Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between the two fields of science education and philosophy of education to inquire how philosophy could better contribute to improving science curriculum, teaching, and learning, especially science teacher education. An inspection of respective research journals exhibits an almost complete neglect of each field for the other (barring exceptions).While it can be admitted that philosophy has been an area of limited and scattered interest for science education researchers for some time, the subfield of philosophy of education has been little canvassed and remains an underdeveloped area. To help bring science education closer into the fold of educational philosophy and theorizing, the historical development of science education and philosophy of education are sketched to reveal their common roots, interests, and concerns. Thereto, the contours of a new philosophy of science education are presented (as an integration of three academic fields). Arguments are provided which seek to illustrate why philosophy in general and philosophy of education in particular can make positive contributions to teacher education and the research field together with suggesting future directions and possible reform contributions (scientific literacy, educational aims, educational theory, pedagogical content knowledge, science teacher, and curricular epistemologies).
It was through the feeling of wonder that men now and at first began to philosophize. … but he who asks and wonders expresses his ignorance … thus in order to gain knowledge they turned to philosophy.
—Aristotle (Metaphysics)
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Notes
- 1.
The prominent US National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) has made STEM a central reform emphasis: www.nsta.org/stem. References for the other more common science classroom curricular emphases are Aikenhead (1997, 2002, 2007), Carson (1998), DeBoer (1991), Donnelly (2001, 2004, 2006), Pedretti and Nazir (2011), Roberts (1982), Schwab (1978), Witz (2000), and Yager (1996).
- 2.
“Regrettably, much of the constructivist literature relating to education has lacked precision in the use of language and thereby too readily confused theories of knowledge with ideas about how students learn and should be taught” (Jenkins 2009, p. 75).
- 3.
- 4.
This component is meant to include the associated disciplines and not just the philosophy discipline itself.
- 5.
- 6.
It has also been historically associated with particular schools of thought (e.g., idealism, rationalism, empiricism, existentialism); hence, particular philosophies which themselves are often associated with individual philosophers (e.g., Plato, Kant, Marx, Nietzsche).
- 7.
This is not meant to discount the next three. Logic has made a renewed appearance in science education under the guise of critical thinking and scientific argumentation; those in ethics intersect with discussions of values and socio-ethical issues (Allchin 2001; Corrigan et al. 2007; Witz 1996; Zeidler and Sadler 2008); even aesthetics has been considered for the field (Girod 2007).
- 8.
- 9.
That one must inevitably justify the value of philosophy for teachers and many researchers suggests a cultural predicament already exists concerning what constitutes “education” in our present age.
- 10.
- 11.
Probably the ongoing reality of the academic divide between the “two cultures” maintained as two solitudes in universities to this day (as described by C.P. Snow; Shamos 1995; Stinner 1989) contributes to the hostility or indifference since science teachers are not generally required to endure Arts faculty courses. All this in combination with the common negative image that academic philosophy is preoccupied with obtuse speculation, arcane technical jargon, and unresolved disputes are remote from everyday matters. Certainly quite different, encouraging evaluations can be had (Matthews 1994a; Nola and Irzik 2005).
- 12.
They continue: “… Too often the selected textbook defines course scope, sequence, and depth implying that a textbook’s inclusion of information, in part, legitimizes teaching that content. Textbooks also exert a significant influence on how content is taught…” (ibid).
- 13.
Many teachers would probably declare “science for all” or “scientific literacy” though seldom with awareness these slogans are replete with ambiguities—the latter goal even suffering inherent incompatibilities due to serious shifts in connotation, and this despite its ultimate prominence in worldwide “standards” documents (Jenkins 2009; Schulz 2009b; Shamos 1995). The science for all theme arguably partially appropriate for junior science nonetheless vanishes when specialty upper secondary or tertiary courses are reached, for here the status quo is maintained as “technical pre-professional training” (Aikenhead 1997, 2002, 2007). In this case an extreme narrowing of the “literacy” notion is found, HPSS aspects are distorted or abused, while the concealment of existent curriculum ideologies remains unrecognized in absence of educational philosophy (e.g.,. scientism, academic rationalism, “curriculum as technology” or social utility; Eisner 1992).
