Abstract
In the aftermath of several incidents involving private military and security companies (PMSCs) in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many have argued that PMSCs were operating in a ‘legal black hole’ where no law applied. Since then, the use of PMSCs in war zones has continued and—due to new circumstances—evolved. Indeed, States still heavily rely on contractors in wars all around the world and due to a digitalization process PMSCs fulfil an ever-broader range of functions. Despite the clear picture of the private security sector that many believe they have, the term ‘PMSC’ now describes a wide array of private actors with very different profiles. In tandem, a regulation for PMSCs has also been developed in recent years. In 2008, the Montreux Document was signed. This instrument defines how international law applies to the activities of PMSCs when they are operating in an armed conflict zone. Two years later, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers was finalized. At the same time, several countries have passed regulations on the use of PMSCs on their own territory and abroad. This chapter examines and categorizes the existing market, as well as new forms of private security services that have developed in recent years. Furthermore, it analyses how international humanitarian law can and should be applied to the different types of services offered. Finally, it provides an overview of the existing international initiatives aimed at regulating PMSCs and briefly examines, in this respect, different examples of national regulation.
The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the authors alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the FDFA.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
Prince E (2017) Contractors, Not Troops, Will Save Afghanistan, The New York Times, 30 August 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/opinion/erik-prince-contractors-afghanistan.html. Accessed 3 December 2018.
- 2.
Examples of this development include the Russian PMSC ‘Wagner Group’ (see footnote 45 below) and the Turkish PMSC SADAT AS International Defense Consulting. Jacinto L (2017) Turkey’s Post-Coup Purge and Erdogan’s Private Army, Foreign Policy, 13 July 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/13/turkeys-post-coup-purge-and-erdogans-private-army-sadat-perincek-gulen/. Accessed 3 December 2018.
- 3.
The notion of mercenaries will be discussed in Sect. 3.3.1.1 of this chapter.
- 4.
Tonkin 2011, p 39.
- 5.
UN Human Rights Council 2010.
- 6.
Ibid., Article 2(b).
- 7.
Ibid., Article 2(c).
- 8.
The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict (2008), Preface number 9. https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/Montreux-Broschuere_en.pdf. Accessed 3 December 2018. For more on the Montreux Document, see below Sect. 3.4.2.1.
- 9.
The Swiss law also includes these elements within its definition of private security services. See Article 4(a)(6) of the Swiss Federal Act on Private Security Services provided Abroad (PSSA) of 27 September 2013, entered into force on 1 September 2015, SR 935.41. https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20122320/index.html. Accessed 3 December 2018.
- 10.
Percy 2012, p 945.
- 11.
Singer 2003, pp 91–95.
- 12.
Ibid., p 91.
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
For a ‘Tip of the Spear’ framework regarding offensive cyber operations, see Maurer 2018, p 15.
- 15.
The ICoC is the result of a multi-stakeholder initiative: it is supported by States, companies active in the private security sector as well as non-profit organizations. It contains standards and principles for the responsible provision of private security services. It aims to create better governance, compliance and accountability of private security companies.
- 16.
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, 9 November 2010. https://www.icoca.ch/sites/all/themes/icoca/assets/icoc_english3.pdf. Accessed 3 December 2018. For more on the ICoC, see Sect. 3.4.2.2 below.
- 17.
Ibid., Section D, para 13.
- 18.
Ibid., Section B. Companies that do not operate in complex environments, however, may still adopt the Code of Conduct and become members of the Association which was created in order to promote, govern and oversee implementation of the ICoC. See Sect. 3.4.2.2.
- 19.
See for example regarding the private security service market in Africa, DCAF 2017b, p 35 and ff.
- 20.
Dunn-Cavelty 2016, p 89.
- 21.
- 22.
Liu 2015, p 3.
- 23.
Control Risk, a UK based security company, offers a range of services with regard to cyber security. Control Risk n.d.
- 24.
