Abstract
Proofs are distinguished by identifying some – in fact many – of them as classical and the rest as constructive. This chapter attempts to understand, from a philosophical perspective, the difference between the classical and the constructive. The constructivism latent in constructive proofs is sought to be seen as grounded in a variety of a philosophical position called anti-realism. The ties of the assumptions, or the lack of them, in this variety, with the resulting presentations of logic are explored in the context of truth as well as in that of proofs.
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Mukhopadhyay, R. (2022). Philosophical Aspects of Constructivism in Logic. In: Sarukkai, S., Chakraborty, M.K. (eds) Handbook of Logical Thought in India. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2577-5_53
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