- 14.
In his comprehensive review, the categories “vision I” and “vision II” were postulated to account for two major competing images of science literacy behind many curricular reforms. The former designates those conceptions which are “internally oriented,” that is, towards science as a knowledge- and inquiry-based discipline and including the image of science education as heavily influenced by the identity, demands, and conceptions of the profession. The latter vision, alternatively, is “outward looking,” towards the application, limitation, and critical appraisal of science in society—the image influenced instead by the needs of society and the majority of students not headed for professional science-based careers. Here the question of the “social relevance” of the curriculum is paramount. He claims that while the second vision can encompass the first, the opposite is not true.
- 15.
For linked views, see Anderson (1992), Fensham (2004), Matthews (1994a/2014, 2002), and Schulz (2009a).
- 16.
It should not be forgotten that the seventeenth-century scientific revolution introduced “science” as a field of research and study under the academic umbrella of Natural Philosophy to distinguish it from the reigning scholasticism of the universities, hermeticism, and Neoplatonism. Our modern conception of the term and the severance of philosophy from science are of relatively recent origin. The division emerged historically as a development in intellectual thought and specialization, which evolved within European industrial society in the mid-nineteenth century.
- 17.
Quoted in Matthews (1994a), p. 84.
- 18.
Scientists and philosophers alike have found it necessary to launch important new subdisciplines to address foundational questions and concerns arising from their scientific areas of expertise—notwithstanding those scientists who disparage the study of PS overall (e.g., Weinberg 1992). Philosophy of physics (Cushing 1998; Lange 2002), philosophy of chemistry (McIntyre 2007; Scerri 2001), and philosophy of biology (Ayala and Arp 2009) are becoming established research fields, including philosophy of technology (Scharff 2002), likewise lauded for teachers today (De Vries 2005).
- 19.
Refer to the respective chapter in this Handbook.
- 20.
Unfortunately it appears that science education worldwide and many science teachers themselves have tended not to keep abreast of these advances and what they possibly offer for curriculum design, instruction, and reform efforts. One might hope these subdisciplines offer, minimally, deeper and improved insights about subject content but, moreso, a better understanding of the essence of the discipline, the core of which teachers are required to inspire and impart to their students. Certainly these are less well known to science teachers and not canvassed by science education researchers to the extent of interest shown in the post-structuralist and “science studies” literature. See Allchin (2004), Collins (2007), Hodson (2008), Holton (2003), Kelly et al. (1993), Nola and Irzik (2005), Ogborn (1995), Roth and McGinn (1998), and Slezak (1994a, b).
- 21.
With such a faculty, teachers could better function in their role as mediator between the scientific establishment and their pupils, also between public discourse about science with pupils or adults not conversant either how science evolves or the nature of modern techno-science (see also Hodson 2009).
- 22.
The term “scientism” can be interpreted in different ways; most construe it negatively (Bauer 1992; Haack 2003; Habermas 1968; Matthews 1994a/2014). Nadeau and Desautels (1984) attribute five components. Irzik and Nola (2009) are careful to distinguish legitimate scientific worldviews from illegitimate scientistic ones: “A scientific worldview need not be scientistic. Scientism, as we understand it, is an exclusionary and hegemonic worldview that claims that every worldview question can be best answered exclusively by the methods of science… that claims to be in no need of resources other than science. By contrast, a scientific worldview may appeal to philosophy, art, literature and so on, in addition to science. For example, scientific naturalism can go along with a version of humanism in order to answer worldview questions about the meaning of life.”
- 23.
Refer to the chapter contribution in this Handbook.
- 24.
What is being suggested here can be taken to correspond with a key objective of critical pedagogy, popularized by the Marxist teacher educator Paulo Freire (1970), their advance to “critical consciousness.”
- 25.
Science education to this day has been unable to resolve the principal dilemma concerning the conflict of the two competing “visions” of its purpose (hence competing conceptions of “scientific literacy”). Roberts (2007, p. 741) admits the community must “somehow resolve the problems associated with educating two very different student groups (at least two).”