In fact, the ‘big four’ – Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers – consulting firms are now also the largest security consulting firms with a combined revenue of about 8.5 billion dollars. Consultancy.uk 2017, The world’s top 10 largest cybersecurity | security consulting firms, 4 September 2017. https://www.consultancy.uk/news/13927/the-worlds-top-10-largest-cybersecurity-security-consulting-firms. Accessed 3 December 2018.
- 25.
- 26.
MPRI was established in 1987. As of 2012, it has been integrated to the independent company Engility. See Engility 2018. https://www.engility.com/about-us/history/. Accessed 3 December 2018.
- 27.
For a detailed account of MPRI’s operations in Croatia, see Singer 2003, p 124.
- 28.
DCAF 2017b, p 36.
- 29.
See DynCorp International n.d.
- 30.
For example, the leak of e-mails from the US Democratic National Committee in 2016, attributed to the group FancyBear and, subsequently, to Russian secret services, was identified by the US cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike. Fryer-Biggs Z (2017) Who Is Attacking America Now? Russian Group Behind DNC Hack Targets Cyber Experts, Newsweek, 3 November 2017. http://www.newsweek.com/who-attacking-america-russian-group-behind-dnc-hack-700607. Accessed 23 April 2019.
- 31.
One example of a large company that provides these types of services is Booz Allen Hamilton. Booz Allen Hamilton n.d.
- 32.
See, for example, RUAG Group n.d.
- 33.
Singer 2003, p 97.
- 34.
Seiberth 2014, p 53.
- 35.
See Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2016. Under the Swiss PSSA 2015, above n. 9, catering troops or laundry services are not considered to constitute military or logistical support as they lack a direct connection to the primary functions of the armed forces.
- 36.
- 37.
Erbel and Kinsey 2016, p 73.
- 38.
Woltag 2014, p 238.
- 39.
In 2014, about 17,000 of Lockheed Martin’s employees worked in logistics and sustainment related functions, representing 26% of its total revenue. Lockheed Martin 2017. In addition, Lockheed Martin offers Special Operations Forces Global Logistics Support Services, which is the US Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) largest service contract, providing a wide range of tailored logistics, maintenance and sustainment services. See Lockheed Martin n.d.
- 40.
According to their homepage, Raytheon provides operation, maintenance and systems sustainment services and delivers full life-cycle modernization and support for air, land and sea-based electronics and weapons systems to 542 sites in 80 countries. Raytheon n.d.
- 41.
General Dynamics’ European Land Systems (GDELS) provides individual logistic and maintenance services through active support in the operational area. It tailors its Integrated Logistic Support solution to each of its customers’ specific requirements on the advice of their specialists. See GDELS n.d.
- 42.
Maurer 2018, p 18.
- 43.
Mazzeti et al. (2019) A New Age of Warfare: How Internet Mercenaries Do Battle for Authoritarian Governments, The New York Times, 21 March 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/us/politics/government-hackers-nso-darkmatter.html. Accessed 9 May 2019.
- 44.
- 45.
Tonkin 2011, p 40.
- 46.
Executive Outcomes officially dissolved in January 1999, allegedly due to, among other things, the ‘Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill’ of 1997 in South Africa regarding the activities of private military services. Singer 2003, p 117, with further references. Sandline International ceased its operations in April 2014 because of ‘[t]he general lack of governmental support for Private Military Companies willing to help end armed conflicts’. See Sandline n.d. Blackwater was first renamed ‘Xe Services LLC’, was then purchased by private investors in 2011, and then renamed again to ‘Academi’. Academi is now part of Constellis Holdings. Tran M (2014) Blackwater considered itself above the law, US state department was warned, The Guardian, 30 June 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/blackwater-security-firm-above-law-us-state-department-killed-17-iraqis. Accessed 3 December 2018.
- 47.
