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Article 71

Consequences of the invalidity of a treaty which conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law

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Abstract

Art 71 concerns the legal consequences of the invalidity of a treaty that is in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law. It singles out the conflict of a treaty with ius cogens as a special reason of invalidity of that treaty because it has certain peculiarities and differs from the other grounds of invalidity. The most important such difference is that the main purpose of Art 71 is not to adjust the legal position as between the parties to the treaty—as in the case of the legal consequences of ‘normal’ invalidity governed by Art 69 –, but to bring it into conformity with what is required by ius cogens. Moreover, while cases of invalidity usually involve a party that has a legitimate claim to protection because it has not validly consented to be bound by the treaty, none of the parties to a treaty conflicting with ius cogens merits any such protection. Thus, in contrast to the other forms of invalidity where at least one of the parties did not freely consent to the conclusion of the treaty, Art 71 (in conjunction with Arts 53 and 64) assumes that both or—in case of a multilateral treaty—all parties have deliberately concluded the treaty contrary to the norms of ius cogens, or at least that the contradiction of the treaty with peremptory norms does in any case not justify the maintenance of a legal situation incompatible with such norms. The reason for this strict approach is that the norms of ius cogens are a manifestation of some kind of international public order and protect fundamental community interests, which are not subject to the disposition of individual States.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 67, 266, para 1.

  2. 2.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 67, 266, para 2.

  3. 3.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 67, 266, para 2.

  4. 4.

    See however the comment of the delegate of the United Kingdom (Sinclair) at the Vienna Conference UNCLOT I 449, who stated that since para 1 lit a involved “reparations”, it “was concerned with a question of State responsibility”.

  5. 5.

    Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (2001). The text of the Articles and the commentaries thereto are included in ILC Report 53rd Session UN Doc A/56/10 (2001), paras 76–77.

  6. 6.

    See eg Draft Art 22 proposed by Fitzmaurice III 28, which considered simply unenforceable a treaty invalid for “illegality of the object”.

  7. 7.

    Waldock II 93–94.

  8. 8.

    See the statements by Tunkin, Yasseen, Ago and Waldock [1963-I] YbILC 231–234.

  9. 9.

    [1963-II] YbILC 216.

  10. 10.

    [1966-I/2] YbILC 160–161.

  11. 11.

    [1966-I/2] YbILC 161.

  12. 12.

    See eg the statements by the representatives of Turkey and Switzerland UNCLOT I 449.

  13. 13.

    See in particular the Finnish amendment UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.295, UNCLOT I 448, UNCLOT III 197.

  14. 14.

    UNCLOT I 483.

  15. 15.

    UNCLOT III 198. Notably, the reference to “termination” in the title was deleted.

  16. 16.

    UNCLOT II 127.

  17. 17.

    Contra Nicoloudis (1974), p. 113; Orakhelashvili (2006), p. 141. See also the discussion in → MN 32–37 below.

  18. 18.

    UNCLOT I 227, paras 66–67.

  19. 19.

    See Orakhelashvili (2006), pp. 140–143 extending the argument on absolute versus relative nullity.

  20. 20.

    Expert Consultant Waldock UNCLOT I 227.

  21. 21.

    See Greig (2006), p. 89.

  22. 22.

    See however Elias (1971), p. 408, who seems to imply that the parties may agree to maintain rights, obligations or situations created by a treaty before it became void by a new peremptory norm of general international law.

  23. 23.

    See eg the statement by the representative of Italy UNCLOT I 450 that Art 71 para 1 lit a “seemed to trespass beyond the present convention into the realm of State responsibility, which was explicitly excluded by [Art 73]” and that “it should therefore be removed”. Similarly the representative of the United Kingdom UNCLOT I 449 argued that Art 71 para 1 lit a, “since it involved reparations, was concerned with a question of State responsibility which did not fall within the purview of a convention on the law of treaties”.

  24. 24.

    Rozakis (1976), paras 135–136 n 66; Crépeau et al (2011), Art 71 MN 25. See also Villiger (2009), Art 71 MN 4.

  25. 25.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 65, 264, para 1.

  26. 26.