- 26.
- 27.
Grade 11 and 12 specialist science courses continue to serve primarily a gatekeeping function for college and university entrance, and their purpose, structure, and content usually replicate first-year tertiary courses—their chief rationale is exclusively with “science for scientists,” and not concerned with the large majority who will not specialize. In other words, as induction into pure academic science but at the neglect (if not deliberate omission) of discussing (never mind integrating), the epistemologies, social practices, and proper history of the sciences—otherwise termed nature-of-science perspectives (Hodson 2008; Irzik and Nola 2011; Lederman 2007; Matthews 1998a). Reform movements like Science-Technology-Society (STS), Science-Societal Issues (SSI), and (lately) scientific argumentation studies have been attempting to counter this dominant school paradigm for some time but continue to make only small inroads.
- 28.
Yet despite these disturbing findings, researchers in these newer fields of study (also Chemical Education Research) still struggle uphill for respect and acceptance in their academic departments, where educational studies and research continue to be afforded a low priority (Gilbert et al. 2004; Hestenes 1998).
- 29.
See Aikenhead (2006), Bencze (2001), Donnelly and Jenkins (2001), Fensham (2002, 2004), Roberts (1988), and Roberts and Oestman (1998). Laugksch (2000) draws attention to different social group interests in defining “science literacy.” Ernest (1991) also identifies several interest groups as determinants of mathematics education.
- 30.
Fensham’s (2002) paper “Time to changing drivers for scientific literacy” (movement away from the academic driver to “social” and industry-based drivers) provoked a lively response from researchers about the “educo-politics” of curriculum development, especially about what role academic scientists should play, if any (Aikenhead 2002; Gaskell 2002); such a suggestion though would reorientate science education back towards the recurrent (and contentious) “social relevancy” goal and the progressivism of Deweyan-type philosophy (Darling and Nordenbo 2003; DeBoer 1991)—whose educational theory is often concealed. It may even involve a Faustian bargain with industrial- and vocational-driven interests. Gaskell believes the risk is worth it. But given the complexity of techno-science and the great diversity of vocations and business interests today leaves one wondering if any sort of meaningful consensus on curriculum is achievable, even locally.
- 31.
Fensham in fact suggests that it is the “dominance of psychological thinking in the area” which attests to why Dewey is not cited more frequently among respondents in the USA (still the most prominent philosopher of education linked with science education in North America).
- 32.
- 33.
Authors in alphabetical order include Bailin, Burbules, Davson-Galle, Garrison, Grandy, Hodson, Matthews, McCarthy, Norris, Phillips, Scheffler, Schulz, Siegel, and Zembylas (see respective references).
- 34.
Matthews comments this may be the significant reason why the science education research literature “is dominated by psychological, largely learning theory, concerns” (ibid). Others have also cited the domination of psychology and conceptual change research (Gunstone and White 2000; Lee et al. 2009).
- 35.
The typical tendency is to adopt philosophical or ideological views from well-known authors outside the field but often not accompanied by critical appraisal of such authors: “… the work of Kuhn, von Glasersfeld, Latour, Bruner, Lave, Harding, Giroux and others is appropriated but the critiques of their work go unread: it is rare that science education researchers keep up with psychological and philosophical literature” (ibid, p. 35).
- 36.
Related to this topic is the question of what worldview(s) science assumes or requires in order to be sustained, hence which one(s) educators need to be supportive or cognizant of (Matthews 2009a). This further raises the question of the universalism of “Western science,” whether or not its knowledge and truth claims are necessarily culturally confined, or merely evolved. Disputes over the interpretations of “multicultural science” will not be addressed here, but again science educators require philosophical training in order to adequately tackle these controversial topics. Philosophical treatment of this subject can be found in Hodson (2009), Matthews (1994a), Nola and Irzik (2005), and chapters in this Handbook.
- 37.
- 38.