Wagner Group is a PMSC based in Russia which reportedly plays a key role in the wars in Syria and Ukraine. On 7 February 2018, it is estimated that about 100 of Wagner’s employees were killed in retaliatory US airstrikes near the town of Deir al-Zour in Syria. Taylor A (2018) What we know about the shadowy Russian mercenary firm behind an attack on U.S. troops in Syria, The Washington Post, 23 February 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/23/what-we-know-about-the-shadowy-russian-mercenary-firm-behind-the-attack-on-u-s-troops-in-syria/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f1a101823844. Accessed 3 December 2018. The Russian government denied any connection to the casualties. Nonetheless, there are strong indicators that the Wagner Group is operating on behalf or, at the very least, with the knowledge of the Russian government. Hauer N (2018) Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries, The Atlantic, 27 August 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/russian-mercenaries-wagner-africa/568435/. Accessed 7 February 2019. Before their rather public involvement in Syria, there were reports about Wagner’s involvement in the war in Ukraine as well. The Economist (2017) How “Wagner” came to Syria, 2 November 2017. https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21730873-captured-soldiers-cast-light-work-shadowy-group-how-wagner-came-syria. Accessed 7 February 2019.
- 48.
Schmitt 2017, p 1.
- 49.
Ibid., p 430; Woltag 2014, pp 242–243.
- 50.
Singer 2004, pp 524–525.
- 51.
- 52.
The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict (2008), Statement 24. https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/Montreux-Broschuere_en.pdf. Accessed 3 December 2018.
- 53.
- 54.
Debarre 2016, p 442.
- 55.
Clapham 2006, p 299.
- 56.
Rona 2017.
- 57.
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, opened for signature 4 December 1989, 2163 UNTS 75, entered into force 20 October 2001.
- 58.
UN General Assembly 1989, p 4.
- 59.
See for example Point 7.6 of the Constellis Group’s Code of Conduct, which states that ‘… as a private company employing private citizens to work in hostile areas that often have a large military presence, the Company and its employees are considered Non-Combatants under the Law of War. Company employees must never take actions that would result in their being considered Unlawful Combatants by virtue of direct participation in an armed conflict or armed hostilities.’ Constellis 2017. The Constellis Group has taken over several major PMSCs in recent years including Academi, Olive Group and Triple Canopy.
- 60.
Doswald-Beck 2007, p 122.
- 61.
Sheehy et al. 2008, p 155.
- 62.
Doswald-Beck 2007, p 123. The two final criteria regarding membership, or rather non-membership in the armed forces, will be discussed in the following section.
- 63.
Neumann W and Dobbert S 2017 Putin’s Mercenaries, Zeit Online, 6 February 2017. http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-02/russia-vladimir-putin-military-mercenary-soldiers-syria/komplettansicht. Accessed 3 December 2018.
- 64.
Ibid.
- 65.
Recent reports indicate that Wagner Group is now also active in African Countries such as the Central African Republic. Seddon and Wilson 2018, Journalists’ deaths highlight Russia’s moves into Africa, Financial Times, 21 August 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/7e55b796-9cac-11e8-9702-5946bae86e6d (link no longer available). Accessed 3 December 2018. For Sudan, see Stratfor 2018 Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground, 15 January 2018. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-revisits-old-cold-war-battleground, Accessed 6 February 2019. And for Venezuela, Roth A 2019 Russian mercenaries reportedly in Venezuela to protect Maduro, The Guardian, 25 January 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/25/venezuela-maduro-russia-private-security-contractors. Accessed 6 February 2019. Since the Russian military is not actively involved in the conflicts in those countries, the assessment of the status of Wagner Group employees may differ depending of the kinds of services provided in those contexts.
- 66.
Sossai 2009, p 3.
- 67.
Cameron and Chetail 2013, p 390.
- 68.
Singer 2003, pp 110–115.
- 69.
Schmitt 2005, p 524.
- 70.
- 71.
- 72.
Doswald-Beck 2007, p 119. However, she questions whether the same would be the case for a PMSC that is subcontracted by another company.
- 73.
Cameron and Chetail, pp 393–401. The authors discuss and dismiss the idea that PMSCs must be under the effective or overall control of a State in order to belong to it. In addition, they argue that the criterion that States accept that PMSC fight on their behalf is the only logical distinction from the category of civilians that accompany the armed forces.