    Rozakis (1976), p. 132; Crépeau et al (2011), Art 71 MN 27.

  27. 27.

    Contra Rozakis (1976), p. 131.

  28. 28.

    Rozakis (1976), p. 132.

  29. 29.

    The exception to the obligation of restitution in Art 35 ILC Articles on State Responsibility is confined to material impossibility only, see Art 35 lit a and commentary to Art 35 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (2001), ILC Report 53rd Session UN Doc A/56/10, para 5.

  30. 30.

    See the cases cited in Art 35 lit a and commentary to Art 35 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (2001), ILC Report 53rd Session UN Doc A/56/10, para 5. See also Nykomb v Latvia (Sweden v The Republic of Latvia) (Award) SCC Case No 118/2001 (2003) IIC 182, 39.

  31. 31.

    See Art 35 lit a and commentary to Art 35 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (2001), ILC Report 53rd Session UN Doc A/56/10, para 5.

  32. 32.

    ICSID Micula et al v Romania (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Case No ARB 05/20, 24 September 2008, paras 166–168.

  33. 33.

    See in particular Art 41 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (2001), ILC Report 53rd Session UN Doc A/56/10.

  34. 34.

    See the discussion in Sztucki (1974), pp. 148–149, who argues that the relationship between Arts 44 and 71 reveals three inconsistencies and that, in particular, the proviso “any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law” in Art 71 para 1 lit a leads to a limited separability of treaty provisions, albeit “with respect to the consequences of past acts only”. On the issue of separability see → MN 30–31 below.

  35. 35.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 67, 266, para 1.

  36. 36.

    Rozakis (1976), p. 135. In terms of drafting the order of paras 1 and 2 is therefore puzzling and the importance of the consequences would indicate the reverse.

  37. 37.

    Ipsen (2014), p. 452.

  38. 38.

    Sinclair (1984), p. 225 (emphasis original).

  39. 39.

    Rozakis (1976), p. 147.

  40. 40.

    IACtHR Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname (Reparations (Art 63 para 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights)) Ser C No 15, para 57 (1993).

  41. 41.

    Gaja (1981), p. 291.

  42. 42.

    Daillier et al (2009), p. 235.

  43. 43.

    See however Elias (1971), p. 409, stating that “[i]t will be generally agreed that acts, which have been performed in good faith in reliance on a treaty considered by the parties to be valid at the time, do not become illegal by reason of the fact that the treaty is subsequently shown to be invalid”. It is submitted that this consequence applies irrespective of whether the parties acted in good faith, provided of course that it is compatible with the new norm of ius cogens.

  44. 44.

    Elias (1971), p. 409.

  45. 45.

    Gaja (1981), pp. 291–292.

  46. 46.

    Rozakis (1976), p. 124 and Rozakis (1974), p. 172, emphasizing the purpose of “penalization of the parties to an illegal treaty for their wrongdoing”. Similarly Crépeau et al (2011), Art 71 MN 35.

  47. 47.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 41, 239, para 8.

  48. 48.

    This is argued by Sztucki (1974), p. 148. See also Gaja (1981), p. 285.

  49. 49.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 61, 261, para 3.

  50. 50.

    IACtHR Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname (Reparations (Art 63 para 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights)) Ser C No 15, paras 55–57 (1993).

  51. 51.

    Orakhelashvili (2006), p. 142.

  52. 52.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 65, 265, para 4; Final Draft, Commentary to Art 66, 266, para 6.

  53. 53.

    Sztucki (1974), p. 145, who however discards such a reading. But see Orakhelashvili (2006), p. 141.

  54. 54.

    See Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 1295 n 3, arguing that Art 71 “would seem to apply in addition to the provisions of Art 69”.

  55. 55.

    Sztucki (1974), pp. 145–146; Rozakis (1974), p. 171; Rozakis (1976), pp. 109–115; Vitzthum and Proelß (2016), p. 62.

  56. 56.

    Gaja (1981), p. 285; Schröder (2008), MN 23.

  57. 57.

    Nicoloudis (1974), p. 113; Orakhelashvili (2006), p. 141.

  58. 58.