“On the one hand, the concept Bildung describes how the strengths and talents of the person emerge, a development of the individual; on the other, Bildung also characterizes how the individual’s society uses his or her manifest strengths and talents, a “social” enveloping of the “individual” (Vásquez-Levy 2002, p. 118). Given this interpretation, one could in fairness associate the values and aims of the Bildung tradition with two prevalent “curriculum ideologies” identified by Eisner (1992) as “rational humanism” and the “personal” stream within progressivism.
- 39.
- 40.
One Canadian study involving science teachers had sought to fuse the Bildung ideal with the STS paradigm and cross-curricular thinking (Hansen and Olson 1996).
- 41.
“In the one, the maturing young person is the purpose of the curriculum. In the other, the teaching of subjects is the purpose. In the one case, disciplines of knowledge are to be mined to achieve its purpose; in the other, disciplines of knowledge are the purposes” (2004, p. 150).
- 42.
- 43.
Roberts (1988, p. 48) draws attention to where teacher loyalties commonly lie: “The influence of the subject community is an especially potent force in science education. In general, the ‘hero image’ … of the science teacher tends to be the scientist rather than the educator [or philosopher].”
- 44.
Hirst (2008b) has recently complained that in some countries such as England, there are now moves afoot to delist such courses for teacher training altogether. It would not be a stretch to conclude that such a downgrade in the general value of philosophy-of-education cannot fail to negatively impact science teacher professional development.
- 45.
The leading journals of the English-speaking world are Studies in Philosophy and Education, Educational Theory, Educational Philosophy and Theory, and Journal of the Philosophy of Education.
- 46.
- 47.
“Domination, resistance, oppression, liberation, transformation, voice, and empowerment are
the conceptual lenses through which critical theorists view schooling and pedagogy” (Atwater 1996, p. 823).
- 48.
- 49.
For examples of teachers caught in the debate, see Sullenger et al. (2000) and Witz and Lee (2009). For different perspectives on the debate in the academy, see Brown (2001), Giere (1999), Gross et al. (1995), Laudan (1990), Nola (1994), C. Norris (1997), Siegel (1987a, b), and Sokal and Bricmont (1998).
- 50.
Science educators continue to quarrel whether basic NoS statements can or should be defined, even where a measure of recognized consensus is said to exist—inclusive of those now written into global policy documents. The dispute centers on how to determine “consensus” (among which experts?), or questions regarding disciplinary distinctions, or about NoS cultural dependence on “Western” science and Enlightenment traditions, among others (Hodson 2008; Irzik and Nola 2011; Matthews 1998a; Rudolph 2000, 2002). Good and Shymansky (2001) make the case NoS statements found in “standards” documents like NSES and Benchmarks could be read from opposing positivist- or postmodernist-type perspectives.
- 51.
This viewpoint aligns to an extent with Hodson’s view (2009, p. 20) except for the fact he ignores relating his desired outcomes to educational philosophy and theory: “In my view, we should select NOS items for the curriculum in relation to other educational goals … paying close attention to cognitive goals and emotional demands of specific learning contexts, creating opportunities for students to experience doing science for themselves, enabling students to address complex socioscientific issues with critical understanding….” On what philo-educational grounds the selection is to be undertaken, we are not told though he considers students’ “needs and interests” (overlap with progressivism?), views of experts (“good” HPSS—the Platonic knowledge aim?), and “wider goals” of “authentic representation” of science and “politicization of students.” His lofty ambition for science education (thus his notion of “literacy”), however, includes too many all-encompassing and over-reaching objectives. These must clash and become prioritized (or so it seems) once his three stated criteria for subordinating goals force them under his socio-techno-activist umbrella of politicizing students—the ghost of Dewey beacons.
- 52.
The focus here is on the normative nature of the question (i.e., what do policy documents, researchers, or theorists stipulate?), as opposed to the empirical (i.e., what is going on in classrooms now?).
- 53.
