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Test Bans and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume I

Abstract

Over the decades, international norms have established prohibitions of nuclear test explosions and a regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Test bans are currently established by several treaties, either multilateral, regional or bilateral. This chapter focuses mainly on the two treaties with universal vocation: the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Neither of them has achieved universality. The former is a result of the balance of powers during the Cold War. It has been in force for 50 years, greatly contributing to the reduction of radioactive substances contaminating the natural and human environment. However, it does not contain a total prohibition of nuclear explosions nor include provisions on control over implementation. The latter stems from the end of bipolarism in the post-Cold War international community. It prohibits all types of nuclear explosions and creates a unique and comprehensive verification system. However, it is still not in force, while a provisional intergovernmental organisation has been founded to build up the verification regime, which is now almost entirely operational. The non-entry into force of the CTBT suggests to explore alternative means of implementation and to consider the role of customary international law in the matter.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A complete list of nuclear testing worldwide is provided by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission at http://www.CTBTo.org/world-overview/ (accessed: 2 May 2014). See also US Department of Energy 2000, UK Ministry of Defence 2012.

  2. 2.

    The most known incident occurred in February 1954, when the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel suffered from radiation sickness due to fallout exposure after an US experimental thermonuclear test in the Bikini Atoll. See Divine 1978, pp. 4–9; Hewlett and Holl 1989, pp. 175–177; Wittner 1997, pp. 146–148.

  3. 3.

    See Badash 1995, pp. 102–108; Hewlett and Holl 1989, pp. 157–159; Greene 2007, pp. 62–66. See also Goldblat 1997, pp. 21–29 on early efforts to ban nuclear weapons.

  4. 4.

    Available at: http://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htm (accessed: 25 January 2013).

  5. 5.

    See Badash 1995, p. 113; Wittner 1997, pp. 33–37 on the formation of Pugwash.

  6. 6.

    The US Democratic Party presidential candidate in 1952 and 1956, Adlai Stevenson, was notably in favour of a test ban. In 1955, the Bandung Conference, which led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, demanded a total prohibition of nuclear weapons. See Divine 1978, pp. 58–59, 93–96; Oliver 1998, pp. 4–5; Wittner 1997, pp. 13–14, 98–101.

  7. 7.

    Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 5 August 1963, 480 UNTS 43.

  8. 8.

    A/RES/50/245, 10  September 1996, adopting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as contained in document A/50/1027.

  9. 9.

    Johnson 2009, pp. 216 and 231.

  10. 10.

    A/RES/502(VI), 11 January 1952, para 1.

  11. 11.

    Gotlieb 1965, pp. 8–13; Divine 1978, pp. 114, 225–231; Hewlett and Holl 1989, pp. 537–542; Oliver 1998, pp. 6–9; Walker 2010, pp. 148, 216–217.

  12. 12.

    Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, Geneva, July 1 to August 21, 1958, 11 Foreign Office, Miscellaneous, London, Stationery Office (1958).

  13. 13.

    See Burr and Montford 2003, presenting a selection of US government documents (esp.doc. 1 to 8). See also Greene 2007, pp. 68–86.

  14. 14.

    Bundy 1988, pp. 328–334; Greene 2007, pp. 60–61.

  15. 15.

    Burr and Richelson 2000/2001, p. 61.

  16. 16.

    Divine 1978, pp. 198–202.

  17. 17.

    Id., pp. 120–123.

  18. 18.

    Bundy 1988, pp. 463–472; Oliver 1998, pp. 6–8; Lewis 1996, pp. 100–102; Greene 2007, p. 70; Walker 2010, pp. 101–107.

  19. 19.

    Bundy 1988, pp. 471–486, 525–535; Schubert 1991, pp. 166–170; Segal 1991, pp. 190–194.

  20. 20.

    The negotiations are aptly recapitulated by Burr and Montford 2003. For more in-depth analysis see Divine 1978; Bundy 1988, pp. 358–461; Oliver 1998; Walker 2010, pp. 65–262.

  21. 21.

    France, however, maintained the original position and announced that, without a comprehensive agreement on nuclear disarmament, its plans of nuclear testing would continue. In fact, it detonated its first nuclear test on 13 February 1960.

  22. 22.

    Divine 1978, pp. 311–314; Bundy 1988, pp. 350–351; Walker 2010, pp. 144–149.

