Abstract
Philosophical continuity between medieval philosophy represented by Avicenna and analytic philosophy embodied by Husserl can be traced in a comparative way through a number of issues, already studied by many authors. This paper attempts to analyze some of the themes linking Avicenna and Husserl. The question of intention is at once the philosophical basis and the hinge that connects medieval philosophy to phenomenology through Brentano. Intention related to the issue of phantasia and perception also echoes to tasawwur and tasdiq in the medieval context. In this comparative analysis, the notion of hylè represents, in a differentiating way, the intelligibility of the data both by the materiality and by the original characteristic form. Hyle is the form of the intelligible data, their flesh and schematic appearance as well as the other side of the internal senses. A third theme which is relevant in a comparative context is logic, for the young Husserl sets out to demonstrate the inadequacy of classical or traditional logic to define a formal then transcendental or phenomenological logic, based on the concept of Logos, which can be compared with the prophetic intellect professed by Avicenna.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. Hua., VII, 1, Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Kritische Ideengeschichte (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1956), p. 61, 329, 106. Hua., XXX, Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie: Vorlesungen 1917/18 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), p. 20. Husserl gives a number of detailed analyses of traditional logic, criticizing in particular conversion (Konversion) and consequence (Schlusse), cf. Hua., Materialien, 6, Alte und neue Logik: Vorlesung 1908–09, ed. Elisabeth Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), p. 253 ff. He appears vehement in his criticism of traditional logic, cf. Erste Philosophie, ibid., p. 19 ff, tr. fr. 26.
- 2.
A philosophical tradition after phenomenology proposes modern philosophical readings of intentionality and of the set of mental acts. Connected to a scientific reading, by means of the cognitive sciences or of the modern psychology, this tradition forms on a philosophic basis to try to enlighten the dark points of the question of the intentionality in particular from the question of language. The historic chain comprises numerous characters but to cite only some of them, see John R. Searle, Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983); John R. Searle, L’Intentionalité: essai de philosophie des états mentaux, trans. Claude Pichevin, Propositions (Paris: Éd. de Minuit, 1985); Hintikka is particularly representative, see Jaakko Hintikka, L’intentionnalité et les mondes possibles, trans. and pres. Nadine Lavand, Opuscule 6 (Villeneuve-d’Ascq: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1989), transl. from: The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities; in France, Jean-Luc Petit gave a pioneer lecture of this tradition, see Jean-Luc Petit, L’action dans la philosophie analytique, Philosophie d’aujourd’hui (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1991); Jocelyn Benoist represents philosophical opinion in the tradition of modern intentionnality, particularly in the continuity of Americans, see Jocelyn Benoist, Sens et sensibilité: l’intentionnalité en contexte, Passages (Paris: les Éd. du Cerf, 2009); another current emphasizes the scientific and practical side of perception partly linked to the question of intentionnality, see Philosophies de la perception: phénoménologie, grammaire et sciences cognitives, dir. Jacques Bouveresse and Jean-Jacques Rosat (Paris: O. Jacob, 2003); one must also cite the work of Thomas Metzinger who inscribes a new modality of consciousness as reference or self-reference and who promotes a philosophy of consciousness literally individualised, see Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2003).
- 3.
Ma’nâ is the concept most often mentioned. In Avicenna latinus, vol. IV–V, 1968, ma’nâ is rendered by intentio, as are maqsud, qasd and ârâ’. About translation and its difficulties, see ibid., (introd.), p. 112 ff., where the word intentio is cited. Herbert Spiegelberg gives more detail about the different meanings and uses of the notion of intention, see Herbert Spiegelberg, The Context of the Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), p. 5. A short analysis of the occurrences of the notion of ma’nâ can be found in Jean Jolivet, “Le vocabulaire de l’Être et de la création dans la philosophia prima de l’Avicenna latinus”, in L’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse and Carlos G. Steel (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), pp. 37–38.
- 4.