This important topic is too often overlooked in curriculum theory or in the science education literature. See Fensham (2004), Geddis (1993), Klafki (1995), Lijnse (2000), Schulz (2011), Vásquez-Levy (2002), and Witz (2000); Dewey, Mach, and Schwab all in their day also identified the issue that the logic of the discipline does not conform with the psychologic of learning the subject matter of the discipline. Thereto, Aikenhead (1996) has argued that learning science involves a culturally rooted “border-crossing” on the part of the student, to negotiate the transition from the personal “lifeworld” to the “school-science world.”
- 54.
- 55.
- 56.
Driver et al. (1996, pp. 16–23) offer five rationales for teaching NoS in classrooms, yet they either assume or overlook their dependence upon different, prior educational theories.
- 57.
- 58.
- 59.
- 60.
He continues: “Too often we try to simply derive pedagogical practices from theoretical positions on learning, or diversity, or language, or the latest research on the functioning of the brain, etc.” (ibid).
- 61.
An example of the confusion which results in science education research when PE is ignored is the paper by Duschl (2008). Here empirical research from the learning sciences and science studies is confused with educational goals, which must be chosen on a normative basis. Such research may very tell us how students (and scientists) learn but expressly not why and what goals they should learn. And to argue for a “cultural imperative” is to make a normative claim extrapolated from such research—one is dabbling in PE without its recognition. Moreover, whether the avowed economic, democratic, epistemic, “social-learning” goals, etc. (as they have been historically articulated for the field) can be “balanced” as Duschl simply assumes is by no means obvious—PE debates show quite the opposite (Egan 1997; Levinson 2010; Schulz 2009a).
- 62.
To name just some in the Western tradition; Eastern and other traditions have of course their own major philosophers who have concerned themselves with education.
- 63.
A classic source of material for this orientation are the essays in Henry (1955).
- 64.
As those in the SocioScientific Issues (SSI), reform movement today insists (Zeidler and Sadler 2008).
- 65.
- 66.
Recall the ongoing past disputes between “science for scientists” and “science for all” perspectives on curriculum, goals, and policy (ByBee and DeBoer 1994; DeBoer 1991). The most recent STEM reform movement in the USA can be justifiably accused of redefining science education as “science for engineers.”
- 67.
So that it may “engage in explorations of what [science] education might be or might become: a task which grows more compelling as the ‘politics of the obvious’ grow more oppressive. This is the kind of thing that Plato, Rousseau and Dewey are engaged in on a grand scale” (Blake et al. 2003, p. 15).
- 68.
Carr holds that educational theory might be better suited to ethics (moral reasoning) than with any sort of empirical science, which is not to dismiss the worth of some empirical work: “On closer scrutiny, it seems that many modern social scientific theories of some educational influence are often little more than normative or moral accounts in thin empirical disguise” (2010, pp. 51–2). This deduction leaves unanswered the important question as to what the proper role and value of empirical research for educational theorizing is to be. The topic is controversial and engenders debate in PE. See Egan (2002) and Hyslop-Margison and Naseem (2007) for a negative assessment and Phillips (2005, 2007, 2009) for a positive view.
- 69.
“We have suffered from tenuous inferences drawn from insecure psychological theories for generations now, without obvious benefit” (Egan 2002, pp. 100–101).
- 70.
Phillips (2002, p. 233) terms these “classic theories of teaching and learning.”
- 71.
It should be noted that Dewey’s aim is among the least predetermined of the others, although it could reasonably be argued that Kant’s ideal is also dynamic insofar as he allows for education’s dual aim, the “perfecting” of man qua man plus the improvement of society and “the human race.” In addition, Frankena (1965, p. 156) also notes that such a dual aim in Dewey could considerably conflict—that the expected growth of the individual and society may clash—in anticipation of Egan’s critique, which claims the clash is inevitable insofar as modern schooling is molded according to progressivist precepts. Alternatively, for Dewey, but also for Aristotle and Kant, such a possible conflict was thought to be reconcilable in principle.
- 72.
Such questions are actually the purview of what is demanded of an educational theory. Philosophy of education properly understood is a much broader field of inquiry that encompasses an analysis of such theories and questions (Peters 1966), which today usually overlaps with curriculum studies. Frankena seems to have been working with a constricted conception solely at the level of theory.
