4. Research Department, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Christophe Paulussen

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Brenneke, M. (2020). Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and Their Compatibility with International Humanitarian Law: A Primer on the Debate. In: Gill, T., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Paulussen, C. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 21 (2018). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 21. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-343-6_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-343-6_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-342-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-343-6

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation