Abstract
Analytical philosophy has not shied away from such a big question as what a just society would look like, how it would be organized. Sometimes a particular segment of society, or a specific dimension is singled out—often in response to a perceived lacuna—as in work on gender justice or justice and the family (e.g. Kirp et al. 1986; Robeyns 2007). When it comes to the elderly, however, broad perspectives and wider visions are nowhere to be seen. A thorough search of the academic literature reveals that the conjunction of ‘justice’ and ‘elderly’ has resulted in just a few topics for philosophical and ethical debate.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See especially the work of Daniels and McKerlie.
- 3.
Of course, when a just distribution of (financial) resources between the young and the old is reached, this must be just both to the young and the old, so that in this respect justice for the elderly has also been done. But the starting-point is very different from the one I suggest in this chapter. (In fact, these debates are often sparked and fuelled by a concern that the elderly are taking too much, leaving too little for younger generations .)
- 4.
Most contributors to this debate do not explicate whether the duties of adult children towards their parents are moral duties or, more specifically, duties of justice . It is my contention that some of the issues at stake here are matters of justice, but I believe that some of the contributors to this debate would agree (e.g. Post 1989).
- 5.
Wang (1998) and Thompson (2003) do address these connections, as do I in Schinkel (2012).
- 6.
For the purpose of this chapter, I do not consider it necessary to define what I mean by a ‘just society’ with great precision. A just society would contain no serious structural injustices, either in the (basic or nonbasic) institutional structure, or in societal or generational attitudes towards specific groups. But it would not have to be perfectly just, if that were to mean the total absence of any form of injustice. It would still be possible for some injustice to occur, for instance as an unintended side-effect of certain policies; but in a just society action would be taken to remedy this, of course. A just society, then, is an ideal – but it should be formulated as a realistic ideal. An assumption underlying this chapter is that even present-day affluent Western societies fall far short of this ideal when it comes to the place and treatment of the elderly in these societies.
- 7.
The distinction between ideal and non-ideal justice is also relevant here. Some policy or course of action may be just in non-ideal circumstances, even if it is unjust from an ideal-theoretical perspective. For this distinction see, for instance, Robeyns and Swift (2008).
- 8.
I will say more about the kinds of claim needs may generate in 3.3.
- 9.
Two popular ways in which these goods have been defined are as ‘primary goods’ (“things that every rational man is presumed to want” because they “normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life”, according to Rawls (2003a, p. 54); or “various social conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary to enable citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two moral powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good”, according to Rawls (2003b, p. 57)), and as ‘capabilities’ (and/or ‘functionings’), which may be defined as actual opportunities and capacities for worthwhile ways of functioning; see, for instance, Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2006). For a comparison between these two ‘metrics’ of justice see Brighouse and Robeyns (2010).
- 10.
This is not a phenomenological description of the experience of recognition, but an interpretation of it in terms of its relevance for considerations of justice.
- 11.
Tillich (1954, p. 63) speaks of “the intrinsic claim for justice of everything that has being”. I will not be concerned here with the question whether we should indeed include ‘everything that has being’ in the scope of justice.
- 12.
- 13.
There are different ways of dealing with intuitions about so-called ‘marginal cases’ or differences between human beings and animals, but I cannot go into this here.
- 14.
The distinction between dimensions and domains is intuitive. A dimension of justice constitutes a specific sense in which people may be treated justly or unjustly; each dimension offers one coordinate of justice in any concrete situation. Domains are relational settings in which justice may or may not be done. But some dimensions may have a connection with a particular domain and vice versa; I treat ‘just care’ as a dimension of justice as recognition, for instance, but ‘care’ could also be seen as a domain of justice.
- 15.
See Keizer’s contribution to this volume.
- 16.
Greenberg, Schimel, and Mertens (2002) relate prejudice against elderly people to fear and anxiety about one’s own mortality.
- 17.
‘Active’ discrimination expresses more than a lack of recognition. It shows positive disrespect rather than a ‘mere’ lack of respect; the person discriminated against is explicitly perceived as worth less than others. This is probably relatively rare when it comes to the elderly. Levy and Banaji (2002) note that ageism differs from prejudice against religious, racial or ethnic groups as well as gender prejudice in that it is much more implicit: there are no hate groups that target the elderly, as there are for the other groups; however, also unlike with religious, racial, ethic or gender prejudice and discrimination, “social sanctions against expressions of negative attitudes and beliefs about the elderly are almost completely absent” (50).