- 73.
Smeyers (1994) identifies the same quandary for Western European education.
- 74.
In brief, socialization conflicts with the “Platonic” (knowledge-focused) project because the former seeks the conformity to values and beliefs of society while the latter encourages the questioning of these; socialization also conflicts with the “Rousseauian project” since the latter argues that personal growth must conflict with social norms and needs. It sees growth and hence education in intrinsic terms instead of as utility for other socially defined ends. (Here exists the principal tension between the Bildung tradition and the dominating utility view of education and science literacy of the English-speaking world.) The Platonic and Rousseauian projects conflict because the former assumes an epistemological model of learning and development and the latter a psychological one. In the former “mind” is created and the aim is knowledge; in the latter it develops naturally, requiring only proper guidance, and the aim is self-actualization.
- 75.
No one normally holds exclusively to one or the other, although usually one or the other is emphasized over the other two at a given time (depending upon the defined “crisis” at hand and under influence of respective social group interests), and the modern school and indeed many “standards” documents aim at a sort of balance between them. Roberts (1988), too, holds that “balance” is both desirable and achievable during public policy curriculum deliberations. Egan though insists that the attempts to achieve “balance” are illusory and must undermine the strengths of any one at the cost of the others.
- 76.
The term itself first came into use in the late 1950s. Initially broadly framed in terms of science, culture, and society relationships, it soon came however to mean learning technical, subject-specific knowledge: “This emphasis on disciplinary knowledge, separated from its everyday applications and intended to meet a perceived national need, marked a significant shift in science education in the post-war years. The broad study of science as a cultural force in preparation for informed and intelligent participation in a democratic society lost ground in the 1950s and 1960s to more sharply stated and more immediate practical aims” (DeBoer 2000, p. 588). By the 1980s the phrase had become commonplace: “Yet despite the problems of definition, by the 1980s scientific literacy had become the catchword of the science education community and the centerpiece of virtually all commission reports deploring the supposed sad state of science education” (Shamos 1995, p. 85).
- 77.
As can the seven “curriculum emphases” behind science curricula, identified by Roberts (1988)
- 78.
Shamos has insightfully argued that its common conception tied to citizenship is fundamentally flawed, that the community is chasing a utopia, that it continues to refuse to accept the grounds why it has failed in achieving it, and finally that many rationales typically put forth to justify it are a myth.
- 79.
Option two although seemingly attractive on the surface does not seem viable, and one can imagine numerous problems associated with it. Just mentioning one, it assumes a degree of autonomy for schools and teachers which they generally lack and which in the climate of “accountability” and standardized testing and under the influence of powerful outside social groups would seem to check their ability to make the kind of choices DeBoer would like. A reversion to option one would in all likelihood result, namely, the default traditionalist position.
- 80.
A series of papers presented at a recent conference attempting to articulate “a more expansive notion of scientific literacy” illustrate the problems associated with this deadlock once more and why the sought-after solutions remain so elusive; discussions including educational theory and philosophy are conspicuously absent (Linder et al. 2007).
- 81.
“This borrowing can have the healthy effect of bringing new insights to bear on the problems of science education, but it can also lead to superficial descriptions that do not seem to be pushing for deeper understanding” (2004, p. 101). He fails to mention a third possibility that outside theories can do outright damage to education, as Egan (1983, 2002) argues for the cases of behaviorism, Piaget, and progressivism. The presumed relevance of cognitive science has lately come into question as well (Slezak 2007).
- 82.
Reliance upon psychology is clearly predominant, primarily Bruner, Gagne, and Piaget in the 1960s and 1970s and the significant role they played marking the revolt against behaviorism.
- 83.
This book, however, as is familiar today, is based on the psychologist Ausubel’s quasi-neural theory of meaningful learning in combination with Toulmin’s philosophy of science and principally restricted to learning theory.
- 84.
