Abstract
The current economic crisis has challenged the democratic model of representation within the European Union. The author mentions three fundamental tensions that characterize the legal position of EU states: First, the tension between national sovereignty and economic stability; second, the tension between executive and legislative powers; third, the tension of the gradual introduction and development of redistributive policies at the European level. According to the author, the debate on the ‘democratic deficit’ is still alive. One of the strongest points of critique on the entire EU has been that there is no concrete democratic path for the national governments. Many measures have been taken to address the economic crisis, such as treaties and soft law instruments. These have led to a new EU Economic Governance Model, where public finance and macroeconomic policies of member states are being coordinated. EU institutions are, on one hand, involved via the European Semester and on the other hand via special procedures in case of problems. The author considers the role of the European Parliament still weak in this issue, as it has no real powers. Arguments therefore arise for stronger national parliaments, for example to compensate this lack of power. The author reminds that national governments are still the key players in defining national economic policies. Although the procedural role of national parliaments in the EU dominates, the author claims that the essential issue is which substantive roles they must pursue in the field of economics.
Associate professor of European Law at the Europa Institute of Utrecht University. Member of the management board of the Europa Institute and the Management team of the Utrecht Centre for Regulation and Enforcement in Europe (RENFORCE).
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Notes
- 1.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/132809.pdf (last accessed 21 February 2014).
- 2.
In her Conclusion to the Pringle case A-G Kokott discussed the emergence of inter-state financial solidarity: Conclusion of 26 October 2012, Case C-370/12, nyr. Borger has further developed this idea in: Borger 2013, pp. 7–36.
- 3.
Corbett et al. 2007, p. 245.
- 4.
See for an overview of the European Parliament’s new powers under the Treaty of Lisbon: Piris 2010, p. 118 ff.
- 5.
See critically on this e.g. Weiler 1995, pp. 219–258.
- 6.
Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 from 30 June 2009, available at:
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html.
- 7.
- 8.
Niblock 1971.
- 9.
- 10.
Protocol no. 2.
- 11.
- 12.
Nettesheim 2005, p. 358.
- 13.
- 14.
Proposal of 21 March 2012 of the Commission for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, COM(2012) 130 fin.
- 15.
COM (2013) 534 fin.
- 16.
van den Brink 2011, pp. 160–180.
- 17.
Article 48(6) TEU.
- 18.
To mention just a selection of contributions: the Pringle case in which the ECJ reviewed the legality of use of the simplified treaty revision procedure: C-370/12. Craig has analyzed the legality of the Fiscal Compact in: Craig 2012, p. 231.
- 19.
In fact, a third type of involvement may be identified for countries that have received financial assistance on the basis of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). This is actually the most far reaching form of EU involvement. The ESM will, however, be excluded from the scope of this contribution.
- 20.
More in detail on this issue for the Dutch context: Report W01.12.0457/I of the Dutch Council of State of 18 January 2013 on the embedding of democratic control in the reform of economic governance in Europe to combat the economic and financial crisis; also Emmerik and Diamant 2013, pp. 94–129.
- 21.
The Dutch Council of State made a distinction between formal and substantive budget rights with the latter concept referring to this further-reaching influence, infra nt. 20, p. 4.
- 22.
Article 5 Regulation 1466/97/EC as amended by Regulation 1175/2011/EU on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies. This provision reads as follows: “In the case of an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or in periods of severe economic downturn for the euro area or the Union as a whole, Member States may be allowed temporarily to depart from the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective referred to in the third subparagraph, provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.”
- 23.
P. 6 of its report.
- 24.
Article 1 of Protocol no. 2 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon on the application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
- 25.
See Jancic 2012.
- 26.
‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ of 12 October 2012, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/132809.pdf (last accessed: 21 February 2013).
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van den Brink, T. (2016). National Parliaments and EU Economic Governance. In Search of New Ways to Enhance Democratic Legitimacy. In: Goudappel, F., Hirsch Ballin, E. (eds) Democracy and Rule of Law in the European Union. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-066-4_2
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