- 74.
- 75.
Cameron and Chetail 2013, p 404. For example, the US Department of Defense (DoD) generally does not allow contractor personnel to wear military uniforms. However, for operational reasons, commanders can authorize contractor personnel to wear standard uniform. US Department of Defense 201, DoD Instruction 3020.41, p 20. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/302041p.pdf. Accessed 17 June 2019.
- 76.
Ibid., p 405.
- 77.
Sossai 2009, p 4.
- 78.
See Cameron and Chetail 2013, p 393, n. 26 for a list of authors who either think it is possible or not.
- 79.
Cameron and Chetail 2013, p 407.
- 80.
Ibid., p 408.
- 81.
Ibid.
- 82.
Boldt 2005, pp 514–515.
- 83.
Cameron and Chetail 2013, p 409.
- 84.
Ibid.
- 85.
Ibid., p 410.
- 86.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1978 (AP I), Article 50; and Seiberth 2014, p 109.
- 87.
Cameron and Chetail 2013, p 103.
- 88.
According to Pictet, carrying an identity card is not a constitutive requirement for POW status, but acts as a safeguard for the civilian carrying it. See Pictet 1960, p 64.
- 89.
For example, according to instructions of the US DoD, civilian personnel supporting the armed forces may be identified as ‘persons accompanying the armed forces’. Debarre 2016, p 443.
- 90.
Arguably, this would not be the case for the transport of ammunition to the front line, as this action would constitute direct participation in hostilities. Melzer 2009, p 56.
- 91.
- 92.
Bellal 2018, p 17.
- 93.
Doswald-Beck 2007, p 126.
- 94.
Renz 2017, p 311.
- 95.
Ibid., with further references.
- 96.
Ibid., p 313.
- 97.
- 98.
- 99.
Melzer 2009, p 36.
- 100.
Ibid., p 34.
- 101.
For a detailed analysis of ‘combatant’ status in NIACs, see Cameron and Chetail 2013, pp 412–418.
- 102.
Sassòli 2013, p 119.
- 103.
Melzer 2009, pp 1–85.
- 104.
Ibid., p 46.
- 105.
Ibid., p 47.
- 106.
Sossai 2009, p 12.
- 107.
Renz 2017, p 315.
- 108.
Melzer 2009, p 51.
- 109.
Sossai 2009, p 11, with further references.
- 110.
Melzer 2009, p 54.
- 111.
Ibid., p 55.
- 112.
Ibid., p 58.
- 113.
Ibid., p 59.
- 114.
Ibid., p 61.
- 115.
Schmitt 2017, p 429.
- 116.
Ibid., p 430.
- 117.
Woltag 2014, p 246.
- 118.
Debarre 2016, pp 457–459.
- 119.
Ibid., p 458.
- 120.
Melzer 2009, p 56.
- 121.
Schmitt 2005, p 544.
- 122.
Debarre 2016, p 459.
- 123.
Schmitt 2005, p 543.
- 124.
- 125.
Boldt 2005, p 521.
- 126.
Schmitt 2005, p 543.
- 127.
Ibid., p 538.
- 128.
Sossai 2009, p 12.
- 129.
Schmitt 2005, pp 538–539.
- 130.
UN Commission on Human Rights 2005.
- 131.
Entenza 2016, p 211.
- 132.
UN Human Rights Council 2010.
- 133.
Ibid.
- 134.
Cameron and Chetail 2013, p 572.
- 135.
UN General Assembly 2017, p 9.
- 136.
Ibid.
- 137.
Ibid.
- 138.
This included Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ukraine, United States of America. At the time of writing, the Montreux Document (2008) is supported by 55 States and 3 international organizations.
- 139.
White 2012, p 13.
- 140.
Entenza 2016, p 237.
- 141.
Some authors, such as White, argue that PMSCs are actually more likely to violate IHRL rather than IHL since they are often active in post-conflict situations. See White 2012, p 13.
