Abstract
Questions concerning the scope, content, and richness of perceptual cognition were widely debated in the ancient philosophical schools. More specific problems related to this theme arose from recognition of the obvious fact that the senses alone are insufficient for explaining the variety of human and animal cognition. Whether or not all such cognition should be ascribed to reason was a matter of debate. Most importantly, opinions diverged with respect to the following questions. Do we have perceptual reflexive cognition, that is, do we perceive that we perceive, or is reflexivity an essentially rational capacity? How can the unity of perceptual cognition be explained in light of the fact that the senses are separate from each other and have unique objects of their own? In a similar vein, if the proper objects of the senses are qualities (for example, flavours are the proper objects of taste), can we perceive things at all? Further, how can absent objects be present to the perceptual soul? To simplify, Aristotle and the Aristotelians were more willing to attribute these cognitive functions to the perceptual soul (2–5), whereas Plato and the Platonists tended to ascribe them to reason (for example, 4–5, see also the section on perception above). In the Aristotelian tradition, reflexive perception and the unity of perceptual cognition were explained by reference to the so-called ‘common sense’ (koinē aisthēsis) (1–2, 5–8), whereas the presence of absent objects to the perceptual soul was attributed to a capacity called phantasia (9–13).
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Tuominen, M. (2014). Common Sense and phantasia in Antiquity. In: Knuuttila, S., Sihvola, J. (eds) Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6967-0_7
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