Abstract
This chapter discusses the pragma-dialectical approach developed in the Netherlands by van Eemeren and Grootendorst between the 1970s and the late 1990s and extended by van Eemeren and Houtlosser at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. After a short expose about the origins and development of the theory in Sect. 10.1and a sketch of the normative pragmatic research carried out in pragma-dialectics in Sect. 10.2, in Sect. 10.3 the meta-theoretical starting points are discussed.
In Sect. 10.4 the model for critical discussion is introduced and explained, followed in Sect. 10.5 by a discussion of analysis as reconstruction of argumentative discourse in terms of a critical discussion. In Sect. 10.6 the rules for critical discussion associated with the model are introduced, and in Sect. 10.7 the fallacies that may occur in argumentative discourse are characterized as violations of these rules.
The extension of the standard pragma-dialectical theory with the inclusion of strategic maneuvering is introduced in Sect. 10.8. Sect. 10.9 deals with the conventionalization of argumentative discourse in communicative activity types that needs to be taken into account when analyzing and evaluating specimens of strategic maneuvering. In Sect. 10.10 the fallacies are revisited by characterizing them as derailments of strategic maneuvering in which in aiming for effectiveness one or more of the rules for critical discussion have been violated.
The next two sections are devoted to pragma-dialectical empirical research of argumentative reality. Sect. 10.11 reports about qualitative research, such as the research concerning indicators of argumentative moves in discourse by van Eemeren, Houtlosser, and Snoeck Henkemans and the research of dissociation by van Rees. Sect. 10.12 reports about quantitative research, such as, to mention the most prominent study, van Eemeren, Garssen, and Meuffels’s experimental research concerning the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules. In Sect. 10.13 various kinds of applications of pragma-dialectical insights to the analysis and evaluation of strategic maneuvering in specific communicative domains are discussed, such as those of Feteris to the legal domain and those of other pragma-dialecticians to the political, the medical, and the academic domain.
To conclude, Sect. 10.14 reports about various kinds of critical responses to the pragma-dialectical theory.
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Notes
- 1.
Some of the monographs mentioned were translated (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, into Russian (1994c) and Spanish (2013); van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a, into Bulgarian (2009b), Chinese (1991b), French (1996), Romanian (2010), Russian (1992b), and Spanish (2007); van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, into Bulgarian (2006), Chinese (2002), Italian (2008), and Spanish (2011); van Eemeren 2010, into Italian (2014) and Spanish (2013b) [Chinese and Japanese translations are in preparation]).
- 2.
Since 2010 they are all part of the International Learned Institute for Argumentation Studies (ILIAS).
- 3.
In hindsight, a potentially constructive move may not be constructive because it is fallacious. See Sect. 10.7.
- 4.
- 5.
For a more detailed exposition of the meta-theoretical starting points, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984).
- 6.
For a well-articulated example of a structure-oriented logical approach to argumentation, see Fisher (2004).
- 7.
The term disagreement space is introduced in Jackson (1992, p. 261).
- 8.
For the distinction between identity conditions and correctness conditions, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a, pp. 30–31).
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
For an articulated example of a non-externalized and psychologizing approach to argumentation, see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969).
- 12.
This response can be viewed as the intended “perlocutionary” effect of argumentation. For a discussion of the relation between the illocutionary act complex of “argumentation” and the perlocutionary act of “convincing,” see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 47–74), Jacobs (1987, pp. 231–233), and van Eemeren (2010, pp. 36–39).
- 13.
See for an articulated example of a descriptive, “emic” approach Doury (2004, 2006). The pragma-dialectical take on Pike’s (1967) distinction between an “internal” emic approach to discourse, which is participant-centered, and an “external” etic approach, which is theory-driven, is discussed in van Eemeren (2010, pp. 137–138).
- 14.
For the notions of objective (or problem-solving) validity and intersubjective (or conventional) validity, which are based on insights developed by Crawshay-Williams (1957), see Barth and Krabbe (1982, pp. 21–22). See also Sects. 3.7 and 3.9 of this volume.
- 15.
A critical discussion reflects a critical rationalist interpretation of the dialectic ideal of testing rationally any form of conviction – not only descriptive statements of a factual kind but also value judgments and practical standpoints about action (Albert 1975). Starting from the idea that in principle all human standpoints are open to criticism, in the pragma-dialectical approach, the guiding principle in testing the acceptability of standpoints is that they are to be subjected to a critical discussion.
- 16.
In line with the critical rationalist perspective, testing standpoints by means of a critical discussion involves in the first place trying to detect inconsistencies between these standpoints and the arguer’s other commitments (Albert 1975, p. 44).
- 17.
Even in settling disputes and disagreements, it can be useful to conduct a critical discussion to find out to what extent a joint resolution is possible.
- 18.
In spite of their different philosophical roots, the model of a critical discussion represents like Habermas’s (1971, 1981) “ideal speech situation ,” an idealized state of affairs which differs from existing reality. However, instead of being instruments in achieving the Habermasian ideal of consensus, intellectual doubt and criticism are in pragma-dialectics viewed as the driving forces of intellectual and cultural progress, fostering a continual flux of ever more advanced opinions. Achieving consensus is in this process in each particular case just one of the necessary intermediate steps on the way to the next difference.
- 19.