It is admitted that Novak’s writings offered an important counter-theory in support of the growing dissatisfaction with the dominance of Piagetian theory arising in the late 1970s (although some science educators continue to hold neo-Piagetian views). With the growth of conceptual change and constructivist research in the 1980s and the influence of Kuhnian philosophy-of-science, this dominance was gradually displaced in the research community. On the other hand, Erickson (2000) cautions there is much common ground between Piaget and the newer constructivist theories. Egan’s cultural-linguistic metatheory (1997) is inclusive of learning theory but goes beyond it and outright rejects Piaget (Schulz 2009b).
- 85.
Leaving aside questions if its individual educational claims are either warranted or empirically validated. Strong advocates for this kind of politico-social activist PSE (just naming some researchers) are Hodson (2009) and Roth and Desautels (2002). Criticisms leveled against it are provided by Hadzigeorgiou (2008) and Levinson (2010).
- 86.
Does it fully take into consideration the three dimensions of the synoptic framework shown in Fig. 39.1?
- 87.
Roberts (1988, p. 50) had earlier cautioned the research community about the “individual ideological preference of professors of science education” which can “indoctrinate science teachers into believing that what counts as science education is the ideology of a single curriculum emphasis (or perhaps a few emphases)” (original italics).
- 88.
It seeks as well to address the common blurring of lines between “descriptive” and “normative” research work, the expectation that classroom research should change classroom teaching and learning, as Sherman (2005) points out, but strictly in accordance with a specified (ideological) program. This academic conflation may indeed be due to our culturally inherited situation, i.e., “if we can’t be objective, we’ll be openly ideological” (p. 205), but regrettably real “openness” is rare. The argument here in a nutshell is that science education avoids (c)overt ideology for candid philosophy.
- 89.
- 90.
For some time a major portion of science education research has in fact been focused on analyzing and critiquing the strengths and weaknesses of school science epistemology, whether of subject content, or of the student, or of the teacher.
- 91.
This has also been referred to in the research literature as the “disciplinary view of knowledge” in contrast to “personal learner epistemology” and “social practice views of epistemology” (Kelly et al. 2012). The latter defers to science studies research and how knowledge is attained and justified through discourse practices within epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina 1999). What is significant is that “within this perspective, knowledge is seen as competent action in a situation rather than as a correct, static representation of the world” (p. 286). What is not being acknowledged is that the two stated perspectives are themselves beholden to two different epistemological philosophies, namely, pragmatism and objectivism. While science education has traditionally been in the thrall of the second and is now expected to shift to the first, it could better take advantage of the respective benefits of each.
- 92.
Even when basic science “subject matter” is taught, it is always accompanied by some context that may operate covertly (e.g., preparatory, socio-utility, etc.). Such contexts have been called “meta-lessons” (Schwab), “curriculum emphases” (Roberts 1988), and “companion meanings” (Roberts and Oestman 1998).
- 93.
Also, what kind of science knowledge is of most worth (a key question of prioritizing subject content)?
- 94.
A very informative discussion on such questions, including examining beliefs, learning, knowledge, and critical inquiry pertaining to the aims of science education, can be found in Nola and Irzik (2005). The comments which follow can be considered supplemental to their work.
- 95.
Certainly the relatively recent research studies to enhance scientific argumentation in the classroom also aim towards resolution of the issues and questions raised here, but are not of present concern.
- 96.
- 97.
Kuhn (1970) was skeptical about what science education could achieve in terms of developing independent thought and argued instead the conservative view of reinforcing the conventional paradigm—in part because this furthered “progress” and in part because students had no competence to do otherwise. Schwab held a different view and thought students could be educated to become “fluid inquirers” within and about a discipline. Siegel (1978) has admirably contrasted the two opposing positions.
- 98.
Mason’s (2003) “Understanding understanding” is one of the few to explore the contrast.
- 99.
Some researchers have ventured into this territory; see, for example, Wallace and Louden (2003).
- 100.
“Current attitudes toward foundationalism, as they have been since Descartes, are sharply divided. The minoritarian conviction (Chisholm, Apel, Habermas, Haack, Swinburne, and others) that some version of foundationalism is or is at least potentially viable is outweighed by the majoritarian belief that in the debate since Descartes, foundationalism has died a natural death and cannot be revived” (Rockmore 2004, p. 56).
