Abstract
A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the DSM since 1980. This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that integrates causal information into the DSM’s descriptive diagnostic categories. The paper proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I examine the goals (viz., guiding treatment, facilitating research, and improving communication) associated with the DSM’s purely descriptive approach. In the second section, I suggest that the DSM’s purely descriptive approach is best suited for improving communication among mental health professionals; however, theoretical approaches would be superior for purposes of treatment and research. In the third section, I outline steps required to move the DSM towards a hybrid system of classification that can accommodate the benefits of descriptive and theoretical approaches, and I discuss how the DSM’s descriptive categories could be revised to incorporate theoretical information regarding the causes of disorders. I argue that the DSM should reconceive of its goals more narrowly such that it functions primarily as an epistemic hub that mediates among various contexts of use in which definitions of mental disorders appear. My analysis emphasizes the importance of pluralism as a methodological means for avoiding theoretical dogmatism and ensuring that the DSM is a reflexive and self-correcting manual.
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Notes
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It is important to note that theoretical approaches are compatible with descriptive approaches to psychiatric classification. Theoretical approaches are only incompatible with the purely descriptive (i.e., atheoretical) approach to classification associated with DSM-III (APA 1980).
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The question of whether the DSM intends to classify natural kinds is murky (cf. Cooper 2005; Tsou 2011). The DSM-III taskforce initially planned to include a statement in the introduction of DSM-III that stated that “mental disorders are a subset of medical disorders” (see Spitzer et al. 1977; Spitzer and Endicott 1978), which would suggest that the DSM does aim to classify natural kinds (cf. APA 1980, p. 6). However, this statement was ultimately not included in DSM-III due to protests from psychologists, social workers, and counselors who regarded it as a declaration that psychiatrists—with medical training—were solely responsible for the treatment of mental disorders (Mayes and Horowitz 2005).
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While there is no agreed upon concept of validity in psychiatry, valid diagnostic categories are generally understood as classifications that pick out real natural phenomena, i.e., categories that ‘carve nature at the joints.’ For a more comprehensive discussion of various proposed definitions of validity (e.g., construct and content validity), see Robins and Guze (1970), Kendler (1990), Kendell and Jablenksy (2003), First et al. (2004), Murphy (2006, Chap. 6), Jablenksy (2012), and Shaffner (2012). While some theorists have argued that validity is best understood in terms of utility, I assume that these concepts are distinct, although it is important to recognize that valid diagnostic categories will be predictively useful (i.e., projectable), but not necessarily vice versa. Given the importance of making reliable predictions in psychiatry (and the difficulty in evaluating more general ideals of validity), predictive validity is arguably the most useful concept of validity to employ in evaluating diagnostic categories (Shaffner 2012).
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For a more comprehensive discussion of Hempel’s analysis, see Schwartz and Wiggins (1986), Murphy (2006, Chap. 6), Bolton (2008), and Tsou (2011). Some authors have suggested that Hempel’s paper played an influential historical role in DSM-III’s adoption of an operationalized and purely-descriptive approach (e.g., see Bolton 2008, p. 3). In this paper, I argue that Hempel’s emphasis on the testability of theoretical taxonomic systems offers compelling support for contemporary arguments in favor of theoretical approaches to psychiatric classification.
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For this purpose, the dimensional measures introduced in DSM-5 (APA 2013) may be disadvantageous because they import an unnecessary level of specificity into definitions of mental disorders.
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In the human sciences, I assume that artificial kinds are classes that are useful for distinguishing a socially relevant group (e.g., ‘liberals,’ ‘widows,’ ‘police officers’), but are not associated with a distinctive biological causal structure (see Tsou 2013). Some clear examples of artificial kinds listed in DSM-5 include histrionic personality disorder, dependent personality disorder, and voyeuristic disorder. There is meager evidence that the characteristic signs of these disorders are caused by identifiable biological mechanisms, and any biological regularities observed for these disorders are better accounted for at a more general level of analysis (e.g., in terms of anxiety or high testosterone levels).
