Abstract
The paper addresses the case when one’s self proves itself to be a hindrance in performing certain actions successfully if their validity hinges on the acknowledgement of others, thus seemingly limiting the scope of one’s autonomy. Picking out our practice of blaming, it is argued that this practice is shaped by the view that, metaphorically speaking, a person with a beam in her own eye is in no position to complain about the mote in the eye of another. Such a complaint would involve a distinctive kind of incoherence (one that can also be found in relation to praise). This incoherence has received little attention from moral philosophers, but incoherent blame and praise may be inappropriate for two rather different reasons. First, they might involve the non-moral inappropriateness of incoherent applications of the standards appealed to. This form of inappropriateness can occur outside morality and is not distinctively moral in nature. Second, incoherent blame and praise are often morally inappropriate because they demean others in that the incoherent appraiser elevates herself above her blamee (praisee) by presenting the latter in an unwarrantedly negative light, comparatively speaking. The first kind of inappropriateness does not explain the second.
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Notes
- 1.
Compare Cohen (2006), 120.
- 2.
The fact that a blamee is justified in offering an indirect reply does not mean she is not required to consider whether what she did was blameworthy.
- 3.
However, compare Smilansky (2007), 90–99.
- 4.
Treating all, including oneself, as individuals who are not owed a justification for their treatment is a flaw, but it is not the sort of essentially comparative flaw that demeaning someone involves.
- 5.
Exceptions – in addition to the two previous references to work by Cohen and Smilansky – Dworkin (2000), 182–188; Cohen (unpublished); Scanlon (2008), 122–214, 224–237.
- 6.
Like others who have written on the present topic (see Sect. 7), I do not use “inconsistent” and “incoherent” in their strict logical senses here; so, in our usage, an incoherent blamer need not contradict herself.
- 7.
An analogous point applies to the illa quoque reply.
- 8.
By “(im)proper” and “(im)propriety”, I mean the same as “(in)appropriate” and “(in)appropriateness”, respectively, so, in the interest of stylistic variation, I use both pairs of terms.
- 9.
Cohen (2006), 127.
- 10.
“A person’s right to complain is limited to violations of principles he acknowledges himself”, Rawls (2000), 190.
- 11.
Sher (2006), 9, 95. The same distinction applies to praising.
- 12.
Sher (2006), 112.
- 13.
Brandt (1958), 8.
- 14.
The self-reproach “I know I am much worse than you are, but I cannot help blaming you at heart” makes sense, which suggests that the inappropriateness under scrutiny does not apply only to cases of public blame.
- 15.
Dworkin (2000), 184. Dworkin’s explanandum is not what makes incoherent blame morally wrong, but what makes it fail to function as an act of blaming. This is why I do not turn to discuss Dworkin’s account (about which I have a number of reservations) towards the end of the paper.
- 16.
- 17.
Cf. Austin (1962), 16.
- 18.
Dworkin (2000), 184.
- 19.
Dworkin (2000), 183–184.
- 20.
Cohen (2006), 119, n.10.
- 21.
Cohen thinks that the root inappropriateness of incoherent blame consists in a certain kind of inconsistency and that it is, at least in part, due to such inconsistency that incoherent blame is pro tanto morally wrong. I return to the second part of his position in Sect. 7.
- 22.
This example does not contradict anything Cohen says because he thinks that incoherent condemning is pro tanto wrong unless certain (unspecified) presuppositions are satisfied and my example might involve the satisfaction of one of these.
- 23.
Dworkin (2000), 185.
- 24.
Cohen (unpublished), 4.
- 25.
I return to this in Sect. 6 in the course of discussing Scanlon’s views.
- 26.
Compare Cohen (unpublished), 2. Dworkin endorses the favourable comparison view: see Dworkin (2000), 185.
- 27.
I am not suggesting that my involvement in another person’s action cannot undermine my standing to blame her for her action if my blame is based on a principle that condemns only such actions and does not condemn others’ encouraging or otherwise being indirectly conducive to the production of such actions. However, the fact that such erosion can occur is clearer when the principle appealed to by the blamer also condemns her involvement in the action.
- 28.
Dworkin might accept this view since, as already mentioned, he allows for infelicity cancellers (Dworkin 2000, 184).
- 29.
In the interest of brevity, I shall not rewrite the self-other asymmetry view to accommodate this point; I merely point to the need for revision.
- 30.
Compare Cohen (2006), 123n17.
- 31.
Studies of the “superiority bias” strongly suggest that false beliefs to the effect that one would perform better than average are widespread, e.g. Kruger and Dunning (1999), 1121–1134.
- 32.
Compare the discussion of the relationship between hypocrisy and tu quoque in the third paragraph of Sect. 3.
- 33.
Compare Cohen (2006), 127, n.21.
- 34.
By “praise,” I have in mind something more than simply judging something to be praiseworthy: namely, what Scanlon calls the positive correlate of blame, see Sect. 6.
- 35.