A difference of opinion emerges when one’s standpoint is not shared by the other. This does not necessarily mean that the other takes an opposite standpoint, as is the case in a “mixed” difference of opinion. It can also be that the other merely has doubt concerning the acceptability of one’s standpoint. A presumption of doubt is already enough reason for advancing argumentation. See van Eemeren et al. (2002a, Chap. 1).
- 20.
If there are more standpoints at issue, a participant in the discussion can take on the role of protagonist for some standpoints and the role of antagonist for other standpoints, so that the various standpoints may have different protagonists. Having the role of antagonist may (but need not) coincide with taking on the role of protagonist of another – contrary – standpoint. See for these distinctions van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a, pp. 13–25).
- 21.
For an argumentative exchange in which this precondition has clearly not been fulfilled, see van Eemeren et al. (1993, pp. 142–169).
- 22.
The different types of complex argumentation that can come into being vary from multiple argumentation to argumentation that is coordinatively compound or subordinatively compound and combinations of them. See for the different kinds of argumentation structure van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a, pp. 73–89) and Snoeck Henkemans (1992).
- 23.
In spite of the use of the expression “I promise,” in this case the speech act performed amounts to a threat rather than a promise.
- 24.
Like other indirect speech acts, expressives sometimes need to be reconstructed as standpoints or arguments. Even if they are just expressives they may be of influence by distracting attention from the discussion, as when a participant sighs to make clear that the discussion depresses her.
- 25.
The subcategory of the usage declaratives is introduced in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 109–110).
- 26.
Viskil (1994, in Dutch) develops theoretical guidelines for the pragma-dialectical framing of definitions.
- 27.
Due to their dependence on the authority of the speaker or writer in a certain institutional context, declaratives can sometimes lead to a settlement (but not a resolution) of a dispute, as when a judge pronounces a verdict.
- 28.
See for of an explanation of these reasons van Eemeren (2010, p. 13).
- 29.
From the observations that often the parties fail to identify what exactly their difference of opinion involves, that it is not always immediately clear who is to be convinced of the acceptability of the standpoints at issue, that the division of the discussion roles and the procedural and material starting points are as a rule only mentioned when they are not regarded as understood, that argumentation remains standardly partly unexpressed and criticisms implicit, and that conclusions are often just suggested, it can be concluded neither that the discourse is deficient nor that the model of critical discussion is not realistic. The former is contradicted by pragmatic insight concerning the conduct of ordinary discourse and the latter by dialectical insight concerning the process of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, Chap. 4; 1992a, Chap. 5; van Eemeren et al. 1993, Chap. 3).
- 30.
An argumentative discourse in which a standpoint is defended by means of a monologue is in pragma-dialectics viewed as an implicit discussion in which only one of the parties participates explicitly. Because such a discourse is also aimed at convincing potential critics, even though they may not be actually present, their views need to be taken into account, however implicit these views may be. Just like in explicit discussions, parties putting forward their case cannot just present their argumentation but need to cover in some way or the other the other discussion stages as well. A practical complication of analyzing implicit discussions is that the discussion stages are usually harder to identify.
- 31.
The first question in reconstructing an oral or written discourse always is whether the discourse is indeed wholly or partly argumentative. Although in some cases the discourse is evidently not argumentative, more often than not a discourse that is not presented as argumentative all the same has an argumentative function. The demarcation criterion is whether the discourse is, directly or indirectly, aimed at overcoming the addressee’s doubts regarding the acceptability of a standpoint.
- 32.
As explained in van Eemeren (2010, pp. 16–19), the analytic overview resulting from the analysis needs to satisfy requirements of economy, efficacy, coherence, realism, and well-foundedness.
- 33.
The transformations are aimed at reconstructing the way in which the various parts of the discourse contribute to resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, which does not necessarily always correspond with the way in which they are viewed by the participants.
- 34.
- 35.
All crucial concepts mentioned in Sect. 1.3 are represented in the analytic overview, except for the concept of fallacies, which plays a part in the evaluation of argumentative discourse. See Sect. 10.7.
- 36.
Starting from an analytic overview (or a writing plan similar to an analytic overview), in pragma-dialectics also a method has been developed for writing and rewriting argumentative texts in such a way that their comprehensibility and acceptability are not diminished by redundancy, implicitness, disarrangement, or lack of clarity (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1999). In this method, four presentational transformation s are applied to the analytic overview (or writing plan) that roughly “mirror” the reconstruction transformations: presentational deletion (what can be left out?), presentational addition (what should be added?), presentational permutation (which rearrangements are to be made?), and presentational substitution (which rephrasings are necessary?).
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
A full explanation of the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion can be found in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 123–157).
- 42.
This procedure, and other procedures mentioned in the rules, will be explained below.
- 43.
The formulation of the code of conduct used in this section is based on its latest version in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 190–196).
- 44.
It is worth noting that observance of these commandments can only be imposed on discussants as a requirement of reasonable acting if the higher-order conditions for conducting a critical discussion have been fulfilled, so that critical reasonableness can be fully realized. If the rules for critical discussion are viewed as the (first order) “rules of the game,” the higher-order conditions represent the various kinds of psychological, sociopolitical, and other preconditions stating the dispositions and attitudes of the discussants and the circumstances of the discussion that are required. The “internal” conditions relating to the state of mind of the discussants are called second-order condition s and the “external” conditions relating to the discussion situation third-order condition s. For the distinction between these higher-order conditions, see van Eemeren et al. (1993, pp. 30–35) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 36–37).
