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Contested Frameworks in Environmental Ethics

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Linking Ecology and Ethics for a Changing World

Part of the book series: Ecology and Ethics ((ECET,volume 1))

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of some key, and contrasting, ideas in environmental ethics for those unfamiliar with the field. It outlines the ways in which environmental ethicists have defended different positions concerning what matters ethically, from those that focus on human beings (including issues of environmental justice and justice between generations) to those who argue that non-human animals, living organisms, ecosystems and species have some kind of moral status. The chapter also considers different theoretical approaches to environmental ethics in terms of consequentialist, broadly deontological and virtue theories. Finally, three different interpretations of moral pluralism in environmental ethics are introduced: pluralism about values, pluralism about theories, and a pragmatic, methodological pluralism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a longer, though still brief history, see http://www.cep.unt.edu/novice.html

  2. 2.

    For more information about approaches drawn from Continental philosophy, see Brown and Toadvine (2003); Foltz and Frodeman (2004), and from Latin American philosophy see Rozzi (2012). For Deep Ecology see Brennan and Witoszek (1999); for Social Ecology, see Bookchin (1995), Light (1998); for ecofeminism, see Plumwood (1994), Warren (1997).

  3. 3.

    But see Elliot (1997), Throop (2000) on ecological restoration.

  4. 4.

    See Callicott and Nelson (1998) on wilderness.

  5. 5.

    So, for instance, on some accounts intrinsic value is taken to mean the value some thing or state has in itself, independently of its relations; while alternatively, on other accounts, intrinsic value is the value an object, state or fact has an end, rather than as a means. See O’Neill (1992); McShane (2007) and Zimmerman (2010) for further discussion.

  6. 6.

    “Strong” and “weak” anthropocentrism can be used in different ways. For instance, these terms may describe the origin of values, or the objects of values; here I’m referring to the objects of values. Bryan Norton takes “strong anthropocentrism” to mean instrumentally valuing nature for consumptive uses and “weak anthropocentrism” to mean “widely” instrumentally valuing nature for nonconsumptive “higher uses” (e.g. as an aesthetic and spiritual resource).

  7. 7.

    I won’t discuss some theories important in ethics more generally (such as ethical egoism and moral contractarianism) that have been less significant in environmental ethics.

  8. 8.

    This is, of course, oversimplified; there are forms of consequentialism that don’t focus on actions; and there are satisficing, not maximizing consequentialisms; but these variations have not been highly significant in environmental ethics.

  9. 9.

    There are other forms of consequentialism that work with intended or actual, not expected outcomes.

  10. 10.

    Some sophisticated forms of consequentialism – in particular various kinds of indirect consequentialism avoid these difficulties; I’m just sketching relatively simple forms here.

  11. 11.

    This kind of value pluralism is of particular significance to consequentialists, who aim at bringing about the best outcomes. There is a similar kind of pluralism of principles, more common among deontologists, that I do not have space to discuss here.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, 4237 TAMU, College Station, TX, 77843-4237, USA

    Clare Palmer

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  1. Clare Palmer
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Correspondence to Clare Palmer .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Texas, Sub-Antarctic Biocultural Conservation Department of Philosophy and Religion St, Denton, USA

    Ricardo Rozzi

  2. Plant Ecology, Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies, Millbrook, New York, USA

    S.T.A. Pickett

  3. Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, USA

    Clare Palmer

  4. Departamento de Ecología, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile

    Juan J. Armesto

  5. Department of Philosophy and Religion Studies, University of North Texas, Denton, USA

    J. Baird Callicott

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Palmer, C. (2013). Contested Frameworks in Environmental Ethics. In: Rozzi, R., Pickett, S., Palmer, C., Armesto, J., Callicott, J. (eds) Linking Ecology and Ethics for a Changing World. Ecology and Ethics, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7470-4_16

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