Abstract
There are two major ways to deal with the limitations of classical logic. It can be replaced by systems representing alternative accounts of the laws of thought (non-classical logic), or it can be supplemented with non-inferential mechanisms. David Makinson has a leading role as proponent of the latter approach in the form of the inferential-preferential method in which classical logic is combined with representations of preference or choice. This has turned out to be a highly efficient and versatile method. Its applications in non-monotonic logic and belief revision are used as examples.
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Notes
- 1.
On the connections between intuitionistic and classical logic, see Gödel (1986, esp. pp. 286–295 and 300–303) and Humberstone and Makinson (2011). On the connections between relevance logic and classical logic, see Friedman and Meyer (1992) and Makinson’s chapter on relevance logic in this book, “Relevance Logic as a Conservative Extension of Classical Logic".
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Hansson, S.O., Gärdenfors, P. (2014). David Makinson and the Extension of Classical Logic. In: Hansson, S. (eds) David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems. Outstanding Contributions to Logic, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7759-0_2
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