- 45.
Advancing argumentation, i.e., the use of logos, may be combined with the use of ethos or pathos but should not be replaced by it. For the role of “ethical” (also called “ethotic”) and “pathetical” means of persuasion in classical rhetoric, in particular in Aristotle’s rhetoric, see Sect. 2.8, subsection The modes of persuasion, of this volume, and Kennedy (1994).
- 46.
When exactly a piece of reasoning is to be considered invalid in a logical sense is dependent on the logical theory that is used as the standard of validity. This standard needs to be agreed upon (explicitly or implicitly) in the opening stage (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, p. 163; 2004, p. 148).
- 47.
We prefer this phrasing to the one used in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), “reasoning that […] is presented as formally conclusive” (p. 193), because it is easier to understand.
- 48.
This phrasing is clearer than the more complicated one in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 194).
- 49.
- 50.
For the notions of problem-solving validity (or problem-validity, or objective validity) and (semi)conventional validity (or intersubjective validity), see Sect. 3.9 of this volume. For a demonstration of the problem-solving validity of the rules for critical discussion, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1994a). To actually serve as tools for resolving differences of opinion on the merits in argumentative reality, next to being problem-solving valid, the rules for critical discussion also need to be intersubjectively accepted as standards by those involved in the evaluation process, so that they are conventionally valid. See Sect. 10.12.
- 51.
In pragma-dialectics, the identification of fallacies is always conditional: an argumentative move may be regarded a fallacy only if the discourse in which it occurs may be viewed as aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. A discourse can only be fully and methodically screened for fallacies if it is first determined to what extent it can be reconstructed in terms of a critical discussion and has been adequately analyzed.
- 52.
For the relationship between relative and structure-dependent properties and the fallacies of composition and division see van Eemeren and Garssen (2009).
- 53.
- 54.
When it comes to the detection of fallacies in argumentative discourse, a distinction needs to be made between the standards defining the various types of fallacies and the criteria that are to be applied in deciding whether a particular speech act conveying a certain argumentative move does or does not violate a certain standard and is therefore to be labelled as a particular type of fallacy. In detecting fallacies, pragmatic insights regarding implicitness and indirectness as well as contextual and background information are to be taken into account.
- 55.
The inclusion of an account of strategic considerations in the theorizing should also be instrumental in developing more sophisticated methods for improving the quality of oral and written argumentative discourse.
- 56.
The study of aiming for effectiveness in argumentative discourse is generally seen as part of the core business of rhetoric (Wenzel 1990; Hample 2007; van Eemeren 2010, pp. 66–80). In particular since the development of “Big Rhetoric,” however, the scope of rhetoric is restricted neither to effectiveness nor to argumentative discourse. See Foss et al. (1985), Lunsford et al. (2009), and Swearingen and Schiappa (2009).
- 57.
See Wagemans (2009), who situates the pragma-dialectical proposal to combine the dialectical and the rhetorical perspectives against the background of antique dialectic and rhetoric.
- 58.
- 59.
The term strategic maneuver refers both to the process of making choices regarding the three aspects and to the product resulting from making these choices.
- 60.
However, for an argumentative move to be characterized as a particular strategic maneuver, the way in which the two other constitutive aspects of strategic maneuvering manifest themselves in the move should not contradict this characterization.
- 61.
For the notion of disagreement space and the notion of virtual standpoints, which is connected with it, see van Eemeren et al. (1993, pp. 95–96).
- 62.
In the pragma-dialectical view, the “stock issues” pertinent to the kinds of attacks and defenses that can be developed depend, among other things, on the type of standpoint at issue.
- 63.
For some examples of the various strategies, see van Eemeren (2010, pp. 46–47).
- 64.
By suggesting that this is the end of the discussion, the father does not really give the boy a chance to draw his own conclusion, but forces him by means of emotional pressure more or less to accept his standpoint. In spite of what is implied by the use of “well then,” however, in agreeing that he loves his father, the son commits himself in no way to accepting the unexpressed premise that someone who loves someone else should never do something that the loved one does not like. Suggesting all the same, as the father does, that such a commitment exists is in pragma-dialectics viewed as fallacious. However, because the father pressures his son so strongly, a preliminary higher-order condition for conducting a critical discussion may be unfulfilled so that a fallacy judgment does not apply.
- 65.
Pragma-dialecticians use the terms institutional and institutionalized in a broad sense, pertaining to all socially and culturally established communicative practices that are formally or informally conventionalized (see also Hall and Taylor 1996). Like Searle (1995), they see institutions as dealing with rights and duties by means of socially constructed rules and sanctions associated with these rules.
- 66.
For a related meaning of the term activity type see Levinson (1992, p. 69).
- 67.
Fairclough characterizes a “genre” of communicative activity broadly as “a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity” (1995, p. 14). The term action schemes, defined by Rigotti and Rocci (2006, p. 173) as “culturally shaped ‘recipes’ for interaction congruent with more or less broad classes of joint goals and involving scheme-roles presupposing generic requirements,” has a similar meaning, but is used to refer both to genres of communicative activity and communicative activity types. According to Greco Morasso, an activity type corresponds with “an interaction scheme applied to a precise interaction field” (2009, note 169).