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Keuck suggests that epistemic hubs and Hempelian scientific taxonomies are different insofar as “the latter strive for precision, whereas as the former need to uphold a certain degree of fuzziness in their descriptions . . . in order to allow different actors to connect their more restrictive classification systems to the epistemic hub” (Kutschenko 2011, p. 585). However, there is no principled reason why the diagnostic categories of scientific taxonomies cannot be formulated at the level of generality required to serve as an epistemic hub.
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The DSM’s diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia could be improved by including ‘cognitive impairments’ (e.g., deficits in attention, memory, and executive functioning), which are theorized to be caused by dopamine dysfunction in the prefrontal cortex (Hyman and Fenton 2003). Similarly, I have argued that there are good theoretical reasons for including mental inflexibility (“cognitive rigidity”) in the diagnostic criteria for depression because there is evidence that this cognitive trait, which is correlated with both depression and suicide ideation, is caused by deficient serotonin projections to the orbitofrontal cortex (Tsou 2013).
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I have elsewhere discussed the importance of cross-cultural research for helping to identify disorders that are natural kinds (Tsou 2007, 2013). On my view, the distinction between natural and artificial kinds is a distinction of a degree, and the symptoms of ‘more natural’ disorders (i.e., disorders whose characteristic signs are more directly determined by biological mechanisms) will exhibit greater uniformity across cultures (and over time) than artificial kinds.
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In this connection, more research efforts should be directed towards to validating proposed criterion sets of disorders by providing evidence that the cluster of signs included in these sets are caused by biological mechanisms (cf. Frances and Widier 2012, pp. 118–120). For this purpose, cross-cultural research is a particularly useful resource for identifying the common cluster of symptoms associated with a disorder (see Kleinman 1988, Chaps. 2–3; Kendler 2009; Tsou 2007; cf. Cooper 2010).
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I have elsewhere discussed the importance of Feyerabend’s views on pluralism (Tsou 2003).
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While I have argued that disorders included in the DSM should have a clear biological basis, the theories that are employed to criticize existing diagnostic categories ought to represent a wide-spectrum of views, including psychoanalytic, humanistic, and social psychological perspectives. These alternative perspectives could help to clarify which particular symptoms of disorders lack a natural basis and shed light on other mechanisms relevant for the expression of disorders.
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As indicated in the Research Domain Criteria Matrix (see Morris and Cuthbert 2012, p. 31), the RDoC seeks to organize research by distinguishing seven units of analysis (viz., genes, molecules, cells, circuits, physiology, behavior, self-reports, and paradigms) and five research domains (viz., negative valence emotional systems, positive valence emotional systems, cognitive systems, systems for social processes, and arousal/ regulatory systems).
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Moreover, the efforts of the RDoC may ultimately serve to drastically revise our understanding of what the proper targets of validation are given that the RDoC will explore new ways of classifying mental disorders that do not rely on DSM diagnostic categories (Sanislow et al. 2010; Morris and Cuthbert 2012; Tabb 2015).
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Acknowledgements
I owe thanks to Ian Hacking, Bill Wimsatt, Robert Richards, Trevor Pearce, Lara Keuck, Kathryn Tabb, Doreen Fraser, Tim Kenyon, John Koolage, Judy Segal, Alan Richardson, Sylvia Berryman, Scott Edgar, Robyn Bluhm, Trey Boone, Jacqueline Sullivan, David Stump, Martin Davidson, Sacha Ludgate, Steeves Demazeux, Patrick Singy, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and discussion. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Science and Society Speaker Series at the University of British Columbia in January 2009 and the fourth biennial conference of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (SPSP) at the University of Toronto in June 2013; I am grateful for feedback that I received on those occasions.
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Tsou, J.Y. (2015). DSM-5 and Psychiatry’s Second Revolution: Descriptive vs. Theoretical Approaches to Psychiatric Classification. In: Demazeux, S., Singy, P. (eds) The DSM-5 in Perspective. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9765-8_3
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