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Ancient Theories of Judgement

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Abstract

The Greek term logos stands for a statement which is expressed in a language, but it also refers to a corresponding judgement or belief (doxa, hypolepsis) in one’s soul when one makes such a statement. The connexion between statements and judgements is arguably close, and some of the problems which arose in connection with statements were also relevant to judgement. A major problem discussed by early Greek thinkers concerned the nature and possibility of false statements: what, if anything, is making a false statement?

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Correspondence to Mika Perälä .

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Perälä, M. (2014). Ancient Theories of Judgement. In: Knuuttila, S., Sihvola, J. (eds) Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6967-0_19

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