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Logics of Strategies and Preferences

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Abstract

Reasoning about games involves elucidating the rational structure of preference that players have over outcomes, as well as the strategies they employ to achieve their preferred outcomes. This involves mutual intersubjectivity of epistemic attitudes. We discuss some propositional modal logics of strategic interaction and point to interesting questions for further research.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Statistical Institute, Chennai, India

    Sujata Ghosh

  2. Instititute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, India

    R. Ramanujam

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  1. Sujata Ghosh
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  2. R. Ramanujam
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Correspondence to Sujata Ghosh .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humani, Manipal University, Manipal, Karnataka, India

    Sundar Sarukkai

  2. School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India

    Mihir Chakraborty

Section Editor information

  1. School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India

    Mihir Chakraborty

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Ghosh, S., Ramanujam, R. (2020). Logics of Strategies and Preferences. In: Sarukkai, S., Chakraborty, M. (eds) Handbook of Logical Thought in India. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1812-8_42-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1812-8_42-1

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