  23. 23.

    Bundy 1988, pp. 356–390.

  24. 24.

    See Bundy 1988, pp. 453–458; Oliver 1998, p. 135.143; Walker 2010, pp. 246–247, discussing the political aspects of the Cuban crisis.

  25. 25.

    A/Res/1379(XIV), 20 November 1959; A/Res/1577(XV) and A/Res/1578(XV), 20 December 1960; A/Res/1632(XVI), 27 October 1961; A/Res/1649(XVI, 8 November 1961; A/Res/1653(XVI, 24 November 1961; A/Res/1726(XVII), 6 November 1962.

  26. 26.

    See Gotlieb 1965, p. 109; Bundy 1988, pp. 458–462 considering the impulse given by the three statesmen to negotiations on the test ban.

  27. 27.

    PTBT Article III para 1. Ratification table at: http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/test_ban# (accessed: 2 May 2014).

  28. 28.

    PTBT Article I para 1.

  29. 29.

    See Schwelb 1964, pp. 646–647; Goldblat 2002, p. 49.

  30. 30.

    PTBT Article I para 2.

  31. 31.

    It must be mentioned here that the PTBT was signed in 1963 and ratified in 1964 in the name of the Republic of China by the Taipei government. See Schwelb 1964, pp. 658–660. The authorities on Taiwan maintain that they are still bound by the provisions of the Treaty with regard to the other parties.

    See http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/test_ban/china/sig/moscow (accessed: 25 January 2013).

  32. 32.

    See Bundy 1988, pp. 472–486; Schubert 1991, pp. 166–174; Labbé 1996, pp. 31–34 on the French strategic nuclear doctrine.

  33. 33.

    See Bundy 1988, pp. 525–535; Segal 1991, pp. 190–199 on the genesis of the Chinese nuclear policy.

  34. 34.

    PTBT Article IV. See Schwelb 1964, pp. 660–663.

  35. 35.

    PTBT Article II. See Schwelb 1964, pp. 649–651.

  36. 36.

    See Glaser 1964, p. 12, describing the PTBT as a mere statement of intention in the absence of control mechanisms.

  37. 37.

    Wittner 1997, pp. 425–432.

  38. 38.

    Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 14 February 1967, 634 UNTS. 281, Article 1.1(a).

  39. 39.

    Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, A/Res/2222(XXI), Annex, Article IV para 2; the prohibition was later restated by the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies A/Res/34/68, Annex, Article 3 para 4. See Goldblat 2002, pp. 166–169.

  40. 40.

    See Chap. 4, The Non-Proliferation Regime and the NPT, in this Volume.

  41. 41.

    Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996 p. 264, para 99. See Tavernier 1996, p. 126; Tabassi 2009, p. 331; Arbatov 2011, p. 78.

  42. 42.

    Text available at: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5204.htm (accessed: 25 January 2013). See Goldblat 2002, pp. 51–53; Ifft 2009.

  43. 43.

    Supra n. 1.

  44. 44.

    Ibid.

  45. 45.

    See Hansen 2006, pp. 55–56; Johnson 2009, pp. 19–20 on nuclear testing between 1964 and 1980.

  46. 46.

    The rationale of the concept of peaceful nuclear explosions was economic, covering deep seismic sounding; creating underground storage cavities; helping to extract gas and oil; extinguishing burning gas or oil wells; creating reservoirs and helping to construct canals. See Nordyke 1998, pp. 1–4; see also http://www.CTBTo.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/peaceful-nuclear-explosions/ (accessed: 25 January 2013).

  47. 47.

    See Nordyke 1998, p. 65.

  48. 48.

    Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, Washington and Moscow, 28 May 1976, available at http://m.state.gov/md5182.htm. See Nordyke 1998, pp. 67–68; Goldblat 2002, pp. 53–55.

  49. 49.

    Nuclear Tests Cases, Judgments of 20 December 1974, Australia versus France, ICJ Reports 1974, pp. 253–274; New Zealand versus France, ICJ Reports 1974, pp. 457–478.

  50. 50.

    See Singh and McWhinney 1989, pp. 294–297 analysing the articulation of the judgment. See also Sands et al. 2012, pp. 240–242 reviewing the pleadings of the claimant states.

  51. 51.