- 142.
van Amstel and Rodenhäuser 2016, p 6.
- 143.
The Federal Council (2014) Private military and security companies: Montreux Document participants Forum to continue working on implementation, 16 December 2014. https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-55689.html. Accessed 6 February 2019.
- 144.
Percy 2012, p 954.
- 145.
International Code of Conduct Association n.d. Frequently Asked Questions.
- 146.
van Amstel and Rodenhäuser 2016, p 7.
- 147.
ICoC, paras 6, 21 and 24.
- 148.
ICoC, paras 11, 12 and 13.
- 149.
These are the following: Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
- 150.
International Code of Conduct Association 2016.
- 151.
Namely ISO 18788, ISO 28007, PSC.1. International Code of Conduct Association n.d. Certification.
- 152.
International Code of Conduct Association 2017.
- 153.
Montreux +5 Conference (2013), Chairs’ Conclusions. http://www.mdforum.ch/pdf/2013-12-13-Montreux-5-Conference-Chairs-Conclusions_en.pdf. Accessed 23 April 2018; Cottier 2006, p 638.
- 154.
DCAF 2017b, p 19.
- 155.
Ibid.
- 156.
Ibid., p 48; Cottier 2006, p 646.
- 157.
Cottier 2006, p 647.
- 158.
For a detailed list of best practices, see DCAF 2016.
- 159.
Cottier 2006, p 640.
- 160.
DCAF 2017a.
- 161.
For example, Section 7 (Articles 30–36) of the Swiss PSSA 2015, above n. 9, forms a statutory basis for the contracting of security companies by the Swiss Federal authorities in complex environments and defines the minimal requirements with respect to the companies concerned. In particular, the provisions determine the requirements of the contracted PMSCs with regard to training, equipment and internal control mechanisms. In addition, the Swiss PSSA (2015) requires the contracted company to become a signatory of the Code of Conduct.
- 162.
US Department of State (2013) State Department to Incorporate International Code of Conduct into Worldwide Protective Services Contracts, 16 August 2013. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/08/213212.htm. Accessed 20 April 2019.
- 163.
One example is South Africa, which regulated certain activities of South African PMSCs operating abroad through the ‘Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill’ of 1997. For a detailed account of the South African regulatory framework, see Bosch et al. 2016, p 50. The US, on the other hand, regulates certain activities of US-based PMSCs via their export control regime, namely, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. For a detailed examination of this approach, see Caparini 2007.
- 164.
Swiss PSSA 2015, above n. 9, Article 2.
- 165.
For an outline of the specific procedures, see Swiss PSSA 2015, above n. 9, Articles 10–14.
- 166.
Swiss PSSA 2015, above n. 9, Article 1 lays out the goals of the act, namely, to contribute to safeguarding the internal and external security of Switzerland, the realisation of Switzerland’s foreign policy objectives, the preservation of Swiss neutrality and the respect for international law, in particular, human rights and IHL.
- 167.
See Swiss PSSA 2015, above n. 9, Articles 8 and 4. With regard to the notion of direct participation in hostilities, the accompanying message makes clear that the ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance is the point of reference for the interpretation of Swiss PSSA 2015, Article 8. See The Swiss Federal Council 2013.
- 168.
Sassòli 2013, p 117.
References
Bellal A (2018) The War Report. The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva.
Boldt N (2005) Outsourcing War: Private Military Companies and International Humanitarian Law. German Yearbook of International Law 47:502–544.
Booz Allen Hamilton (n.d.) Cybersecurity. https://www.boozallen.com/expertise/cyber.html. Accessed 2 February 2019.
Bosch S et al. (2016) Mercenaries or legitimate actors? South African regulation of PMSCs. In: Schaub G Jr, Kelty R (eds) Private Military and Security Contractors. Controlling the Corporate Warrior. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham.
Cameron L, Chetail V (2013) Private Military and Security Companies under Public International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Caparini M (2007) Domestic regulation. In: Chesterman S, Lehnardt C (eds) From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies. Oxford Scholarship, Oxford, pp 158–178.