- 68.
Certain communicative activity types are hybrids in the sense that they involve the activation of a combination of several genres of conventionalized communicative activity. Political interviews, for example, are communicative activity types in which the genres of deliberation and dissemination of information are prototypically combined.
- 69.
The term deliberation is here used in the broad meaning given to this concept by Habermas (1994, p. 8; 1996, pp. 307–308) and other protagonists of “deliberative democracy.” In their view, intended to replace the traditional view of political deliberation as an activity conducted only in formal institutions such as parliaments, informal and less regulated communication among citizens are equally important to rational democratic politics.
- 70.
The institutional point of the “interpersonal” communicative activity types generally is to keep the relationship going. However noncommittal some of these communicative activity types may seem, some implicit conventions always need to be observed, even if no well-defined institutional goals are pursued.
- 71.
Unlike Hymes (1972), who uses the term speech event for communicative activity types as well as their actual manifestations, we restrict our use of this term to the latter.
- 72.
See, for instance, Hietanen’s (2005) analysis of Paul’s argumentation in Galatians 3.1–3.5, in which pragma-dialectics is used in New Testament exegesis.
- 73.
As van Eemeren et al. (2010) explain, the pragma-dialectical communicative activity types share some common ground with Walton and Krabbe’s (1995) “dialogue type s.” However, with dialogue types, it is not clear whether they are distinguished on the basis of analytic considerations or on the basis of empirical observation, so that it is not certain whether their status is normative or descriptive. Walton (1998, p. 30) maintains that each dialogue type constitutes a separate normative model of argumentation, but in describing the dialogue types, he refers continually to empirical observations. Because of their institutional and empirical orientation, Jacobs and Aakhus (2002), Aakhus (2003), and Jackson and Jacobs (2006), who view the conditions a specific context imposes on argumentative discourse in terms of “design,” come closer to the pragma-dialectical approach.
- 74.
Using a critical discussion as the general point of reference in the argumentative characterization of all communicative activity types leads to consistent and coherent characterizations and creates possibilities for a unified comparison between communicative activity types.
- 75.
In some communicative activity types the participants have different missions, depending on their role in the activity type. In Prime Minister’s Question Time, for instance, the parliamentarians’ mission is to hold the government to account for its policies and actions, whereas the Prime Minister’s mission is to justify them.
- 76.
Besides official, usually formal, and often procedural primary preconditions, pragma-dialectics distinguishes secondary preconditions, which are unofficial, usually informal, and often substantial. In the communicative activity type of a general debate in the European parliament, for instance, the rules of order guarded by the Chair are primary preconditions while the “European predicament” that the parliamentarians need to combine serving the interests of Europe and those of their home countries is a secondary precondition (see Sect. 10.13).
- 77.
Van Eemeren mentions in this connection the structuring of the discourse in accordance with what is considered topical or relevant at a particular point, the underexposure of what is considered evident or known, the overexposure of what is considered important or significant, and the lack of precision and elaboration that is deemed unnecessary (2010, p. 197).
- 78.
Arguers may sometimes also neglect their interest in effectiveness – say for fear of being perceived as unreasonable. This can result in rhetorically bad strategic maneuvering, but not in a fallacy.
- 79.
For the presumption of reasonableness, see Jackson (1995).
- 80.
Referring to Woods and Walton (1989, pp. 15–24) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a, pp. 136–137), van Eemeren (2010) cites, for example, the following general criteria for judging authority arguments: the authority referred to should have indeed the professed authority, the authority’s judgment should be recognized as pertinent to the topic at issue in the difference of opinion, the parties in the difference of opinion should in principle agree on appealing to the authority in the discussion, and the authority should by quoted correctly and at a point where this is relevant (pp. 202–203).
- 81.
In some cases it might be necessary to supplement the general criteria with specific criteria that are only relevant in a particular institutional macro-context.
- 82.
Note that an argumentative move that is relevant in any of these three senses is not necessarily a successful move in the sense of being effective.
- 83.
Cf. Pinto and Blair’s (1989) distinction between cumulative and complementary “premise sets.”
- 84.
- 85.
Dialectical profiles can also have a heuristic role in the analysis of strategic maneuvering. Because every dialectical move specified in a dialectical profile allows for rhetorical exploitation, the dialectical profile is an appropriate starting point for identifying the ways of strategic maneuvering the arguers can deploy to steer the critical resolution process into their own direction.
- 86.
It is primarily for efficiency reasons that the profile allows the dialogue about the acceptance of Y to be part of the dialogue about the acceptance of X. This inclusion allows for cases in which the acceptance of Y by T1 has consequences for the argumentative value of X, that is to say, imposes restrictions on the argumentative use that T1 can make of Y in support of his standpoint. If it could not become clear as early as in the opening stage of the discussion that the acceptance of Y had these consequences, it could happen that T1 and T2 run through the whole discussion about the acceptability of T1’s standpoint and agree in the concluding stage that T1 is allowed to maintain his standpoint on the basis of the support he has provided with the use of X, while it would have been clear all the time that if T2 could have proposed Y as a starting point and T1 had accepted Y as such, T1’s support for his standpoint would have been overruled by an attack by T2 on the basis of Y, and T1 would therefore not be allowed to maintain his standpoint.