Avicenna, Resâleh-ye Nafs [Treaty of the soul], ed. Mousâ ‘Amid (Hamadan: Anjuman-i âsâr-i farhangi va mafâkhir-i farhangi; dânishgâh Bou ‘Ali Sinâ, 1383/1994), p. 16 ff., here, p. 20; Avicenna, Dânishnâmah ’Ala’i, Tabi’iyat, ed. Mohammad Meshkât (Hamadan: Anjuman-i âsâr-i farhangi va mafâkhir-i farhangi; dânishgâh Bou ‘Ali Sinâ, 2004), p. 96; receptivity has a passive and detached aspect in relation to the soul, al-Ta’liqât, p. 23. Let’s underline the existence of a second current which denies the proximity between the medieval notion of intention and what has been treated as intention in modern philosophy from Brentano then Husserl, see J.-F. Courtine. About the word intentio and its modern presence, one can note that Jean-François Courtine uses the word “visé” to translate the word intentio, Jean-François Courtine, Suarez et le système métaphysique (Paris: PUF, 1990), p. 22. Later on, he draws conclusions from the medieval notion of intention which doesn’t relate to “une problématique phénoménologique de l’intentionnalité au sens “sich-richten-auf””, Jean-François Courtine, La cause de la phénoménologie (Paris: PUF, 2007), p. 20.
- 5.
Edmund Husserl, Phantasia, conscience d'image, souvenir : de la phénoménologie des présentifications intuitives : textes posthumes, 1898–1925, trans. Raymond Kassis and Jean-François Pestureau; rev. Jean-François Pestureau and Marc Richir (Grenoble: Millon, 2002), p. 62.
- 6.
Avicenna, Resâleh-ye Nafs, p. 21.
- 7.
About that aspect concerning common sense and distinction, see Max Horten, Die philosophischen Systeme der Spekulative Theologen im Islam (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1912), p. 183. For a more recent view, see Alain de Libera, La querelle des universaux: de Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge (2nd. ed., Paris: Seuil, 2009), p. 196.
- 8.
Max Horten translates al-tawahhum by the fact of knowing the intention of an individual by means of estimative [imagination], like for example the sheep which recognizes in the wolf its natural enemy, Max Horten, Die spekulative und positive theologie des Islam nach Razi (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1912), p. 364. About the notion of wahm, see Robert E. Hall, “The “Wahm” in Ibn Sina’s psychology”, in Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale, ed. Maria Cândida Pacheco and José F. Meirinhos (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), vol. I, pp. 533–549. About the medical aspect and the localisation of internal senses by Avicenna, p. 546 ff. According to the author, there is no localisation for wahm in Avicenna, even though he mentions it briefly, ibid., p. 548. About the notion of Wahm in relation with intentionnality and the elaboration of such notion, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: the Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300 (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), p. 141 ff.; also Nader el-Bizri, “Avicenna’s De Anima: between Aristotle and Husserl” in The Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), pp. 82–85. Recent studies have also focused on this localisation, Paul Mazliak, Avicenne & Averroès: médecine et biologie dans la civilisation de l’Islam (Paris: Vuibert, 2004), p. 90 ff.
- 9.
Hence the critic of this attempt by Ibn Rushd: “Ibn Rushd reproche à Avicenne le fait qu’il pose dans l’animal une faculté autre que l’imagination, qu’il appelle “wahmyyah (en arabe)” à la place de la pensée en l’homme. Ibn Sînâ donne comme exemple: la faculté qu’a la brebis de reconnaître en le loup son ennemi. Ibn Rushd trouve qu’il est superflu de nommer une autre faculté ce qui ne relève que de l’imagination, puisque l’imagination elle aussi est une faculté cognitive …” cited after ‘Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, “Avicenne en Espagne musulmane: pénétration et polémique” in Milenario de Avicena (Madrid: Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura, 1981), p. 22.
- 10.
Hua., 39, p. 129.
- 11.
Ibid., p. 605.
- 12.
See Hua., XV, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil, 1929–1935, ed. Iso Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 542–543.
- 13.
Amélie-Marie Goichon explains the concept of maqsud, but she stresses the fact that this word does not represent anything particular in the Avicennian vocabulary, Amélie-Marie Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d’Ibn Sinâ, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), p. 304, Herbert Alan Davidson’s article, “Averroes on the material intellect”, Viator 17 (1986), analyses the aspect of the intellect, specifically the material and potential intellect, pp. 91–137; the question of the relation between tasawwur and tasdiq can also be found there, ibid., p. 8 ff. and the material intellect is considered according to Averroes’ Epitome as a disposition and not a substance. One must also emphasize the question of the translation of notions, as, according to the author, Averroes understands tasawwur (concepts) as an equivalent of tasdiq (propositions), ibid., hence the author questions the statute of language in Averroes’ phrasing. This aspect has been analysed by Harry Austryn Wolfson who explains that it originates in Averroes’ commentary about conception and judgement in Aristotle, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, “The Terms Tasawwur and Tasdiq in Arabic Philosophy and Their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents”, in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Religion, ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977–1979), pp. 119–123, here pp. 119–120. See also the rhetoric reading of Renate Würsch, Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen rhetorik: ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der Islamischen Welt (Berlin: Schwarz, 1991) who sees the use of the words tasawwur and tasdiq in the persanophone Avicenna as equivalents respectively of Begriff and Urteil., pp. 22–23.