    Nuclear Tests Cases, supra n 49, ICJ Reports 1974, pp. 271–272, paras 57–59; p. 477, paras 60–62.

  52. 52.

    See Franck 1975, pp. 615–616.

  53. 53.

    See Elias 1983, pp. 100–118; Wenqiang 2012, p. 332 on the minority judges' dissenting opinions.

  54. 54.

    Order of 22 September 1995 in the Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case (ICJ Reports 1995, pp 305–306, paras 62–65). See MacKay 1995, pp. 1883–1885.

  55. 55.

    Supra Sects. 6.3 and 6.3.1. See Johnson 2009, pp. 21–22.

  56. 56.

    See http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm (accessed: 11 February 2013) on the position of the US government. See also Johnson 2009, p. 38.

  57. 57.

    See Sands et al. 2012, pp. 543–546.

  58. 58.

    Taking into account the importance of environmental protection for the survival of humankind, one commentator has ventured to affirm that the ban on atmospheric nuclear testing is now a jus cogens norm: see Hulsroj 2006, p. 8.

  59. 59.

    These have been mainly based on the recognized capability to extend the service lives of nuclear warheads without NTEs. See Patrick and Forman 2002, pp. 229–230; Jonas 2007, p. 1013; Medalia 2008, pp. 11–14; Hafemeister 2009, pp. 474–475.

  60. 60.

    The CD was initiated as the Committee on Disarmament (A/RES/S-10/2, 30 June 1978, para 120) but renamed pursuant to A/RES/37/99 K, 10 December 1982, para II. Originally it had 40 members; presently it counts 65 states, including all those having developed nuclear weapon capacity. See http://www.unog.ch/ (accessed: 3 February 2013).

  61. 61.

    A/RES/48/70, 16 December 1993; A/RES/49/70, 15 December 1994; A/RES/50/65, 9 January 1996.

  62. 62.

    1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Decision 3, NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex, at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199503.pdf.

  63. 63.

    See Hoekema 1995, p. 238; den Dekker 2000, p. 673; Aust et al. 2008, pp. 37–38; Johnson 2009, pp. 73–76 examining test ban issues in the 1995 NPT conference.

  64. 64.

    Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra n 41 pp. 226–267, paras 99–103.

  65. 65.

    Negotiations are extensively covered by Hansen 2006, pp. 14–45 and especially by Johnson 2009, pp. 57–108.

  66. 66.

    See Deshingkar, 1996, pp. 43–48 discussing India's position on the comprehensive test ban. But see Chaudhuri 2012, arguing that non-membership of the CTBT is currently not in India's foreign policy interests.

  67. 67.

    A/RES/50/245, 10 September 1996, adopted by 158 votes to three (Bhutan, India, and Libya), with five abstentions (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria and Tanzania). See Tavernier 1996, pp. 121–122; Johnson 2009, pp. 137–141. The CTBT includes a Protocol in three parts: Part I detailing the International Monitoring System (IMS); Part II on On-Site Inspections (OSI); and Part III on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). Annex 1 to the Protocol specifies the location of the monitoring assets associated with the IMS, and Annex 2 details the parameters for screening events.

  68. 68.

    CTBT preamble paras 4–5.

  69. 69.

    See Asada 2002, pp. 87–88; den Dekker 2000, p. 673 discussing the dual purpose of the CTBT. See also Medalia 2008, pp. 51–56, reviewing the divergent opinions about the CTBT's contribution to non-proliferation and/or disarmament.

  70. 70.

    CTBT Article I para 1. Even third states will benefit from that prohibition, since a Party to the treaty could not test a nuclear weapon without violating its obligation to other Parties. See ILA 2000, p. 758 at n 118.

  71. 71.

    CTBT Article I para 2. The possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes may be considered by a CTBT Review Conference recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to the treaty (Article VIII para 1). This provision was agreed to accomodate the demand of China, that the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes may be allowed. See Johnson 2009, pp. 97–102.

  72. 72.

    Tavernier 1996, pp. 124 and 127; den Dekker 2000, p. 673; Goldblat 2002, pp. 59–60. See also Hoekema 1995, pp. 233–234. But see Aust et al. 2008, emphasizing the positive correlation between the test ban and non-proliferation.

  73. 73.

    CTBT Article IX para 1.

  74. 74.