- 87.
In addition, Verbiest (1987) describes from the same theoretical point of view how disputes arise in informal conversations. She shows that there is an important parallel between confrontation in conversations and the normative pragma-dialectical view of confrontation.
- 88.
Van Rees (1991) examines whether descriptive models for problem-solving discussions can be used to investigate the extent to which such discussions conform to the normative ideal.
- 89.
Earlier Slot (1993) discussed the problem of recognizing and interpreting rhetorical questions from a pragma-dialectical perspective.
- 90.
From the same theoretical perspective, Tseronis (2009) investigated in Qualifying Standpoints the strategic function of “stance adverbs” in qualifying standpoints as a presentational device in strategic maneuvering.
- 91.
Other pragma-dialectical case studies include the analysis of some of J. R. Reynolds’s tobacco advertorials by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2000a; van Eemeren 2010, pp. 20–21, 47–50); van Eemeren et al. (2011b); and the doctoral dissertations on the strategic use of dissociation and definitions defended at the University of Bucharest by Cosoreci Mazilu (2010), concentrating on the abortion debate, and Muraru (2010), concentrating on mediation and diplomatic discourse regarding the Camp David agreements. For a detailed illustration of the advantages of an “extended” analysis of a press release by KLM compared to a “standard” analysis, see van Eemeren et al. (2012c).
- 92.
Experimental pragma-dialectical empirical research concerning the production of argumentative moves (and texts) is still thin on the ground since it follows the development of the interpretation and evaluation research. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1999) for the pragma-dialectical (re)writing method.
- 93.
- 94.
Van Eemeren et al. (1984) conducted first several feasibility studies to ensure that the respondents in the experiment understand “argumentation” in the intended way. In testing the suitability of their measuring instruments, they concentrated on “single” argumentation, in which just one reason in defense of a standpoint is articulated. The conceptual validity of their argumentation concept was proven by the fact that the items submitted to the respondents were in 95 % of the cases correctly identified as argumentation.
- 95.
For experimental research concerning the role of standpoints preceding the argumentation in identifying argumentation, see Jungslager (1991).
- 96.
Students follow in Dutch secondary school education different programs (from vocational to academic) according to their general cognitive skills and achievements.
- 97.
This result seems to confirm van Dijk and Kintsch’s (1983) contention that in determining the communicative function (“force”) of verbal utterances, language users take refuge in “linguistic strategies.” All nonlinguistic factors Clark (1979) mentions as affecting the interpretation of indirect speech acts are incorporated in a well-defined context.
- 98.
For experimental research concerning the identification of “nonmixed” and “mixed” differences of opinion, see Koetsenruijter (1993).
- 99.
Experimental research carried out by Gerritsen (1999) indicates that clarified versions of argumentation with an unexpressed premise were better appreciated by the respondents only if the original versions were for them indeed difficult to understand.
- 100.
See for the measurement of argumentative skills also Oostdam (1991).
- 101.
This research is reported in English in Garssen (2002).
- 102.
This means, for example, that next to cases of abusive argumentum ad hominem the test included also sound personal attacks and that other fallacies were in a similar way “accompanied” by representations of their sound counterparts.
- 103.
In a number of cases, a replication study was carried out – sometimes to support interpretations, sometimes to exclude alternative explanations, and, in doing so guaranteeing the internal validity, sometimes to optimize the external validity.
- 104.
The only exceptional case is the tu quoque variant of the argumentum ad hominem.
- 105.
Going by the absolute size of the empirical averages obtained, there is a considerable variation as to the extent to which the fallacies studied are found unreasonable. A practical didactic implication is that, since it is now clear which are obviously the least complicated cases, these cases should in an introductory course on fallacies be dealt with first and the more complicated cases later.
- 106.
According to van Eemeren (2010), the intersubjective validity of the rules for critical discussion, which is to lend the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure conventional validity, is likely to be based primarily on their problem-solving validity, i.e., their instrumentality in resolving a difference of opinion on the merits. One may surmise that the rules will be acceptable to people who are like members of Popper’s Open Society in the sense that they are antidogmatic, antiauthoritarian, and anti-foundationalist and reject monopolies of knowledge, pretensions of infallibility, and appeals to unfaltering principles.
- 107.
It is worth noting that in the study the confrontation stage and the opening stage have been studied exhaustively in this regard.
- 108.
The three hypotheses are closely connected with the theoretical views on the relationship between argumentation and effectiveness in the sense of convincingness that were expounded in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984).
- 109.
This type of effectiveness research is a critically inspired pragma-dialectical complement to the prevailing (non-dialectical) persuasion research. The pragma-dialectical preference for the label “effectiveness research” rather than “persuasiveness research ” is in the first place motivated by the fact that the term effectiveness is, unlike the term persuasiveness, not exclusively connected with the argumentation stage but pertains also to argumentative moves made in other discussion stages, such as proposing starting points in the opening stage and stating the outcome of the discussion in the concluding stage.
- 110.
- 111.
In line with this research tradition, Amjarso (2010) tackled the question of whether in the context of a monologue simply mentioning arguments in support of a standpoint is more effective than also mentioning and refuting anticipated counterarguments.