- 101.
Rorty, of course, also surfaces representation, but he explicitly ties it to philosophy as a profession whose role as a foundational discipline (with its “theory of knowledge” being essentially a “general theory of representation”) was to adjudicate all cultural knowledge claims, eventually including scientific ones. His view is comparable to Taylor’s “To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and the nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation” (1979, p. 3).
- 102.
Taylor links the success of “knowledge as correct representation” standpoint with two factors: its link with the rise of mechanistic science in the seventeenth century, whose mechanized worldview overthrew the Aristotelean one with its notion of “knowledge as participation” (“being informed by the same eidos, the mind participated in the being of the known object, rather than simply depicting it,” p. 467); secondly, the influence of Cartesian philosophy that insisted a new reliable “method” was required that could guarantee certainty of the representation. Yet this method entailed, unlike in philosophical antiquity, the reflective and critical cast of individual mind performing a subjectivist inward turn. Rorty’s view is similar (1979, p. 248).
- 103.
- 104.
See especially Rorty (1979, Chap. 7) and Gadamer (1989, p. 235).
- 105.
“Putnam now agrees with Goodman and Wittgenstein: to think of language as a picture of the world—a set of representations which philosophy needs to exhibit as standing in some sort of nonintentional relation to what they represent—is not useful in explaining how language is learned or understood” (1979, p. 295; original italics).
- 106.
This hermeneutic perspective on learning and understanding corresponds with the newer epistemological perspectives of the field: “… increasingly, science education researchers are viewing meaning as public, interpreted by participants (and analysts) through interaction of people via discourse including signs, symbols, models, and ways of being” (Kelly et al. 2012, p. 288).
- 107.
Hence his complaint that one can distinguish between “systematizers” (those engrossed in normal discourse) and “edifying” philosophers (anti-foundationalists like Dewey and hermeneutic thinkers like Heidegger, Gadamer, who disrupt it) within the tradition—the latter whose status as “true” philosophers is often questioned by academic professionals.
- 108.
Rockmore (2004, p. 57) writes that Rorty maintains “a strict but wholly arbitrary distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics in order to equate the failure of foundationalism with a form of skepticism that cannot be alleviated through a hermeneutical turn.” He accuses Rorty of still clinging to a standard of knowledge that he admits cannot be met. Rorty freely concludes that one can no longer hope to bring the mind in contact with the real and that interpretation must be the alternative, but just denies this will lead to knowledge in the conventional sense. Alternatively, Rockmore argues that “the main strategy for knowledge is, and always has been, interpretation” (ibid), not to be taken as tantamount to skepticism.
- 109.
This is not meant to imply this field of study is monolithic, and commentators commonly distinguish between “right-wing” (Gadamer) and “left-wing” (Derrida) factions. Yet such a categorization is equally overly simplified. Those in educational studies—see Gallagher (1992)—distinguish four separate schools: conservative (Dilthey; Hirsch), moderate (Gadamer; Ricoeur), radical (Derrida; Foucault), and critical (Habermas; Apel).
- 110.
Rockmore maintains that the shift leads to a redefinition of epistemology, from “knowing the way the mind-independent world is” to “the interpretation of experience” which is justified by the standards in use in a given cognitive domain. In this reformulation “then epistemology as hermeneutics presents itself as a viable successor to the traditional view of epistemology—indeed as the most likely approach at the start of the new century” (p. 11). Westphal criticizes Rorty for failing to distinguish between classical epistemology and hermeneutics seen as a generic epistemological task, hence, to differentiate the replacement of only one type (foundationalism): “hermeneutics is epistemology, generically construed … it belongs to the same genus precisely because like them it is a meta-theory about how we should understand the cognitive claims of common sense, of natural and social sciences, and even metaphysics and theology” (p. 416; original italics).
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Schulz, R.M. (2014). Philosophy of Education and Science Education: A Vital but Underdeveloped Relationship. In: Matthews, M. (eds) International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7654-8_39
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