Abstract
Artefacts affect users in many ways. In this paper we develop an account of the moral status and relevance of artefacts. We argue in favour of an active role for artefacts, without introducing radically new moral agency concepts. We develop a tool for the ethical evaluation of artefacts: the ‘action scheme’. An action scheme is the repertoire of possible actions available to an agent or group of agents in a given situation. Each of these options has a certain degree of attractiveness. There are many influences on an agent’s action scheme – we distinguish between physical, intentional, and social contexts. When artefacts are introduced, they alter an agent’s action scheme; new options become available, and some are made more, some less, attractive. Our tool allows designers to analyse and evaluate the effects of artefacts on users in a systematic way; it can show them in what ways artefacts can influence what agents are likely to do. The agent remains, of course, responsible for what he or she does. But the designer (and others involved in the creation of artefacts) has what we call a ‘second-order responsibility’ for changes in the user’s action scheme. We argue that the action scheme and the related concept of second-order-responsibility are two conceptual tools which enable us to look at artefacts in a way more promising than alternative ethical accounts.
Parts of this chapter are taken from Illies and Meijers, “Artefacts without Agency” (The Monist 92/3 (2009), 422–443), reprinted here with permission of The Monist. The chapter presents an advanced development of the ideas of that article, which was mainly set up as a critical response to Peter-Paul Verbeek’s thesis of a (limited) moral responsibility of artifacts. The present chapter has a more systematic ambition. It presents two key elements of a general framework for analyzing the moral status of artefacts: ‘action schemes’ and ‘second-order responsibility’. In response to helpful critiques that we have received of our Monist-paper, we have modified our ideas in several ways. Among other things we emphasize that the ‘action scheme’ is a conceptual tool, not a revised ontology. Furthermore, the influences on an agent’s action schemes are more clearly analyzed and described. To show the practical relevance for ethics, an elaborated example from architectural ethics has been added.
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Notes
- 1.
See, among many other publications, Bruno Latour (1987).
- 2.
See “‘It’s the Computer’s Fault’ – Reasoning About Computers as Moral Agents”,
http://www.sigchi.org/chi95/proceedings/shortppr/bf2_bdy.htm (accessed September 2011).
- 3.
See for a more extended discussion of Verbeek’s position Illies and Meijers (2009).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
We will focus here on the Moral Relevance Debate. The Autonomy Debate is taken up again in Sect. 10.6.
- 8.
Wilson (2007).
- 9.
See his discussion in the third book of Nicomachean Ethics.
- 10.
We fail to see why Selinger et al. characterize our position here as “attractiveness appears to be a feeling” (p. 84). The attractiveness of an action to travel by car, for example, is determined by its cost, its fuel consumption, the time it takes, and so on, in addition to its emotional characteristics.
- 11.
It is therefore a misunderstanding of our position to conceive action schemes as separate ontological entities that have causal powers to motivate agents, as Selinger et al. (2011, 84) do. What motivates agents is their beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on. The knowledge of new options for action, including new actions made possible by artefacts, may also motivate agents to act in certain ways. There is, however, ontologically nothing mysterious about this. The repertoire of possible actions is only made larger and their attractiveness for the agent changed, which might result in a different outcome of deliberation. There is no reason to assume that because of the influence of technological artefacts on actions schemes, we have to assume that “action schemes are metaphysically real and must be found somewhere” (p. 85). In a more radical spirit, Peterson and Spahn (2011) argue that Ockham’s razor would apply to the unnecessary ontological claims we make by introducing the notion of ‘set’ in the actions scheme discussion. We agree that we do not need these unnecessary ontological claims. Our initial phrasing of action schemes in terms of sets of possible actions may have added to the misunderstanding, the notion set was intended there in an everyday sense. See also Koller (2011) for useful suggestions about the possible readings of the notion of a set. We believe, however, that our account is compatible with various ontological readings of the notion of ‘repertoire of actions’, as long as this allows for an evaluation of such a repertoire in terms of moral preferences.
- 12.
This not only applies to technological artefacts but also to social artefacts, such as laws, organizations, and institutions. The possible application of the action scheme approach is thus much wider than discussed in this paper.