- 112.
Both in the original test and in the replication carried out to be better able to generalize the results, straightforward abusive attacks are consistently rejected as unreasonable discussion moves, and legitimate personal attacks are invariably considered reasonable. The “disguised” abusive attacks presented as responses to an abuse of authority however are judged as substantially less unreasonable than the overtly fallacious direct attacks.
- 113.
In addition, a fruitful collaboration was realized with researchers of the University of Lugano who concentrate on argumentation in mediation, editorial meetings, financial communication, and health communication.
- 114.
- 115.
For a discussion in English of the use of a contrario reasoning in legal argumentation, see Jansen (2005).
- 116.
- 117.
A revised version of Andone’s dissertation was published as a monograph (Andone 2013).
- 118.
These patterns involve rephrasing the original standpoint in a way that (1) makes the politician’s support of the position at issue dependent on the fulfillment of certain specific conditions, (2) makes clear that the interviewer’s interpretation that there is an inconsistency is based on a misunderstanding, and (3) enables the politician to claim that the original standpoint concerned something else than the present standpoint (Andone 2010, pp. 88–89).
- 119.
See Labrie (2012).
- 120.
Both Pilgram at the University of Amsterdam and Labrie at the University of Lugano are engaged in doctoral research from a pragma-dialectical perspective concerning the use of authority in doctor-patient consultation.
- 121.
In her doctoral research at the University of Amsterdam, Wierda focuses on the use of authority argumentation in medical advertising.
- 122.
The use of pragmatic argumentation in health brochures was also the topic of van Poppel’s (2013) doctoral research at the University of Amsterdam.
- 123.
Aimed at contributing to this project is Popa’s doctoral research concerning “thought experiments” at the University of Amsterdam.
- 124.
Dissociating “a pragma-dialectical approach” to argumentation from “pragma-dialectics” as the theoretical enterprise of those who have coined the term is in our view just as awkward as it would be to dissociate “a new rhetoric approach” to argumentation from the “new rhetoric” of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. The term normative pragmatics, which van Eemeren (1986, 1990) introduced as a general label, is a more suitable starting point for further differentiations.
- 125.
This discussion of criticisms is based on van Eemeren (2012).
- 126.
In a review of Johnson’s (2000) Manifest Rationality, van Rees (2001) signals and corrects a whole series of misunderstandings of pragma-dialectics; that it is concerned only with spoken and not with written arguments being just one of them and that it is concerned only with dialogic and not with monolectical discourse another one.
- 127.
- 128.
- 129.
- 130.
As her discussion of the Gulf Debate in American Congress makes clear, Goodwin (1999) uses the term argumentation in the general sense of “argument.” Her tentative definition of argumentation as “showing” that a standpoint is acceptable and her reference to the terms demonstrare and apodeixis, which are associated with logical proof, confirm this reading. Goodwin emphasizes that some politicians who advanced “argumentation” in Congress said explicitly that they did not want to convince and mentions “explaining” as one of the functions of “argumentation,” but in the pragma-dialectical usage “explaining” is a different function of “argument” than “argumentation.”
- 131.
Gilbert suggests “moving away from the abstract to the actual, from the ideal to the real” (2001, p. 7). Although he presents this as a “continuation” of van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s inclusion of the rhetorical dimension of argumentation, what he seems to have in mind is something different: to continue by considering certain terminological and conceptual categories of pragma-dialectics merely as heuristic distinctions.
- 132.
The principle of externalization promotes concentrating on traceable commitments in the analysis and evaluation“ of argumentative discourse (see Sect. 10.3). Application of this principle also creates an appropriate starting point for the examination of the cognitive processes involved in the production, perception, and appreciation of these commitments. For methodological reasons, pragma-dialecticians are reluctant to amalgamate argumentation theory completely with psychology, sociology, epistemology, communication theory, or any other discipline belonging to its intellectual resources.
- 133.
In spite of the fact that generally rhetoricians themselves associate rhetoric primarily with aiming for effectiveness (see van Eemeren 2010, pp. 66–80), Kock (2007) criticizes the tendency among argumentation theorists to define “rhetorical” argumentation in this way. Arguers “speaking for opposite choices,” he also observes, are not “obliged” to resolve their difference of opinion. However, if they aim to convince others of their position, their argumentation must be aimed at resolving a difference of opinion with the audience they want to convince (which need not necessarily coincide with the opponents they address). Kock ignores that choosing from different options involves expressing a preference for a certain decision and that political argumentation is as a rule aimed at convincing others of the preferred option.
- 134.
In a moralistic essay, in which he claims that Perelman “recognized the defining characteristic of totalitarian thought: the absolute commitment to the ‘cold logic’ of deductive reasoning” (p. 270), Frank (2004) reacts in the first place to criticisms in the handbook Fundamentals of argumentation theory (van Eemeren et al. 1996) and its predecessors of some aspects of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric.
- 135.
Leaving aside the wrong description of their soundness standard, and the fact that pragma-dialecticians in fact actively promote the democratic cause (e.g., van Eemeren 2002, 2010, pp. 2–4), the use of “good” is misleading, because pragma-dialecticians, being argumentation theorists, concentrate explicitly and exclusively on the argumentative quality (“soundness”) of advocacy, not on other qualities “good” may refer to.