Carmola K (2010) Private Security Contractors and New Wars: Risk, law, and ethics. Routledge, London/New York.
Clapham A (2006) Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Constellis (2017) Code of Business Ethics & Conduct. http://docs.constellisgroup.com/Group_Code_of_Conduct.pdf. Accessed 23 April 2018.
Control Risk (n.d.) Cyber Security. https://www.controlrisks.com/our-services/creating-a-secure-organisation/cyber-security. Accessed 3 December 2018.
Cottier M (2006) Elements for contracting and regulating private security and military companies. International Review of the Red Cross 88(863):637–663.
DCAF (2016) Legislative Guidance Tool for States to Regulate Private Military and Security Companies. https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Legislative-Guidance-Tool-EN_1.pdf. Accessed 6 February 2019.
DCAF (2017a) Guidance Tool for Contracting Private Military and Security Services (PMSCs), p 13. http://www.mdforum.ch/pdf/contract-guidance-tool.pdf. Accessed 7 February 2019.
DCAF (2017b) The Montreux Document: A Mapping study on Outreach and Implementation, Burdzy AM (ed) www.mdforum.ch/pdf/mapping-study.pdf. Accessed 7 February 2019.
Debarre A S (2016) U.S.-Hired Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict: Indirect Participation and its Consequences. Harvard National Security Journal 7:437–468.
Doswald-Beck L (2007) Private military and security companies under international humanitarian law. In: Chesterman S, Lehnardt C (eds) From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies. Oxford Scholarship, Oxford, pp 115–138.
Dunigan M (2016) The Consequences of Outsourcing Military Support Functions. In: Berndtsson J, Kinsey C (eds) Routledge Research Companion to Security Outsourcing. Routledge, London/New York, pp 241–256.
Dunn-Cavelty M (2016) Cyber-Security and Private Actors. In: Abrahamsen R, Leander A (eds) Routledge Handbook of Private Security Services. Routledge, London/New York, pp 89–99.
DynCorp International (n.d.) What We Do. Training. http://www.dyn-intl.com/what-we-do/training/. Accessed 3 February 2019.
Entenza H (2016) Les obligations et la responsabilité de l’Etat face aux activités des entreprises militaires et de sécurité privées. Helbing Lichtenhahn, Basel.
Erbel M, Kinsey C (2016) Privatizing Military Logistics. In: Abrahamsen R, Leander A (eds) Routledge Handbook of Private Security Services. Routledge, London/New York, pp 70–78.
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (2016) Guidelines to the Federal Act on Private Security Services provided Abroad (PSSA). https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/sicherheitspolitik/wegleitung-BPS-ausland_EN.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2019.
General Dynamics’ European Land Systems (GDELS) (n.d.) Integrated Logistic Support. https://www.gdels.com/ils.php. Accessed 3 December 2018.
Hoffman W, Levite A (2017) Private Sector Cyber Defense. Can Active Measures Help Stabilize Cyberspace? http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/06/14/private-sector-cyber-defense-can-active-measures-help-stabilize-cyberspace-pub-71236. Accessed 3 December 2018.
International Code of Conduct Association (n.d.) Frequently Asked Questions. https://www.icoca.ch/en/frequently-asked-questions. Accessed 3 December 2018.
International Code of Conduct Association (n.d.) Certification. Certification. https://www.icoca.ch/en/certification. Accessed 6 February 2019.
International Code of Conduct Association (2016) Minutes of the 2016 ICoCA Annual General Assembly. https://www.icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/Annual%20General%20Assembly%20Minutes.zip. Accessed 6 February 2019.
International Code of Conduct Association (2017) Transitional Membership Process. https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/uploads/Amendment%20to%20AoA%20-%20Transitional%20Membership_Explanatory%20note%20for%20website%20PDF.pdf. Accessed 6 February 2019.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2005) Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: Summary Report. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/2005-09-report-dph-2005-icrc.pdf. Accessed 6 February 2019.