- 14.
Dânishnâmah ’Ala’i, Tabi’iyat., op. cit., p. 96.
- 15.
Avicenne, Al-Shifâ, al-Tabi’iyat, 6, al-Nafs (Cairo: al-hay’at al-mesriya al-’amma li al-kitab, 1395/1975), p. 35, the characteristic of an abstraction is here in the comprehension (idrak) without act (al-idrâk lâ ma’a al-fi’l). Avicenna, Al-Najat: min al-ghargh fi bahr al-zalalat, ed. Mohammad Taqi Danishpazhuh (Tehran: intisharat-e danishgah-e Tihran, 1374/1985), pp. 327–328: “ce qui est compris du loup d’abord par le sens et ensuite par la faculté interne, là, c’est une imagination, et [en revanche] ce qui est compris par la faculté interne sans sens aucun, là, c’est l’intention” (fa al-lazi yudraku min al-z’eb awwulan bi al-hiss summa al-quww al-batinah fahuwa al-sura(t), wa al-lazi turakuhu al-quww al-bâtinah dun al-hiss, fahuwa al-ma’ni).
- 16.
Avicenna, Al-Mubâhisât (Qom: Intishârât Bidâr, 1371/1992), question 519, p. 179. About the notion of wahm and its difference with zann (opinion, belief), see Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna’s Psychology (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 79–80.
- 17.
See Al-Fârâbi, Risâla al-Fusus, ed. Max Horten, “Das Buch der Ringsteine Fârâbis. Mit Auszügen aus dem Kommentare des Emîr Ismâ’il el Hoseini el Fârâni” in Abū Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Fārābī: texts and studies, II, coll. and reprint. by Fuat Sezgin, Islamic philosophy 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, 1999), pp. 26–27.
- 18.
Avicenna, Al-Shifâ, al-Mantiq, 5 al-Burhân (Cairo: Nashr wizara al-tarbiya wa al-ta’lim, 1375/1956), vol. 3, p. 259, also, in Avicenna, Al-mabda’ va al-ma’âd, ed. Abdullah Nûrânî (Tehran: McGill University; Tehran University, 1984), pp. 115–116. For the definition of the notion of Hads, see Amélie-Marie Goichon, Lexique., op. cit., p. 65. About the Hads as key to the prophetic intellect, see Herbert A. Davidson, “Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect” Viator 3 (1972), pp. 109–178, here, pp. 167, 176 ff. About prophecy as intellectual and noetic modality, see Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal “Multiplicité des modes de la prophétie” in Études sur Avicenne, ed. Jean Jolivet and Roshdi Rashed (Paris: Les Belles-Lettres, 1984) pp. 125–142.
- 19.
A recent study highlights this notion in Avicenna’s philosophy and its difference with the notion of thought, see Dimitri Gutas “Intuition and Thinking: the Evolving Structure of Avicenna’s Epistemology”, in Aspects of Avicenna, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2001), pp. 1–38. In this article, Hads is equivalent to intuition.
- 20.
Dânishnâmah ’Ala’i, Tabi’iyat., op. cit., p. 142 ff. Avicenna is even more determined to define the hads as a divine emanation (fayz ilâhi) and an intelligible connection without any acquisition, Al-Mubâhisât., op. cit., Q 237, p. 107.
- 21.