    This was put beyond any doubt by the Final Draft, Commentary to Art 39, 237, para 4: “The phrase ‘application of the present articles’ used in both paragraphs refers, it needs to be stressed, to the draft articles as a whole and not merely to the particular article dealing with the particular ground of invalidity or termination in question in any given case. In other words, it refers not merely to the article dealing with the ground of invalidity or termination relevant in the case but also to other articles governing the conditions for putting that article into effect”. See also the statement by Expert Consultant Waldock UNCLOT I 226–227.

  59. 59.

    See the Final Draft, Commentary to Art 62, 262, para 1: “[T]he Commission considered it essential that the present articles should contain procedural safeguards against the possibility that the nullity, termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty may be arbitrarily asserted as a mere pretext for getting rid of an inconvenient obligation.”

  60. 60.

    Rozakis (1976), p. 110; Gaja (1981), p. 285. See also Orakhelashvili (2006), p. 140, who however discards the argument as “sin[ning] against the clear wording of the Vienna Convention” (Orakhelashvili 2006, p. 141), unfortunately without giving any indication as to such “clear wording”.

  61. 61.

    Zemanek (1997), p. 97; Zemanek (2011), p. 389.

  62. 62.

    This is also the majority view in the doctrine, see eg Sztucki (1974), p. 146; Rozakis (1974), p. 171; Rozakis (1976), pp. 109–115, 144; Jiménez de Aréchaga (1978), p. 59; Czaplinski and Danilenko (1990), p. 10; Frowein (1987), p. 77; Frowein (2009) MN 9.

  63. 63.

    UNGA Res 34/65 B, 29 November 1979, UN Doc A/RES/34/65.

  64. 64.

    Gaja (1981), p. 282.

  65. 65.

    See the detailed discussions in Sztucki (1974), pp. 125–132 and Rozakis (1976), pp. 115–122. See also Gaja (1981), p. 283; Tomuschat (1993), p. 363; Aust (2013), p. 281; Shaw (2014), pp. 684–685; Dahm et al (2002), p. 714. Contra Orakhelashvili (2006), pp. 142–143. Cassese (2005), p. 177 admits that under the VCLT “only a party to the defective treaty may invoke its consistency with jus cogens”, but argues “that the customary rules corresponding to the Vienna Convention’s provisions on invalidity of treaties should be interpreted to the effect that any State concerned, whether or not party to the treaty, may invoke jus cogens” (emphases original). However, Cassese unfortunately does not disclose the foundations for the establishment of such “customary rules”. As to the customary nature of Art 71 see below → MN 40–41.

  66. 66.

    IACtHR Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname (Reparations (Art 63 para 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights)) Ser C No 15, para 57 (1993).

  67. 67.

    Special Court for Sierra Leone Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara (Appeals Chamber) (Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty) SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), 13 March 2004, para 61.

  68. 68.

    Special Court for Sierra Leone Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara (Appeals Chamber), (Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty) SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), 13 March 2004, para 62.

  69. 69.

    Final Draft 1982, Commentary to Art 71, 67.

  70. 70.

    The debates and the vote on Art 71 VCLT testify to this situation (→ MN 7). Thus Gaja (1981), p. 279 stated still in 1981: “The […] attitude on the part of many States makes it impossible to maintain that the provisions in the Convention relating to peremptory norms correspond to the existing law on the subject.” See also Sinclair (1984), p. 17; Ipsen (2014), p. 450, and Schröder (2008) MN 24, who describes the rules of Art 71 as being “of a pioneering character”.

  71. 71.

    Crépeau et al (2011), Art 71 MN 9. But see Villiger (2009), Art 71 MN 11, stating that “it is most likely that Article 71 crystallized into customary law only after is adoption in Vienna in 1969”, without however providing any indication for such customary status. See also Cassese (2005), pp. 157–158.

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  1. Associate Professor of Public International Law, Department of European, International and Comparative Law, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Stephan Wittich

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    Oliver Dörr

  2. Faculty of Law, Department of Public Law/International Law, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria

    Kirsten Schmalenbach

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Wittich, S. (2018). Article 71. In: Dörr, O., Schmalenbach, K. (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_75

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