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“Why be Moral?” a Philosophical Taxonomy of Moral Motivation

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Handbook of Moral Motivation

Part of the book series: Moral Development and Citizenship Education ((MORA,volume 1))

Abstract

In the following pages I will try to clarify the concept of moral motivation by laying out a “philosophical taxonomy” of the concept that takes into account the classical and contemporary literature of philosophical ethics as well as psychological accounts of human motivation and moral judgment.

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Wren, T.E. (2013). “Why be Moral?” a Philosophical Taxonomy of Moral Motivation. In: Handbook of Moral Motivation. Moral Development and Citizenship Education, vol 1. SensePublishers, Rotterdam. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6209-275-4_3

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