Abstract
Function is omnipresent in every aspect of biological knowledge but shows problematic relationships with evolution and teleology. From the 1970s, two major philosophical theories have been discussed: the “etiological” and the “systemic” or “causal role” theory of function. The most popular version of the etiological theory states that “The function of a trait is the effect for which that trait was selected” (Neander). The causal role theory considers that the issue of origin is not relevant: ascribing a function is no more no less than stating the causal role of a part in the system that contains it. Both conceptions claim to be in agreement with the standard use of causation in science, but they have quite a different taste in biology. The etiological theory fits well with evolutionary biology; the systemic theory is atemporal, mecanicist, and analytical. Consequently, the method of testing is different: convergent circumstantial evidence vs. experimental demonstration.
In the current practice of biology, function cannot operationally be treated as an abstraction, but rather as a specific action, or interaction, as a concrete manifestation, here and now, of the particular properties of material objects or structures. “Structures without functions are corpses, functions without structures are ghosts.” (Wainwright). This aspect has been neglected by most contemporary philosophers.
In practice, the characteristics of any biological entity appears to be controlled not by two, but by three kinds of interacting causes, denoted historical, functional, and structural (Gould’s reformulation of Seilacher’s proposal). These categories are in common use in most fields of evolutionary biology. The present chapter confronts them with the modern philosophical theories of function.
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Notes
- 1.
The Krebs cycle is a series of biochemical reactions providing energy to a cell.
- 2.
- 3.
By “functionalism,” we understand here simply a statement of the non-trivial appropriateness of a biological structure to its function, without implying the connotations of this term in philosophy of mind or in metaphysics.
- 4.
See the Chap. 5 “Adaptation” by Philippe Grandcolas in this volume. (Eds. note)
- 5.
Allometry is the quantitative study of the relative growth of organs in the course of development; for example, the relative proportions of the head and legs, which are different in newborns and adult humans. It is believed that changes in the coefficients of allometry can modify physical proportions in evolution, by enlarging (or shrinking) an organ, which may thus become “available” for new functions. Heterochrony is a modification of the sequence or the tempo of developmental events (for example, earlier or later mineralization in skeletal development), with various morphological consequences.
- 6.
A monophyletic group, or clade, is a natural unit that comprises the last common ancestor and all its descendants. In modern terms, a natural systematic group is characterized more by a historical-genealogical concept than by a structural one.
- 7.
These tests rely on cumulative corroboration by independent circumstantial data that “agree with each other” and that reciprocally support each other. The term “consilience” was introduced by Whewell in 1840 in his History and Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, which profoundly influenced Darwin, who used this type of argument throughout the Origin of Species as a model of proof. (See Philip Sloan, “Evolution,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/.)
- 8.
We understand here by historicism (in relation to functionalism and structuralism) simply any causal explanation that is rooted in diachrony.
- 9.
The attempts to synthesize the two concepts of function invoke the concept of “design,” to cover the overlap between the two. Thus, the organism, seen as a whole, is a “design,” or a system, of which the parts have functions that are “what they were conceived for” (by the fact of natural selection). The attribution of function in the system then coincides with function in the etiologic sense. See Kitcher (1993).
- 10.
The introduction of the idea of “design” in its etiologic sense could also lead to a solution: we could say “eyes are conceived for seeing,” which attributes a function to the eye that is at the same time an explanation of its presence via natural selection.
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Acknowledgements
This work is greatly indebted to the Action cordonnée incitative (ACI) of the Ministry of Higher Education and Research organized by Jean Gayon (Université Paris 1, IHPST, UMR 8590/CNRS/ENS) “La notion de fonction dans les sciences humaines, biologiques et médicales” (2004–2008), in academic partnership with François Parot (REHSEIS, UMR 7596, Paris 7, IHPST, CNRS), Olivier Houdé (Groupe d’imagerie neurofonctionnelle, UMR 6095 CNRS, CEA LRC36 V, Paris 5, Université de Caen) and Armand de Ricqlès (Collège de France). Some passages of this text summarize Gayon (2006). We thank warmly Abigail Lustig for her translation of the paper, and her thoughtful suggestions.
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de Ricqlès, A., Gayon, J. (2015). Function. In: Heams, T., Huneman, P., Lecointre, G., Silberstein, M. (eds) Handbook of Evolutionary Thinking in the Sciences. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9014-7_6
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