    CTBT Article XV; VCLT Article 19 para (c).

  75. 75.

    CTBT Article IX paras 2–3.

  76. 76.

    Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 3 September 1992, 1974 UNTS 45–466. See Tavernier 1996, pp. 129–130; Johnson 2009, pp. 168–163 on the effects of the CWC experiences on CTBT negotiations.

  77. 77.

    CTBT Article II.

  78. 78.

    CTBT Article II paras 12–26.

  79. 79.

    CTBT Article II paras 27–41.

  80. 80.

    CTBT Article VI.

  81. 81.

    Tavernier 1996, pp. 131–133; Asada 2002, pp. 90–91; Johnson 2009, pp. 145–174.

  82. 82.

    Under Article IV para 5 CTBT states parties also have the right to use their national technical means of verification to obtain information ‘in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States.’

  83. 83.

    CTBT Article V paras 2–3. The expression ‘in conformity with international law’ is arguably to be interpreted in the light of customary international law as codified by the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, Articles 51–57).

  84. 84.

    See Hansen 2006, pp. 46–58; Aust et al. 2008, pp. 9–12; Johnson 2009, pp. 109–137 reviewing the different positions of states about entry into force requirements during the CTBT negotiations.

  85. 85.

    See http://www.CTBTo.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/ (accessed: 2 May 2014).

  86. 86.

    US Constitution, Article II, Section 2.2. See Patrick and Forman 2002, pp. 232–243; Hewitson 2003, pp. 449–453; Jonas 2007, pp. 1019–1026, discussing the political and substantive reasons which caused the rejection of the treaty.

  87. 87.

    The present US administration's commitment to CTBT ratification relies on the ability to maintain an effective nuclear stockpile by means of advanced simulation and computing capabilities, without nuclear explosive testing. See Hafemeister 2009; Schneidmiller 2011; Gottemoeller 2012.

  88. 88.

    See Lewis 2010; Hawkes 2011.

  89. 89.

    Article III CTBT.

  90. 90.

    A table of national provisions implementing the CTBT is available at: http://www.ctbto.org/member-states/legal-resources (accessed: 2 May 2014).

  91. 91.

    ‘A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a Party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.’ .

  92. 92.

    See Asada 2002, pp. 95–96; den Dekker 2000, pp. 677–678; Hewitson 2003, p. 464; Jonas 2007, p. 1039; Tabassi 2009, pp. 317–318 considering acts which would defeat the CTBT's object and purpose.

  93. 93.

    Tabassi 2009, p. 313.

  94. 94.

    See CRS 1998, pp. 20–35.

  95. 95.

    S/RES/1172 (1998), 6 June 1998, para 9.

  96. 96.

    S/RES/1172, preambular para 2 and para 3. See Tabassi 2009, pp. 322–325.

  97. 97.

    Lahore Memorandum of Understanding, 21 February 1999, available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptlahore.pdf (accessed: 11 February 2011).

  98. 98.

    Ibid., para 4. See Hansen 2006, p. 70.

  99. 99.

    S/RES/1718 (2006), 14 October 2006 paras 1–6; S/RES/1874 (2009), 12 June 2009 paras 2–6, 8. See Tabassi 2009, pp. 328–330. The DPRK withdrew from the NPT in 2003: see ILA 2004, pp. 492–494.

  100. 100.

    See Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron (accessed: 2 May 2014).

  101. 101.

    See Bajoria 2012 and Ong Suan Ee 2012.

  102. 102.

    S/RES/2087 (2013), 22 January 2013.

  103. 103.

    S/RES/2094 (2013), 7 March 2013.

  104. 104.

    S/RES/2094 (2013), para 2.

  105. 105.

    Aust et al. 2008, p. 49; Johnson 2009, pp. 222–226; Lewis 2010.

  106. 106.

    See Michie 2005, pp. 351–355 discussing the role of provisional application in the context of arms control treaties. Currently, only a part of the CTBT (concerning the most part of the verification system) is being provisionally applied (see infra Sect. 6.6.2).

  107. 107.

    Johnson 2009, pp. 227–230; Aust et al. 2008, p. 46.

  108. 108.

    A/RES/48/263, 17 August 1994, Annex.

  109. 109.

    Pedrazzi 2007, pp. 87–88.

  110. 110.

