Abstract
The objective of this report is present the inter-governmental dynamics when considering a deliberate biological incident. In such an event, the epidemiological data may be incorporated into a larger investigation or intelligence analysis framework and may be showcased for legal or national security decision making. While in many countries, the civilian public health and security communities (broadly including in the latter the intelligence, law enforcement and the military) are not de facto partners in countering biological threats, there is a significant, upward global trend of pursuing inter-ministerial collaboration and a “whole of government”/“whole of society” national approach in that regard. Illustrative examples of blending these “yin and yang” areas of countering biological threats also exist at the international level under the WHO International Health Regulations (IHRs), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) as well as in several bilateral engagements between inter-governmental organizations. By identifying the synergy and convergence of public health and security under the BWC, IHRs, and UNSCR 1540, countries could maximize the use of limited national resources by establishing inter-ministerial, regional and international partnerships in order to strengthen the core capacities required by the WHO IHRs as well as the existing national measures consistent with their obligations under the BWC and UNSCR 1540 to deter, prevent, and respond to biological incidents or threats.
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Notes
- 1.
Confidence-Building Measure (CBM) “B” under the BWC (on “Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins”) identifies specific reporting criteria for “outbreaks that seem to deviate from the normal pattern”- when the cause of the outbreak cannot be readily determined or the causative agent is difficult to diagnose; when the disease may be caused by organisms which meet the criteria for risk groups III or IV, according to the classification in the latest edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual; when the causative agent is exotic to a given geographical region; when the disease follows an unusual pattern of development; when the disease occurs in the vicinity of research centres and laboratories subject to exchange of data under CBM A; when suspicions arise of the possible occurrence of a new disease. See: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/. (httpPages)/E5DF7E4EB547D5ACC1257AC40056A030?OpenDocument
- 2.
WHO IHRs website at: http://www.who.int/ihr
- 3.
1540 Committee website at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540
- 4.
Ibid.
- 5.
National 1540 Matrices are posted online at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-imple-mentation/1540-matrix/committee-approved-matrices.shtml
- 6.
1540 Committee website dedicated to the 2009 Comprehensive review, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/comprehensive-review/2009.shtml
- 7.
BWC Implementation Support Unit website, at: http://www.unog.ch/bwc
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The views, opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or the official policy or position of the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Government, or the United Nations. At the time of publication of this manuscript, the author serves in a U.S. Government-seconded position as a member of the UN Security Council 1540 Committee’s Group of Experts (http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/committee/expert-group.shtml).
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Perkins, D. (2013). The Yin and Yang of Countering Biological Threats: Public Health and Security Under the International Health Regulations, Biological Weapons Convention, and the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. In: Vaseashta, A., Khudaverdyan, S. (eds) Advanced Sensors for Safety and Security. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series B: Physics and Biophysics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7003-4_5
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