Abstract
This chapter investigates Xunzi’s conception of human beings through an exploration of his famous claim that people’s nature (ren zhi xing 人之性) is bad. Xing for Xunzi refers not to human nature but rather the original and spontaneous state of human beings. Xunzi suggests that people’s natural feelings and desires have no inherent propriety and yet they come with motivating power to seek for their own satisfaction. By themselves, natural feelings and desires necessarily lead to bad behavior and bad consequences. It is in this sense that Xunzi claims people’s nature is bad. However, human beings can become good through deliberate exertion. Through artifice human beings can guide and transform natural feelings and desires and incorporate xing into an ethical order.
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Notes
- 1.
The difference between “people’s nature” and “human nature,” and the reason why I translate “xing” as “people’s nature” instead of “human nature” will be explained later in the paper.
- 2.
The Chinese text comes from Lau 1996 (HKCS). The HKCS numbers refer to, in order, chapter number, page number and line number(s) respectively. The English translation is my own unless otherwise specified, though I have consulted translations by others, especially Knoblock 1988–1994 (K). I also include Knoblock’s volume number (in Roman numerals) and page number, and chapter and section number (in that order) for reference.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Xu Fuguan also insists the first sentence must not be understood as “that which is so by birth.” Xu suggests xing in the first sentence refers to the basis of life and has a metaphysical connotation (Xu 1968: 232–33). Robins points out that the first sentence should be translated as “That by which sheng 生 (birth, growth) is as it is—call it xing” (Robins 2011: 37). I think Robins’ translation basically captures the meaning of the sentence.
- 6.
In a response to Dan Robins , who holds a similar view as mine on this point (Robins 2011: 37), Eric Hutton points out that the Chinese sentence itself is ambiguous and there is textual evidence for the possibility that sheng means nonetheless “birth” (Hutton 2011: 527–29). Although I am not fully convinced by Hutton’s argument, I admit that there is room for further debate on this issue.
- 7.
Even if we grant that sheng means “birth” in this first definition, my central claim is not affected. For what I want to establish is that there is a distinction between xing as the basis of our natural life and xing as being expressed in natural feelings and desires . For Xunzi, the former xing cannot be changed but the latter xing can be re-formed.
- 8.
We can accept that there are these two aspects of xing even on the more traditional reading of the first definition of xing, which sees suo yi ran merely as how one is at birth. It seems natural to assume that how we are at birth largely shapes natural life development. I thank an anonymous reader for pointing this out to me.
- 9.
Graham thinks the first definition refers to the tendency of life abstracted from actual life processes while the second definition refers to the actual life processes embodying such a tendency. He also suggests that Xunzi was the first person to recognise such a distinction in pre-Qin times. Graham ’s understanding, although a bit different from mine, also recognises a two-level structure (Graham 1986: 15).
- 10.
Zhi 之 is a possessive particle. Without it, renxing 人性 could be either a noun-noun possessive construction (where the possession is implicit) or an adjective-noun construction.
- 11.
It should be noted the term renxing appears once in D.C. Lau ’s version of the Xunzi, at HKCS 23/114/24. While Lau’s version of the text is based ultimately on the Taizhou 台州 version of the Song dynasty, I am following the text of Wang at this point (Wang 1988: 439). I suspect that at this point the Taizhou version of the text might be a result of a typographical error.
- 12.
One exception is James Legge , who translates the sentence as “The nature of man is evil; the good which it shows is factitious.” (Legge 1970: 79).
- 13.
It should be noted that here I translate ji e 疾惡 as “an abhorrence of harms.” That is certainly not a standard translation. However I do not want to digress into a detailed discussion of the issue here, as it is not essential to the main arguments of the paper. I simply note here that I take ji e as similar in meaning to wu hai惡害 (hating harms), a term that is coupled with hao li* 好利 (“loving benefits”) in other places in the Xunzi.
- 14.
For example, HKCS 5/19/10–11; K I.208, 5.6; and HKCS 6/23/7; K I.226, 6.9.
- 15.
When I say “people . . . actively comply with,” I am not assuming that it must be a full-blown action by an agent. What I wish to stress is the contrast between something that happens to the person and something the person does.
- 16.
以所欲為可得而求之, 情之所必不免也; 以為可而道之, 知所必出也。 It should be pointed out my translation differs significantly from that of Knoblock . Knoblock translates the first sentence as “When what is desired is judged to be obtainable, it will be pursued.” However, such a translation ascribes the power of judgment to qing 情 (“feelings”) and renders the role of qing indistinct from that of zhi 知 (“understanding”), which is supposed to judge on desires. I think Knoblock does not appreciate Xunzi’s suggestion that feelings and understanding play vastly different roles.