This is not to deny that coherent praise from a more virtuous person can be coherent and yet condescending (in essence, demeaning). This might occur because the praise all too clearly manifests the praiser’s view of herself as superior.
- 36.
Maes (2004), 485–497.
- 37.
In fact, the issue of who is a relevant other might helpfully be seen as a fifth dimension of incoherent blame. I owe this suggestion to Nadja Jelinek and Michael Kühler.
- 38.
There are several determinants of who is a “relevant other”: e.g. whether the appraiser acts in her capacity as the occupant of a particular social position; whether the putatively relevant other is an individual to whom the same evaluative standards are applicable as are applicable to the appraised person (e.g. both are grown-ups); whether the putatively relevant other is physically present (as illustrated by the Hitler example).
- 39.
Scanlon (2008), 122–123, 128–129. This appears not to fit the case where Adam acts in a way that is blameworthy, but less so than what Beatrice had, for good reason, expected. Presumably, Beatrice might blame Adam for what he did even if she now thinks that their mutual relationship has improved relative to what it was prior to Adam’s blameworthy action. It is also unclear whether Scanlon’s account fits cases of incoherent blame where the blamer blames the blamee for something the blamee has done to a third party: compare Scanlon (2008), 178–179.
- 40.
Scanlon (2008), 151.
- 41.
Scanlon (2008), 151.
- 42.
Scanlon (2008), 176–177. I think the intended meaning in the last sentence is captured better if “it is your willingness” is read as “it is only your willingness” since otherwise the blamer is not implying anything false.
- 43.
Recall my discussion of the relationship between hypocrisy and tu quoque in the third paragraph of Sect. 3.
- 44.
Even more problematic are cases where the greater faults are indicative of their possessor being a more trustworthy participant in normal moral relationships.
- 45.
By “praising” I mean the positive Scanlonian correlate of blame: see the second paragraph of this Sect. 6.
- 46.
The case in which the lesser sinner ignores the much greater faults of another and blames herself, thus falsely implying that it is her own lesser faults that impair their relationship, supports the same conclusion.
- 47.
Cohen (unpublished), 8. Later in the notes, Cohen suggests that inconsistency is not the whole explanation: respect enters the picture as well.
- 48.
Cp. Cohen (unpublished), 9.
- 49.
If we do say this, it is in order to change the self-reproacher’s view of the seriousness of her faults, not to deny her the right to reproach herself.
- 50.
A “condemnation that displays motivated selection condemns itself”, Cohen (unpublished), 9.
- 51.
A further problem is that it seems false that other-directed inconsistency is motivated (period) and self-directed inconsistency is not. More likely, both cases will often involve motivation, but with differing specific content. The former presumably involves motivation springing from self-love or from a superiority bias. The latter may involve motivation springing from excessive humility or from a masochistic desire to punish oneself. However, this problem is less pertinent to my concerns in this chapter than the one presented in the main text.
- 52.
Apart from the element of sending a message, this is true even in the case of private blaming. Arguably, such blame does not wrong the blamee, but it still reflects a vice of the blamer’s, e.g., vainglory or partiality.
- 53.
Some philosophers, including Kantians, perhaps, might affirm a moral duty not to demean oneself. However, since they presumably think that incoherent self-reproach is morally wrong and demeaning to the person incoherently reproaching herself, they might still accept that the right account of the morality of incoherent appraisals should be based on considerations having to do with the wrongness of demeaning someone.
- 54.
Incoherent praise of another individual can also be demeaning because it signals that one’s expectations of the praisee are insultingly low, comparatively speaking, despite the absence of evidence warranting such low expectations.
- 55.
Previous versions of this paper were presented at University of Konstanz, July 30, 2008; University of Copenhagen, September 30, 2008; Swedish Center for Advanced Studies (SCAS), Uppsala, October 10, 2008; and University of Aarhus, November 19, 2008. I thank Gustaf Arrhenius, Ludvig Beckman, Krister Bykvist, John Christman, Karin Wohlgast Elsawah, Jakob Elster, Hans Fink, Ejvind Hansen, Nils Holtug, Nadja Jelinek, Michael Kühler, Sune Lægaard, Raino Malnes, Christian Munthe, Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen, Jonas Olson, Nila Parly, Ingmar Persson, Robert Jensen-Rix, Jesper Ryberg, Thomas Søbirk Petersen, Morten Raffnsøe-Møller, Paul Robinson, Raffaele Rodogno, Troels Stru Schmidt, Gottfried Seebaβ, Johanna Seibt, Saul Smilansky, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Folke Tersman and Torbjörn Tännsjö for helpful criticisms. Also, I am indebted to Jerry Cohen and Nir Eyal for penetrating written comments on the penultimate draft and to the former for sharing with me his brilliant unpublished notes on this chapter’s topic (besides so much else).
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Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2013). Who Can I Blame?. In: Kühler, M., Jelinek, N. (eds) Autonomy and the Self. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 118. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4789-0_14
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