    See A/RES/48/263, preambular para 6.

  111. 111.

    See Oxman 1994; Anderson 1995 analyzing the key features of the 1994 Agreement.

  112. 112.

    Szaz 2002, pp. 904–905.

  113. 113.

    Dahlitz 1991, pp. 169 and 177.

  114. 114.

    Supra Sect. 6.4 and n 57.

  115. 115.

    Supra Sect. 6.5.1 and n 97.

  116. 116.

    The ‘persistent objector’ doctrine postulates that if a state constantly and openly objects to a rule when this is in the process of emerging, it will not be bound by it. See ILA 2000, pp. 738–740.

  117. 117.

    Asada 2002, pp. 93–94. See also Sixty-sixth General Assembly, Observance of International Day against Nuclear Tests (AM), Experts warn of nuclear testing risks despite moratorium, as General Assembly marks International Day, GA/11272 OBV/1134, 6 September 2012: at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11272.doc.htm (accessed: 25 February 2013).

  118. 118.

    See Tabassi 2009, pp. 334–335; Wenqiang 2012, pp. 335–336. See also ILA 2000, pp. 747–749, analysing the elements of a customary norm of abstention, and Michie 2005, p. 373, discussing the effects of the provisional arrangements for the CTBT on the emergence of a norm prohibiting all NTEs.

  119. 119.

    See Tabassi 2009, pp. 341–342, p. 347. In its order of 22 September 1995 (supra n 54) the ICJ made reference to ‘the obligations of States to respect and protect the natural environment’ in connection with nuclear testing (ICJ Reports 1995, p 306, para 64). The separate opinions of the minority judges also elaborate at length about the relevance of international environmental law for nuclear testing issues. See MacKay 1995, 1884.

  120. 120.

    Resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, CTBT/MSS/RES/1 17 October 1996, at: http://www.CTBTo.org/fileadmin/content/reference/legal_resources/prepcom_resolution.pdf (accessed: 25 February 2013).

  121. 121.

    Paris Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 13–15 January 1993, Legal Series PC-OPCW 1, 1994, at: http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=840 (accessed: 25 February 2013).

  122. 122.

    Resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (supra n 120), Annex, paras 4, 6–8, 12, 22. See den Dekker 2000, p. 674; Asada 2002, pp. 104–108; Aust 2004; Michie 2005, p. 368; Hansen 2006, pp. 56–58, describing the PrepCom's institutional and operational features.

  123. 123.

    Tavernier 1996, p. 122.

  124. 124.

    Pedrazzi 2007, p. 86.

  125. 125.

    http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/the-provisional-technical-secretariat-pts/budget/ (accessed: 2 May 2014).

  126. 126.

    A/RES/54/280, 30 June 2000.

  127. 127.

    See Aust et al. 2008, p. 7.

  128. 128.

    See 4 CTBTO Newsletter, July 2004, on the legal aspects of the IMS facility agreements, at: http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/reference/outreach/spectrum_issues_singles/ctbto_spectrum_4/p1.pdf (accessed: 25 February 2013).

  129. 129.

    Medalia 2013, pp. 11–17.

  130. 130.

    See Johnson 2009, pp. 215–266 describing the civil and scientific applications of the verification system. The environmental benefits of the IMS have been recognized by the Article XIV Conference of 2011: see Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry Into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, para 7, at: http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2011/23-09-11/Final_Declaration.pdf.

  131. 131.

    ‘Indeed, it would be highly questionable to maintain an expensive and fully functional international monitoring system for provisional application of a treaty.’ See ILA 2004, p. 495.

  132. 132.

    UN Charter, Article 29.

  133. 133.

    S/RES/1540(2004) para 4. The Committee's mandate is presently extended to 2021.

  134. 134.

    See http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2011/ctbto-to-share-data-with-iaea-and-who/ (accessed: 25 February 2013).

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  1. Dipartimento di Studi Internazionali, Università degli Studi di Milano, Via Conservatorio, 7, 20122, Milano, Italy

    Gabriella Venturini

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  1. School of Management - Law, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, United Kingdom

    Jonathan L. Black-Branch

  2. Cologne, Germany

    Dieter Fleck

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Venturini, G. (2014). Test Bans and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. In: Black-Branch, J., Fleck, D. (eds) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume I. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-020-6_6

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