- 18.
Wicclair (1993, p. 82) defines policies, practices, beliefs, et cetera, as ageist “if they are based on false or unfounded universal or statistical generalizations that attribute negative characteristics to the elderly or old age”, such as that all elderly are forgetful or depressed.
- 19.
This is a short statement of the ‘broader’ definition of ageism; the ‘narrow’ definition says that “ageism is discrimination against older people on grounds of age” (Bytheway 2005, p. 338).
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
His main treatment of this issue is in Daniels (1988).
- 23.
The idea of ‘fair innings’ expresses a similar idea somewhat differently, suggesting that those who attain what Callahan calls a natural lifespan have had their ‘fair share’ of life; for a critique of the fair innings argument see Rivlin (2000).
- 24.
Wicclair (1993, p. 89): “Justice can require greater expenditures.”
- 25.
There is obviously some affinity here between Daniels and Callahan.
- 26.
Jecker (1989, p. 87).
- 27.
The distinction between comparative and noncomparative justice derives from Feinberg (1974). Comparative issues are issues where what one person is due can only be determined by reference to what others are due; in the noncomparative case, a person’s due can be determined without reference to others.
- 28.
Irwin (1996) argues that there is little evidence in society of the antagonism between generations that many authors anticipate, and suggests, in effect, that it may be a theoretical construct, resulting from particular (flawed) approaches to demographic changes and social inequality.
- 29.
- 30.
Kittay (1999, p. 71) does speak of “the recognition of equality inherent in the understanding that we are all some mother’s child” (which she calls ‘connection-based equality’), and others also occasionally use the term; yet they do not develop the concept.
- 31.
Sen (2009, 251–252, 260–261) acknowledges the importance of needs, but emphasizes the relative importance of freedom “(including the freedom to meet our needs)” (251). Engster (2007) makes care central to his moral and political theory: “Because human beings universally depend upon one another for care, we all have moral obligations to care for others in need.” (2) Thus, for Engster, a caring society is one in which individuals are enabled, first of all, “to meet their basic needs” (76) – and ‘care theory’, in this book, provides nothing other than “an alternative vision of a just society” (5).
- 32.
See, for instance, Tonkens (2007) for comments on this use of diapers.
- 33.
See, for instance, the study by Lindau et al. in the United States (2007), which showed that 26 % of respondents between 75 and 85 years of age were still sexually active. Significantly more men than women were sexually active at that age.
- 34.
Culpability does not always matter, especially when it comes to basic needs. Even if it is someone’s own fault that he lacks food, justice may (in some cases) still require others to provide it.
- 35.
If I get on the same bus (that she drives) every day, however, I do after some time expect her to recognize me in the most familiar sense of the word, and if she does not, or does not acknowledge it at all, this amounts to a lack of respect.
- 36.
I cannot go into the relations between recognition as the primary act of justice and people’s need for recognition in any detail here. Failure of recognition, in the sense in which I use the term, is not only problematic because it frustrates people’s need for recognition.
- 37.
They refer to Zebrowitz, L.A., and J.M. Montepare. 2000. “Too young, too old: Stigmatizing adolescents and elders”. In The social psychology of stigma, ed. T.F. Heatherton, R.E. Kleck, M.R. Hebl, and J.G. Hull, 334–373. New York: Guilford Press.
- 38.
They refer to Kite, M., and B. Johnson. 1988. “Attitudes toward older and younger adults: A meta-analysis”. Psychology and Aging 3: 233–244.
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Acknowledgements
In writing this chapter I have benefited greatly from various people’s helpful comments on earlier drafts; thanks are due especially to Martijn Boot, Patrick Delaere, Anca Gheaus, Elke Müller, Gijs van Oenen, Ingrid Robeyns, Maureen Sie, Christian van der Veeke, Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours and Arno Wouters at Erasmus University Rotterdam, as well as to the editors of this volume. The research for this paper was done in the context of Ingrid Robeyns VICI project Social Justice and the New Welfare State, financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).
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Schinkel, A. (2013). Justice and the Elderly. In: Schermer, M., Pinxten, W. (eds) Ethics, Health Policy and (Anti-) Aging: Mixed Blessings. Ethics and Health Policy, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3870-6_12
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