- 13.
As mentioned before, this does not mean that the agent always needs to be consciously aware of these options.
- 14.
Sen, Amartya (1982).
- 15.
Sen (1992, 19–21, 26–30, 37).
- 16.
Peterson and Spahn (2011) raise an objection which seems to undermine our claim that the notion of an action scheme is neutral with respect to ethical theories. In their consequentialist view it is a “category mistake” to attribute moral properties to action schemes or sets of actions. Doing so would be “a radical departure from one of the most basic assumptions in moral philosophy”, viz. that only actions are the true bearers of moral properties (ibid.). A number of observations have to be made here. First, their claim is factually incorrect. Virtue ethics, for example, is not about actions but about the moral traits of a person’s character. But the real issue is of course whether consequentialism is compatible with our action scheme approach. If we take consequentialism to be the general claim that the moral properties of X depend only on its consequences, then even within consequentialism this allows for different types of X and also for what could be conceived as relevant consequences. In the history of consequentialism the X that is the object of moral analysis has not only been actual or concrete action but also abstract entities such as possible actions, intended actions, likely actions, or counterfactual actions. Therefore, the fact that action schemes are abstract entities does not make them incompatible with consequentialism. Moreover, not only actions but also motives, virtues or character traits have been put to consequentialist analysis. Thus a philosopher defending (direct) consequentialism about motives holds that the moral qualities of a motive depend on its ultimate consequences in the world. A consequentialist stance on virtues holds that the moral qualities of a character trait depend on the consequences of that trait. Given this plurality of possible approaches within consequentialism we see no reason why action schemes cannot be relevant to a consequentialist moral analysis. It seems perfectly possible for a consequentialist to say that an action scheme that contains a dilemma (two options for action that have equally negative moral consequences) is morally inferior to an action scheme that contains a third option for action that has positive moral consequences. Finally, the objection by Peterson and Spahn that it makes sense to attribute moral properties only to something that is under our control seems to be too strong. It would rule out moral judgments about situations that are not under our control where these judgments seem to be perfectly natural. We fail to see, for example, why a consequentialist cannot make the judgment that a situation in which an agent finds herself in a trolley car with failing brakes and only two options for action (which both involve killing people), is morally inferior to one which contains a third option for action in which nobody is killed.
- 17.
See Nicomachean Ethics III.1–5 (1110a–1111b4).
- 18.
The distinction between first-order and second-order responsibility does not correspond to the distinction between direct and indirect responsibility. We can bear direct and indirect responsibility for actions as well as action schemes. The distinction between direct and indirect responsibility reflects the degree to which my actions causally contribute to the realization of a certain effects. Some effects will be the direct result of my action, others will be realised only if other contributing causal factors are in place.
- 19.
The notion of second-order responsibility is different from the notion of meta-task responsibility, as discussed in Van den Hoven (1998). Meta-task responsibility is defined by him as: “A user A has a meta-task responsibility concerning X means that A has an obligation to see to it that (1) conditions are such that it is possible to see to it that X is brought about and (2) conditions are such that it is possible to see to it that no harm is done in seeing to it that X is brought about” (Van den Hoven 1998, 103). The idea that agents are not just responsible for a task but also for the conditions that make it possible to carry out that task in a responsible way differs from the idea developed here. Second-order responsibility implies that agents are in some sense not only responsible for their actions but also for the repertoire of actions available to them and others. That involves much more than securing enabling conditions for a certain task. Both notions have in common, however, that they widen the responsibility of agents beyond a specific task or action.
- 20.
Peterson and Spahn (2011) have argued that the action scheme model does not allow for a sharp distinction between human influence via artefacts and natural phenomena affecting the action scheme: these phenomena “are at least as unpredictable and difficult to control as are new technologies.” (p. 12). Yes they are – but responsibility only comes into it when an event or phenomenon is directly or indirectly linked to intentional action. To the extent that physical events are outside human control, there is no point in regarding any human being, let alone the events, as morally responsible for changing an action scheme.
- 21.