Liu H-Y (2015) Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare as Emerging Gaps in Private Military and Security Company Regulation: Thoughts for the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries.http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Event2015/HinYanLiu.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2018.
Lockheed Martin (n.d.) Special Operations Forces Global Logistics Support Services. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/soflogistics.html. Accessed 3 December 2018.
Lockheed Martin (2017) Logistics and Sustainment. https://web.archive.org/web/20171011025120. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/what-we-do/aerospace-defense/logistics-sustainment.html. Accessed 6 February 2019.
Maurer T (2018) Cyber Mercenaries. The State, Hackers, and Power. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Melzer N (2009) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law. ICRC, Geneva.
Melzer N (2013) Status of Private Military Security Companies under International Humanitarian Law. In: D’Aboville B (ed) Private Military and Security Companies. 35th Round Table on Current Issues of International Law. Franco Angeli, Milan, pp 99–107.
Percy S (2012) Regulating the private security industry: a story of regulating the last war. International Review of the Red Cross 94(997):941–960.
Pictet JS (1960) Commentary to the III Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.
Raytheon (n.d.) Mission Support. https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/missionsupport. Accessed 3 December 2018.
Renz F (2017) The Role of Private Military and Security Companies: Corporate Dogs of War or Civilians Operating in Hostile Environments? Swiss Review of International and European Law 3:305–332.
Rona G (2017) When is a Mercenary (Not) a Mercenary? The Case of Foreign Fighters in the UAE’s Military. https://www.justsecurity.org/41055/mercenary-not-mercenary-case-foreign-fighters-uaes-military/. Accessed 23 April 2018.
RUAG Group (n.d.) RUAG Cyber Security. https://www.ruag.com/en/products-services/land/cyber-security. Accessed 23 April 2018.
Sandline (n.d.). http://www.sandline.com/. Accessed 23 April 2018.
Sassòli M (2013) International Law and the Use and Conduct of Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict. ICIP Research 01:109–126.
Schmitt M (2005) Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees. Chicago Journal of International Law 5(2):511–546.
Schmitt M (ed) (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the international law applicable to cyber operations, prepared by the International Groups of experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Seiberth C (2014) Private Military and Security Companies in International Law. Intersentia, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland.
Sheehy B, Maogoto J, Newell V (2008) Legal Control of the Private Military Corporation. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Singer P (2003) Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.
Singer P (2004) War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law. Privatized Military Firms and International Law. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 42(2):521–549.
Sossai M (2009) Status of PMSC Personnel in the Laws of War. The Question of Direct Participation in Hostilities. EUI Working Paper AEL 2009(6):1–25.
The Swiss Federal Council (2013) Message concernant la loi fédérale sur les prestations de sécurité privées fournies à l’étranger. https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2013/1573.pdf. Accessed 6 February 2019.
Tonkin H (2011) State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
UN Commission on Human Rights (2005) The Use of Mercenaries As a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination. UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/2.
UN General Assembly (1989) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. UN Doc. A/44/43, Supplement No. 43.
UN General Assembly (2017) Report of the open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies on its sixth session. UN Doc. A/HRC/36/36.
UN Human Rights Council (2010) Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination. UN Doc. A/HRC/15/25 Annex (Draft Convention).
van Amstel N, Rodenhäuser T (2016) The Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct: Understanding the relationship between international initiatives to regulate the global private security industry. DCAF, Geneva.
White N (2012) Regulatory Initiatives at the International Level. In: Bakker C, Sossai M (eds) Multilevel Regulation of Military and Security Contractors. The Interplay between International, European and Domestic Norms. Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland.
Woltag J-C (2014) Cyber Warfare: Military Cross-Border Computer Network Operations under International Law. Intersentia, Cambridge.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gasser, M., Malzacher, M. (2020). Beyond Banning Mercenaries: The Use of Private Military and Security Companies Under IHL. In: Heffes, E., Kotlik, M., Ventura, M. (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-339-9_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-339-9_3
Published:
Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague
Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-338-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-339-9
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)