Abstract
While institutional shareholders are shown to be effective monitors in curbing executive compensation in mature capital markets, this study presents findings from Chinese stock markets, and indicates the possible collusion between institutional shareholders (e.g. mutual funds) and executives in publicly listed companies. Mutual funds in China fail to serve as an effective monitor of executive compensation, suggesting that ethics seems to play no part when mutual funds and the management of listed companies extract their self-interests. Further analysis also demonstrates that, while bank-affiliated mutual funds are not better monitors than non-bank-affiliated ones, joint-equity-bank-affiliated ones are more effective monitors than state-owned-bank-affiliated ones.
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Notes
- 1.
Common stocks in China consist of both tradable shares and non-tradable shares. This is one of the typical features of Chinese markets, and will be further discussed in the next section.
- 2.
According to the People Daily, employees in Chinese urban areas earn, on average, RMB24,932 in 2007. Source: politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/8375733.html
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Ding, S., Jia, C., Li, Y., Wu, Z. (2013). Institutional Shareholders and Executive Compensation: An Ethical View. In: Cressy, R., Cumming, D., Mallin, C. (eds) Entrepreneurship, Finance, Governance and Ethics. Advances in Business Ethics Research, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3867-6_16
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