The phenomenological analysis of perception leads Husserl towards analyzing the issue of phantasia, see Phantasia, conscience d’image, souvenir, p. 49. These are writings from the years 1904–1905 and according to the editor, they are posterior to Logical Investigations., ibid., p. XXXI. One takes into account that these lessons are Husserl’s teaching about “[…] phenomenology and the theory of knowledge in which for the small circle of the more advanced students I begin [to teach] a phenomenological system of intuition […]”, Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel, in collab. Elisabeth Schumann, ed. Karl Schumann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), vol. I, p. 25 (Der Phänomenologie und theorie der Erkenntnis, in welcher ich für einen kleineren Kreis fortgeschrittener Schüler Anfänge einer systematischen Phänomenologie der Intuition.). About method, see Bernhard Rang, Husserls Phänomenologie der materiellen Natur (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1990), p. 223, in which the author points out that the triad Hyle-noesis-Noema corresponds to Empfindung-Auffassung-Auffassungsinn in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. About the complexity of the noetic and hyletic relation in Husserl’s phenomenology, see Michel Henry, Phénoménologie matérielle (Paris: PUF, 1990), pp. 24–29; another author underlines this relation in Ideen, see Alfons Süssbauer, Intentionalität, Sachverhalt, Noema: Eine Studie zu Edmund Husserl (München: Alber, 1995), pp. 102–106.
- 22.
Husserl, meanwhile, in Ideen.3 analyses a kinaesthesy from the animated body, French tr. Paris, 1993, p. 140 ff.; Ideen 2 makes a conclusion about a consciousness constituting objects in its totality, Fr. tr. Paris, 1996, p. 53. The noetic act can be considered as pure abstraction. A certain aspect which distinguishes the noetic act of sense has been approached by Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Noema and Meaning in Husserl”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, supplement (1990), pp. 263–271.
- 23.
Edmund Husserl, Collected Works, Volume II, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983), §86, p. 209.
- 24.
Ibid. p. 210.
- 25.
Hua., III/1, Beilag 51, p. 606.
- 26.
The question of the body and the continuity of bodily sensations has been discussed, see Max Horten who stresses this dimension, Die philosophischen Systeme., op. cit., p. 177 ff. For Descartes, the reception of common senses follows the union between the soul and the brain. See Étienne Gilson, Index scolastico-cartésien (Paris: Vrin, 1979), p. 263, and postface, p. 366. The self is posed as an entity, an Ego and « le centre spirituel de la personne humaine », in Avicenna latinus, De Anima, vol., IV–V, (Introd.), pp. 37–38. It must be noted that Ján Bakos translates Badan by the word “corps (vivant)” in the sense of the unity of the self which understands in anticipation its kinaesthetic members rather than the intelligible and rational knowledge, Ján Bakos, Psychologie d’Ibn Sinâ d’après son œuvre As-šifa’ (Prague: Académie tchécoslovaque des sciences, 1956), vol. 2, p. 182 (original text., vol. I., p. 253). About the unity of the self via the kinaestheses and the kinaesthetic sensation, ibid., vol. II, p. 181, (vol. I of the original text., p. 252), Avicenna the philosopher may have had a more detailed knowledge of the body by the means of the medicine available to him through the Greek tradition, in particular Galen (Jâlinous) along with others, as Eudemus of Rhodes (Ozimous). Manfred Ullmann stresses the importance of Avicenna’s Qânoun, see Manfred Ullmann, Die Medizin in Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1970), p. 172 ff., about Eudemus, see Dimitri Gutas “Eudemus in the Arabic Tradition”, in Eudemus of Rhodes, ed. Istvan Bodnar, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 11 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp. 1–23. Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino, “Ibn Sinâ and Husserl on Intention and Intentionality”, Philosophy East and West 54:1 (2004), p. 74 ff. mentions that Avicenna cites « physicians » in a context of criticism of the views of Aristotle’s predecessors about sight and perception, Dânishnâmah ’Ala’i, Tabi’iyat, op. cit., p. 87.
- 27.
Husserl defines logic from Logos as synonym of reason (Vernunft) in one of his writings, Hua., XVII, Formale und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft, ed. Paul Janssen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 22 ff. Étienne Gilson, Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1981), discusses Avicenna’s doctrine about logic (cited from Avicenna, Logica, p. III; f; 9 r b., he compares with Duns Scot p. 171: “Il (Avicenne) distingue en effet alors le genre logique du genre naturel. Est genre naturel l’essence même de la chose, celle que l’on assigne pour répondre à la question: qu’est-ce que c’est ? c’est le cas de l’animalité par exemple. Est genre logique ce qui s’ajoute au genre naturel pour lui conférer l’universalité”).
- 28.
