Abstract
The idea of the self plays a pivotal role in human life. The most common way of conceptualizing the self may be called the free-floating or separative self. This amounts to treating the self as something away from the web of life and as something in need of protection and aggrandizement. Another major characteristic of the free-floating self is the belief in free will. There have been many studies questioning the empirical validity of free will, and this takes cudgels against the free-floating self-conception also. Even though some traits associated with this kind of self-conception might have had evolutionary advantages, it is not difficult to see that the moorings of many human problems can be traced to the separative self-conception. Therefore, efforts need to be made to develop an alternate way of understanding the self. It is contended in this chapter that the conception of the free-floating self is primarily a case of gut feeling of certainty and our present environment is conducive to overcome this inveterate way of understanding ourselves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Mirror test is designed to find out whether a chimpanzee can consider the image seen on a mirror as that of oneself.
- 2.
Thomas Metzinger (2010) describes an experiment in which the subjects are asked to observe a rubber hand lying on the desk in front of them, with their own corresponding hand concealed from their view by a screen. The visible rubber hand and the subject’s unseen hand were then synchronously stroked with a probe. After a certain time, the rubber-hand illusion emerges. The rubber hand is experienced as one’s own, and one feels the repeated strokes in this rubber hand.
References
Albahiri, M. (2007). Analytical Buddhism: The two-tiered illusion of self. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Bohm, D. (2007). On dialogue. New York: Routledge.
Brass, M., & Haggard, P. (2007, August 22). To do or not to do: The neural signature of self-control. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27(34), 9141–9145.
Burton, R. (2008). On being certain: Believing you are right even when you are not. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Damasio, A. (2010). Self comes to mind: Constructing the conscious brain. New York: Pantheon.
Jaynes, J. (1976). The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. New York: Basic Books.
Leary, M. R. (2004). The curse of the self: Self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of human life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will involuntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 529–566.
Metzinger, T. (2010). The ego tunnel: The science of the mind and the myth of the self. New York: Basic Books.
Philips, M. (2008). The undercover philosopher: A guide to detecting shams. Lies and delusions. Oxford: One World Publications.
Wegner, D. M. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist, 54(7), 480–492.
Wilson, E. (1999). Consilience: The unity of knowledge. New York: Vintage Books.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer India
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Narayanan, V.H. (2014). Reconceptualizing the Separative Self. In: Menon, S., Sinha, A., Sreekantan, B. (eds) Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Consciousness and the Self. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1587-5_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1587-5_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New Delhi
Print ISBN: 978-81-322-1586-8
Online ISBN: 978-81-322-1587-5
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)