Abstract
Ernest Sosa’s views on testimony and testimonial knowledge are rich, insightful, and subtle and have been developed in a number of papers and chapters spanning over 20 years. He has made important contributions to many of the central debates in this area of philosophy, but here I will limit my discussion to only three of them. I should say at the outset that though there is much that I agree with in Sosa’s writings, I will focus mostly on our areas of disagreement in what follows.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
It is only what Sosa calls “animal knowledge” that is acquired in extended Gettier cases; he still denies that subjects in such cases acquire what he calls “reflective knowledge.”
- 3.
- 4.
For an early discussion of this thesis, see Goldman (1976).
- 5.
See, for instance, Coady (1992).
- 6.
Again, see Coady (1992).
References
Coady, C.A.J. 1992. Testimony: A philosophical study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1976. Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 73: 771–791.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2007. Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know. Synthese 158: 345–361.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2009. Knowledge and credit. Philosophical Studies 142: 27–42.
Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical explanations. Cambridge: The Belknap Press.
Pritchard, Duncan. 2005. Epistemic luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pritchard, Duncan. 2008. A defence of quasi-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. Philosophica 78: 13–28.
Sosa, Ernest. 1991. Knowledge in perspective: Selected essays in epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, Ernest. 1999. How must knowledge be modally related to what is known? Philosophical Topics 26: 373–384.
Sosa, Ernest. 2000. Contextualim and skepticism. In J. Tomberlin (ed.). Philosophical Issues 34: 94–107.
Sosa, Ernest. 2002. Tracking, competence, and knowledge. In The oxford handbook of epistemology, ed. Paul Moser, 264–287. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, Ernest. 2003. The place of truth in epistemology. In Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology, eds. De.Paul, Michael and Zagzebski, Linda, 155–179. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, Ernest. 2006. Knowledge: Instrumental and testimonial. In The epistemology of testimony, eds. Lackey, Jennifer and Sosa, Ernest, 116–123. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Baron Reed for helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Lackey, J. (2013). The Virtues of Testimony. In: Turri, J. (eds) Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 119. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5934-3_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5934-3_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-5933-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-5934-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)