Edmund Husserl, Recherches logiques: Prolégomènes à la logique pure; trans. Hubert Elie, Arion L. Kelkel and René Scherer (3rd ed., Paris: PUF, 1994), vol 1., p. 239. Far from traditional logic, Husserl only mentions it to criticize it vehemently: “Personne ne voudra se familiariser avec l’idée de réduire la science à ce qu’elle était du temps de la logique aristotélico-Scolastique. Surtout quand il paraît en outre en résulter que, comme l’enseigne Kant lui-même, la logique a depuis Aristote, le caractère d’une science achevée”). The absence of certain names as Boetius or Porphyry is to be noted in Husserl’s criticism of traditional logic. New readings mention the Porphyry’s Isagoge in Husserl’s logic, see George Heffernan, Isagoge in die Phänomenologische Apophantik: eine Einführung in die phänomenologische Urteilslogik durch die Auslegung des Textes der “Formalen und transzendentalen Logik” von Edmund Husserl (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). About the continuity of this tradition of logic in western thought, see Porphyre, Isagoge, trans. Alain de Libera and Alain-Philippe Segonds; introd. and notes Alain de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 1998), p. CVII.
- 29.
Philosophie première, 1923–24. 1, Histoire critique des idées, trans. Arion L. Kelkel (3rd ed., Paris: PUF, 2002), pp. 25–26, my Eng. trans. On aristotelian logic, see Richard Cobb-Stevens “Being and Categorial Intuition”, The Review of Metaphysics, 44:1 (1990), pp. 43–66.
- 30.
Philosophie première, p. 32.
- 31.
Ibid., p. 37. Husserl also discusses traditional logic in the context of apophantic logic which will appear in further analyses.
- 32.
The Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Organon has introduced at once a science that has been developed by Arab philosophers. The question of conversion is part of analogy and appears as one of the modalities of syllogism. Aristotle, Mantiq Arastū, ed. ‘Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, Dirāsāt Islāmiyyaẗ 7 (Beirut: Dār al-qalam, 1980), 3 vols; vol. 1, p. 137 ff. An analysis of Avicenna’s logic and its relation, through induction, to Aristotelian logic is found in Jon McGinnis, “Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 41:3 (2003), pp. 307–327.
- 33.
al-Shifâ, al-Mantiq, 1, al-Madkhal (Cairo: Nashr wizara al-tarbiya wa al-ta’lim, 1371/1952), pp. 17–18.
- 34.
Danishnâmah, Risâlehy-e Mantiq, ed. Muhammad Mu’in and Muhammad Mishkât (Hamadan: Anjuman-i âsâr-i farhangi va mafâkhir-i farhangi; Dânishgâh Bou ‘Ali Sinâ, 1383/1994), p. 9; Fr. trans.: Le Livre de science; trans. Mohammad Achena and Henri Massé (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1955), p. 24. In spite of the considerable efforts of learned translators, a new reading of this translation is necessary, particularly as far as some notions, like intention, are concerned. This text and its translation are criticized in Jules Janssens, “Le Dânesh-Nâmeh d’Ibn Sînâ: un texte à revoir ?” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, 28 (1986), pp. 163–177.
- 35.
al-Shifâ, op.cit., p. 23 ff.
- 36.
Ibid., p. 34. Avicenna in his advice at the end of his logical treatise Danishnâmah, underlines the fact that one must believe in sense (Ma’ni) and not name, Danishnamah ‘Alâ’i: Mantiq, op. cit., p. 160, tr. fr. ibid., p. 86.
- 37.
al-Shifâ., op. cit., p. 36.
- 38.
Edmund Husserl, Alte und neue Logik: Vorlesung 1908–1909, ed. Elisabeth Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), Vol. 6, p. 253 ff. It is a set of writings by Husserl about logic and the theory of judgement, being part of the F group of manuscripts, see Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie: Vorlesungen 1917/18 mit ergänzenden Texten aus der ersten Fassung von 1910/11, ed. Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), Vol. 30, pp. 236–249. A certain trend wants modern logic to inscribe itself in a continuity from Frege to Russell and Wittgenstein. To mention only one typical example, see Rudolf Carnap, Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften, ed. Thomas Mormann, Philosophische Bibliothek 560 (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2004), p. 63 ff., here, pp. 65–66. This tradition is very narrowly linked to mathematics whereas modern logic in Husserl’s view has a phenomenological basis destined by Mathesis universalis, see Edmund Husserl, Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie et une philosophie phénoménologique pures. 3, la phénoménologie et les fondements des sciences; Postface à mes idées directrices pour une phénoménologie pure; trans. Dorian Tiffeneau and Arion L. Kelkel (Paris: PUF, 1993), p. 69. Mathesis universalis reaches a formal ontology in the view of some authors, see Jean-François Courtine “L’objet de la logique” in Husserl, dir. Jocelyn Benoist (Paris: Éd. du Cerf, 2008), p. 83.