- 17.
- 18.
Admittedly “freedom” or “free choices” are used rather loosely here. It might be noted that Xunzi thinks that the heart/mind is the lord of the body and master of consciousness. In principle the heart/mind is capable of making choices unimpeded by anything (HKCS 21/104/10–12; K III.105, 21.6a). Yet as we have seen above, Xunzi also thinks that the heart/mind can be turned into being just like the mouth and stomach, meaning that the heart/mind is dominated by natural inclinations and desires. In such a case, the heart/mind still occupies the role of the lord and master but its orders are stipulated by natural inclinations and desires. I thank Eric Hutton for suggesting this remark to me.
- 19.
- 20.
That on the heart/mind is in HKCS 21/106/1; K III.108, 21.7d; that on feelings is in HKCS 4/16/16; K I., 4.11; that on the five sensory organs is in HKCS 17/80/10; K III.16, 17.3a.
- 21.
I use “morality” interchangeably with “ethics,” referring loosely to any set of ethical norms. “Morality” is not meant to imply a particular view or ethical system such as that of Kant .
- 22.
The view on ritual appears in HKCS 19/90/3–8; K III.55, 19.1a; that on music appears in HKCS 20/98/14–19; K III.80, 20.1.
- 23.
「禮起於何也?」曰:「人生而有欲, 欲而不得, 則不能無求; 求而無度量分界, 則不能不爭;爭則亂, 亂則窮。先王惡其亂也, 故制禮義以分之, 以養人之欲, 給人之求, 使欲必不窮乎物,物必不屈於欲, 兩者相持而長, 是禮之所以起也。 It might be suggested that 長 should not be pronounced as zhang and translated as “develop”; it should rather be pronounced as chang and understood as “long-lasting.” Such an understanding is possible. But I would like to suggest 長 as it is used here bears a close relation with characters like chi 持, yang 養 and cheng成 and should best be understood as “develop.”
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- 25.
Eric Hutton also observes that even if Xunzi admits that people have a natural love for their parents, such a love is not a virtue for him. This is so because such a love becomes a virtue only when given the proper form, but there is no natural tendency for people to acquire the proper form (Hutton 2000: 230–31).
- 26.
One early example is the famous saying by Youzi 有子 (a disciple of Confucius ), which appears in Analects 1.2.
- 27.
凡人之欲為善者, 為性惡也。夫薄願厚,惡願美, 狹願廣, 貧願富, 賤願貴, 苟無之中者, 必求於外; 故富而不願財, 貴而不願埶, 苟有之中者, 必不及於外。用此觀之, 人之欲為善者, 為性惡也。今人之性, 固無禮義, 故彊學而求有之也; 性不知禮義, 故思慮而求知之也。然則[生]性而已, 則人無禮義, 不知禮義。人無禮義則亂; 不知禮義則悖。然則[生]性而已, 則悖亂在己。 Here I take the two last characters sheng 生 to be xing性.
- 28.
Eric Hutton points out to me that the character gou 苟 (“if”) of the first principle might be understood as “only if.” Seen in this way, Xunzi does not commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent and the first principle is operative in the argument.
- 29.
Indeed at one point Xunzi explicitly defines order in terms of ritual and righteousness (HKCS 3/10/12; K I.176–77, 3.7). Since order is a defining feature of goodness, such a definition by Xunzi does suggest that ritual and righteousness are necessary for goodness. I thank Eric Hutton for pointing this out for me.
- 30.
所謂性善者, 不離其朴而美之, 不離其資而利之也。使夫資朴之於美, 心意之於善, 若夫可以見之不離目, 可以聽之聰不離耳, 故曰: 目明而耳聰也。
- 31.
When Xunzi uses the two characters ming 明 (“clarity”) and cong 聰 (“acuity”), his emphasis is on the normal ability to see and the normal ability to hear, rather than on the exceptional keenness of certain eyes and certain ears.
- 32.
Whether values are entities in the world is a controversial metaphysical question. Here I am making the minimal assumption that they are different from physical entities and do not have independent physical existence.
- 33.
- 34.
The two phrases on human nature are inspired by Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre 1984: 53). The second phrase is originally “human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos.” Xunzi does not believe that people’s nature has any natural telos. However, Xunzi does believe that there are proper moral ends for human beings, the realization of which constitutes the completion of humanity.
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Acknowledgments
An anonymous reader and Eric Hutton have read through an earlier draft of this chapter and provided very detailed and constructive comments. I thank them for their effort. All the remaining errors are of course mine.
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Tang, S. (2016). Xing and Xunzi’s Understanding of Our Nature. In: Hutton, E. (eds) Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7745-2_6
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