The example is taken from Verbeek (2008a) and adapted for our purposes.
- 22.
Cases of coercion are no exceptions to this rule: if we force someone to do something, we (and not she) are responsible for the harm we did to her and for the action she performed.
- 23.
See Nicomachean Ethics III.5.
- 24.
Aristotle justifies the harsher punishment by saying that “the moving principle [for his ignorance] is in the man himself” – but we might remark that the sober man also possesses the moving principle for committing a crime himself. This simply leaves open the question why should it be worse to drink (and thereby make oneself ignorant) before doing something wrong rather than doing something wrong straight away.
- 25.
For an analysis of the dual nature of artefacts see Kroes and Meijers (2006).
- 26.
What would have been the right way to make people actually save energy? It would have been to increase the attractiveness of the action ‘switch the light bulb off’, for example by environmental education (to create an incentive to save energy), or even a rather drastic law banning excessive illumination of houses (with legal sanctions making it unattractive to leave lights on). One could also design smart light-bulbs which switch off automatically if no one is in a room. In that case the ‘leave the light bulb switched on’ option would simply be removed from the action scheme.
- 27.
There is a caveat. Certain high-tech artefacts are increasingly acquiring properties that are agent-like. In future there may be a need to develop agency-concepts that reflect these properties. A modern computer may pass the Turing test under certain well-defined conditions. A missile may be said to have goal-directed behaviour. Research into artificial intelligence aims at developing non-human agents. Whether or not we will attribute agency, or even moral agency, to artefacts or systems in the future remains an open question. This issue should not, however, be confused with the issue of unpredictability discussed in this paper.
- 28.
See Houkes and Vermaas (2004).
- 29.
See, for example, the important collection of articles by Warwick Fox (2000).
- 30.
Rees (1992).
- 31.
See Illies (2009b).
- 32.
For this see also Illies and Ray (2009).
- 33.
Hall and Hall (1975, 42).
- 34.
It has been debated whether architecture can actually influence the behaviour of its users and inhabitants in any significant way. Alice Coleman (1990), on one hand, argues for a strong influence of urban structures upon behaviour – similar arguments are made, at least implicitly, by many defenders of New Urbanism. Others, on the other hand, disagree, and consider social factors more important than physical ones. Bill Hillier (1986) and others argued that many of Coleman’s results were statistical artefacts and that the same forms might have been perfectly suitable for different inhabitants. For a general overview see Mikellides (2007).
- 35.
Brittain-Catlin, T. (2006).
- 36.
See Osmond (1957).
- 37.
http://www.defensiblespace.com/art.htm (accessed September 2011). It should be added that the well-documented physical and mental illnesses associated with poorly designed social housing projects are often caused primarily by economic and social deprivation, the impoverished quality of the architecture merely illustrating the problem and inevitably compounding it.
- 38.
New kinds of behaviour can also be opened up in subtle ways – for example, by making people think about new issues, or about old ones in new ways. Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, designed most of his so called Prairie Houses around a fireplace or hearth to express family life and its values, especially unity, harmony with nature, and the simple life. Expressed in terms of action schemes we might say that having such a fireplace in a house can lead to different kinds of behaviour by fostering the attractive option of sitting together around a fire-place. And this might trigger reflections about the fundamentals of family life etc.
- 39.
Jencks (1987).
- 40.
Birmingham (1998).
- 41.
Some work in this direction, though without the concept of action schemes, has already be done in, for example, the context of “evidence based design”. It is, however, very much limited to hospitals, and looks at very few options for action.
- 42.
- 43.
We should mention here that the notion of actant was not developed for an ethical analysis of the role of technology but for purely sociological analysis.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Marcus Duewell, Stefan Koller, Peter Kroes, Martin Peterson, Andreas Spahn, and the participants of the NIAS workshop on Moral Agency and Technical Artefacts in Wassenaar/The Netherlands for their stimulating comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Illies, C.F.R., Meijers, A. (2014). Artefacts, Agency, and Action Schemes. In: Kroes, P., Verbeek, PP. (eds) The Moral Status of Technical Artefacts. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7914-3_10
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