- 136.
In a more critical vein, Walton (2007) plays down the empirical scope of the pragma-dialectical theory by portraying a “critical discussion” as just one of the many dialogue types (or communicative activity types) used in argumentative reality, thus ignoring its status of a theoretical construct applying to all of them. See for the scope of pragma-dialectics, e.g., van Eemeren (Ed., 2009), and for a critical response to Walton, Garssen (2009, pp. 187–188).
- 137.
Van Eemeren (2010) summarizes the pragma-dialectical position regarding the two dimensions of validity: “Granting that ‘conventional validity’ based in intersubjective agreement is indeed a prerequisite for reaching a conclusive judgment concerning the acceptability of argumentative moves, I would like to emphasize that, because of its overriding importance, determining their ‘problem-solving validity’ should come first” (p. 137). In agreement with this hierarchy, Tindale reaches in his discussion of the criticisms against pragma-dialectics eventually also the conclusion that “it is these rules (or the observance of them) which guarantee the reasonableness of the proceedings. So perhaps all along we have only needed to recognize these rules as the necessary objective conditions” (1999, p. 61). “The rules should have priority over the agreement of the discussants,” he acknowledges (p. 62).
- 138.
This answers Tindale’s observation that, “in the shift to the new concept,” the pragma-dialecticians “appear to bring the old criteria of the traditional fallacies with them” (1999, p. 55).
- 139.
Tindale (1999), who reaches on several points conclusions which do justice to the pragma-dialectical position, also recognizes the importance of problem-solving validity. It is indeed hard to imagine how one could embark on examining the fallacies from a normative perspective without having some kind of “etic” approach, involving external critical norms, because in an “emic” approach argumentative moves which are acceptable to the participants in the discussion do not require any further reflection as to their possible “fallaciousness.” See van Eemeren et al. (1993, pp. 50–51).
- 140.
As a case in point, Woods (2004) claims erroneously that “the pragma-dialectical construal makes of ad baculum, ad hominem and ad misericordiam […] the same fallacy” (p. 156). He also observes that this construal of the traditional fallacies provides “brief caricatures straight out of the Standard Treatment” (p. 159, pp. 178–179), without mentioning that van Eemeren and Grootendorst precisely aim to show that pragma-dialectics can, in principle, accommodate the fallacies distinguished in the Standard Treatment.
- 141.
Cummings (2005, p.178) reaches a negative judgment about pragma-dialectics based on the observations made by Woods. Striking in Wreen’s (1994) equally negative judgment are the basic assumptions that fallacies are intrinsically connected with inferences (whereas pragma-dialecticians put them in a broader communicative perspective) and have an objective ontological status (whereas pragma-dialecticians view them as impediments to resolving a difference of opinion on the merits whose identification depends on whether one shares this theoretical outlook on the discourse).
- 142.
As Botting (2010) observes, from an epistemic perspective, critical discussion models “the critical rationalist procedure of conjecture and refutation” (p. 415).
- 143.
Zenker concludes from his inventory of the (very few) changes the pragma-dialectical rules have undergone in the course of time that the most important material change is “the acknowledgement of non-deductive forms of validity” (2007a, p. 1588). Lumer (2010) asserts that van Eemeren and Grootendorst “originally” proposed “only one type of argumentation, namely deductive argumentation” and “more recently” included “some further argument schemes” (p. 65), “as a way to explain and justify non-deductive arguments” (p. 66). In reality, van Eemeren and Grootendorst distinguish already since 1978 argument(ation) schemes (van Eemeren et al. 1978, p. 20), next to (deductive and nondeductive) logical argument forms (e.g., van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, pp. 66–67).
- 144.
Another critic who accuses pragma-dialectics of “some form of” deductivism is Kock (2003, p. 162).
- 145.
Another critic who endorses this wrong characterization of pragma-dialectics is Lumer (2010). Botting (2010) indicates which basic characteristic of argumentative exchanges, captured in the model of a critical discussion, is probably the source of the consensualist misconception: a completed critical discussion “ends with consensus” (p. 416). However, in pragma-dialectics an unequivocal result of the process of resolving a difference of opinion is in a critical rationalist vein viewed as being only a temporary state of affairs in an ongoing flux of opinions. Unlike in consensualism, it does not represent a final point with a desired status, but a provisional outcome. See for a continuation of this discussion about the epistemic dimension of pragma-dialectics Lumer (2012) and Botting (2012).
- 146.
Oddly, Zenker (2007b) ends up calling satisfaction of the preliminary higher-order conditions “a further necessary condition” for resolving differences of opinion. Ignoring that the pragma-dialecticians were the ones drawing attention to these preconditions for a legitimate application of the rules for critical discussion in evaluating the reasonableness of argumentative discourse, he correctly remarks that the nonfulfillment of certain higher-order conditions can explain seemingly unreasonable behavior (see van Eemeren et al. 1993, pp. 30–35). Without considering how far argumentation theorists should go in extending the boundaries of their efforts, he reproaches the pragma-dialecticians for their “apparent laxness” in not specifying the higher-order conditions “precisely and exhaustively.” It is doubtful whether it is really a proper task for argumentation theorists to examine whether in practice the psychological and sociopolitical higher-order conditions have been fulfilled.