- 39.
Alte und neue Logik., op. cit., p. 262 (… der Schluss ist nur wahr, wenn die Prämissen eben wahr, wie sie urteilmässig als Wahrheiten gesetzt sind).
- 40.
The link between logic and mathematics has been studied by various authors, e.g. Barry Smith, David Murray, “Logic, Form and Matter” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 55, (1981), pp. 47–63, 65–74; see also Richard Tieszen, “Phenomenology and Mathematical Knowledge” Synthese, 75:3 (1988), pp. 373–403.
- 41.
Alte und neue Logik., op. cit., p. 263, (Die hier auftretenden Relations termini sind als im Wesen der kategorialen Begriffe Menge, Anzahl gründende selbst kategorial).
- 42.
Alte und neue Logik., op. cit., p. 263. See Richard Cobb-Stevens, “Being and Categorial Intuition”, op. cit., p. 63.
- 43.
Avicenna, al-Shifâ 2, al-Mantiq 4, al-Qiâs, (Cairo: Nashr wizara al-tarbiya wa al-ta’lim, 1383/1964), p. 54 (wa amma a-râbita fa zâtiya li al-muqaddma hattâ yakoun muqaddama, va lâkinnahâ tabtal ‘ind al-inhilâl, va lâ yakoun mâ tanhal ‘ilay al-muqaddam mâ yabtal ‘inda al-inhilâl, falâ yakoun haddan li almanhal, fa inna al-hadd huwa mâ tanhal ‘ilaih al-muqaddam. wa fi al-shartiyât, izâ asqatat hurouf al-shart wa al-ajzâ’ wa hurouf al-‘inâd allati bihâ al-irtibât, baqiy al-muqaddam wa al-tâli).
- 44.
Alte und neue Logik, op. cit., pp. 263–264. For the analysis of some grammatical terms see Käte Hamburger, “Zur Theorie der Aussage”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 20:1 (1966), pp. 23–56, here pp. 24–30. Other remarks have been made about the grammatical logic and its articulation in Husserl, see a review by Ignacio Anglelli, “The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 16:2 (1978), pp. 250–252, here p. 251.
- 45.
Alte und neue Logik, op. cit., p. 267.
- 46.
Ibid., p. 267 (Aber die eine Prämisse haben wir durch eine äquivalente Relationsprämisse ersetzt, und diese Prämissenänderung macht es, dass nun der Schlusssatz nicht unmittelbar in den Prämissen liegt).
- 47.
Da^nishnâmah, Mantiq., op. cit., p. 83 ff., Fr. tr., op. cit., p. 57 ff.
- 48.
Alte und neue Logik., op. cit., p. 269.
- 49.
Alte und neue Logik., op. cit., p. 272, (Das “Neue” das sie lehren, besteht in einem wahren Satz, der unmittelbar noch nicht verknüpfte Termini zur Verknüpfung bringt).
- 50.
Alte und neue Logik., op. cit., p. 272 (Die traditionelle Logik scheidet hier in der Regel nur Schlüsse aus einer Prämisse als blosse “Folgerung” und Schlüsse aus mehreren Prämissen).
- 51.
Danishnamah., Mantiq., op. cit., pp. 156–165, Fr. tr., op. cit., pp. 85–88.
- 52.
A certain philosophical school is still under the influence of this current which sees perception as comprehension or intelligible apprehension (idrak). According to this current, perception refers to aesthesia which must match noetic perception (tasdiq) and in that context we are always surrounded by perception as intuitive data where noesis comes to us in a direct way. Perception in the sense of idrak corresponds to Wahrnehmung which covers at once all of the corporal sensations. Obviously, perception is opposed to phantasia and in general to imagination which, in turn, represents a different intelligible and noético-morphique dimension and, both by formation and function, of perception. There is also the idea that phantasm becomes like the flesh of consciousness, which means that there exists a carnal dimension in phantasia in the process of acts. See Arno Anzenbacher, Die Intentionalität bei Thomas von Aquin und Edmund Husserl (Vienna: Oldenburg, 1972), p. 115.
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Rokoee Haghighi, S.R. (2014). Avicenna and Husserl: Comparative Aspects. In: Tymieniecka, AT., Muhtaroglu, N., Quintern, D. (eds) Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue. Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7902-0_12
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