Abstract
It is widely accepted that we bear special responsibilities toward those who are vulnerable, especially those who are vulnerable to our actions and choices. However, exactly who falls under the category of the vulnerable? What special responsibilities do we have toward them, and on what grounds?
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Notes
- 1.
Defining “vulnerability” in terms of a list of capabilities essential to the normal functioning of a person is not without problem. For people may have disputes about what functioning is to be regarded as normal and which capabilities as essential to the functioning in question. The disputes, however, cannot be easily settled in this short essay. In my view, what counts as “functioning normally” for a human adult and what capabilities are counted as essential to that normal functioning depend very much on the theory of the good one holds. In that case, the notion of vulnerability is a theory-laden concept. And any adequate treatment of moral issues in relation to human vulnerability must be conducted from a certain ethical perspective.
- 2.
This kind of “analogical” thinking can be found in Mencius as well. “Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the young of other families…In other words, all you have to do is take this very heart here and apply it to what is over there.” (Mencius, IA.7)
- 3.
In The Analects, there are passages which state the normativity of ren. “The Master said, ‘Of neighbourhoods benevolence is the most beautiful. How can man be considered wise who, when he has the choice, does not settle in benevolence?” (The Analects, IV.1) “If the gentleman forsakes benevolence, wherein can he make a name for himself? The gentleman never deserts benevolence, not even for as long as it takes to eat a meal. If he hurries and stumbles one may be sure that it is in benevolence that he does so.” (The Analects, IV.5)
- 4.
It is the central idea of virtue ethics that rules cannot fully capture the complexities of the moral reality and, thereby, our moral responsibilities, and that only when one becomes a virtuous person is she able to grasp those complexities and know her moral responsibilities to others.
- 5.
For the Confucian, individual rights can never be the ground of morality. I have argued for this conclusion on many occasions. In brief, the notion of individual rights requires a social structure in which a sharp distinction between individuals exists and individuals are treated as equal. However, it is exactly such a sharp distinction between individuals and equality among individuals that is absent in the social structure which aims to develop people’s ren. In a society with that social structure, how a person should be treated depends, though not entirely, on her relations to others. Equality, then, is relatively unimportant in the moral and social life of that society. Only against a social background which accords the state a distributive function could equality have an important role to play. Lacking such a social background, it would be meaningless to talk about equality unless what is being talked about is formal equality. However, in traditional Chinese society, the state was not accorded such a distributive function. And only when we understand this, are we able to understand why Mencius said, “That things are unequal is part of nature…If you reduce them to the same level, it will only bring confusion to the empire.” Mencius (1984). 3A:4.
- 6.
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes three subjects of justice, namely, general justice, distributive justice and rectificatory justice.
- 7.
“Confucians would agree with Rawlsians that there ought to be fundamental principles to direct the institutions…Confucians could not affirm that such principles primarily concern the distribution of primary social goods…If intrinsic goods such as ren and yi are not established in the first place, the concern with instrumental goods such as money or profit would not really do good.”
- 8.
“Some conceptions of justice make the concept of desert central, while others deny it any relevance at all. Some conceptions appeal to inalienable human rights, others to some notion of social contract, and others again to a standard of utility…To know what justice is, so it may seem, we must first learn what rationality in practice requires of us. Yet someone who tries to learn this at once encounters the fact that disputes about the nature of rationality in general and about practical rationality in particular are apparently as manifold and as intractable as disputes about justice.”
- 9.
Let us call these social principles the principles of Ren -Yi.
- 10.
Ibid. note 13, p. 34.
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Chan, J. (2014). Health Care and Human Vulnerability: A Confucian Perspective. In: Tham, J., Garcia, A., Miranda, G. (eds) Religious Perspectives on Human Vulnerability in Bioethics. Advancing Global Bioethics, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8736-9_14
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