- 147.
Notions such as “pro argumentation” and “justificatory force” are in pragma-dialectics understood in a dialectical fashion and acquire a non-justificationist meaning. See also Garssen and van Laar (2010, p. 134).
- 148.
In a paper marked by incomprehension, Lumer calls pragma-dialectics “a heterogeneous theory composed of unqualified and therefore unsatisfactory consensualism and an ill-conceived form of epistemic rationalism” (2010, p. 67) According to Lumer, pragma-dialectics relies on very problematic epistemologies, “namely Critical Rationalism and Dialogic Logic” (p. 67). However, “much could probably be improved by changing the epistemological basis of Pragma-Dialectics” (p. 58).
- 149.
A similar point is made by Wreen (1994, p. 300).
- 150.
Pragma-dialecticians, too, aim for the most rational outcome but leave room for the possibility that a definitive verdict about truth cannot be given in all cases because the necessary tools for doing so are lacking. In some cases we have to appeal to experts from the various disciplines, and if they cannot come to a unified verdict, we shall have to live with it. Some truths (e.g., non-flatness of the earth, global warming) were in limbo for some time. As Garssen and van Laar rightly ask (2010, p. 129): Who is to decide in such cases?
- 151.
In this perspective, the addressees and their procedural and material starting points are of vital importance to argumentation theory. Siegel and Biro (2010, p. 467) may regret it, and perhaps Tindale (1999, p. 57) too, but as a consequence of argumentation’s involving not just reasoning but also trying to convince others, besides reaching a “problem-solving valid” conclusion, intersubjective agreement needs to be aimed for – and this makes it necessary to reach agreement between the parties. A consequence may be that (exceptionally, we hope) in practice (unlike, in epistemics, we hope) “good” arguments and standpoints are eventually rejected and “bad” arguments and standpoints accepted. This happens on reasonable grounds, however, only if the arguers have complied with all the required testing procedures. A “better” result can only be achieved if first the problem-solving validity of the testing methods for establishing truth, and for carrying out the other critical tests, is improved and the tests are made acceptable to would-be discussants.
- 152.
Although assignment of truth values to such standpoints is not excluded, the disputants are not in the first place out to establish their truth but to determine their acceptability on reasonable grounds.
- 153.
Siegel and Biro may claim that nothing in the epistemic view suggests that there cannot be arguments about moral, political, and legal matters (2010, p. 472), but the “justified beliefs” involved in dealing with evaluative and prescriptive issues can as a rule better be treated in terms of intersubjective acceptability than in terms of objective truth. Problem-solving validity and intersubjective validity have in pragma-dialectics a broader scope than these epistemologists seem to have in mind.
- 154.
According to Biro and Siegel (2006b), the central difference between the two kinds of approaches lies in “the different ways they conceive of the role in argumentation and in argumentation theory of dispute resolution and epistemic seriousness, respectively” (p. 8). See also Biro and Siegel (2006a). We think however that the differences are a matter of how argumentation and argumentation theory are viewed rather than dispute resolution and epistemic “seriousness.”
- 155.
See also Biro and Siegel (1992, p. 91).
- 156.
As Tindale (disapprovingly) observes: the whole pragma-dialectical program “has been set up to be resolution-oriented and not audience-oriented (dialectical and not rhetorical)” (1999, p. 63).
- 157.
Is it reasonable for participants to start from the best material and procedural starting points they have access to or only from starting points which epistemologists consider objectively true or valid? This is what the difference amounts to. As epistemologists, Biro and Siegel seem to be only interested in the assessment of argumentation by an external evaluator who judges the argumentation on “objective” grounds, independently of the particularities of the actual discussion in which it takes place and its intersubjective acceptability (see Siegel and Biro 2010, pp. 467–468). Apart from the question whether this is indeed a better view of what argumentation theory should be, the question arises to what extent in practice such an approach can lead to decisive results and is more suitable for dealing with argumentative discourse in the various communicative practices than the pragma-dialectical approach.
- 158.
Establishing the acceptability of starting points is, according to pragma-dialecticians, not a proper task of argumentation theorists if it involves more than checking whether they are on the “list” of jointly accepted starting points. However, because of the critical rationalist rationale of their theory, it is understood that their acceptability is to be established in a problem-solving valid way.
- 159.
According to Botting, “there is a way of testing a system of rules, showing that the rules pass these tests is a good way of arguing for their acceptance, and acceptance is, in the long run, a reliable indicator of verisimilitude” (p. 432). In his view, “the Normative Claim that standpoints that have the unqualified consensus of all participants in the dispute will generally be epistemically sound should be construed in the same way” (p. 432).
- 160.
Interestingly, extremely different positions such as – bien etonnés de se trouver ensemble – Gerber’s and Frank’s pragmatic ethics and rhetorical moralism, on the one hand, and Biro and Siegel’s objectivist epistemics, on the other hand, have in common that they are out to include certain extrinsic requirements which, in the pragma-dialectical view, transcend argumentation and argumentation theory proper.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Garssen, B., Krabbe, E.C.W., Henkemans, A.F.S., Verheij, B., Wagemans, J.H.M. (2014). The Pragma-Dialectical Theory of Argumentation. In: Handbook of Argumentation Theory. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9473-5_10
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