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Article 51

Coercion of a representative of a State

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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

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Abstract

In denying legal effect to consent procured by coercion of the representative of a State Art 51 primarily protects the freedom of consent of the represented State. By virtue of the coercion directed against the representative, he or she effectively becomes an instrument of the coercing State and therefore ceases to express the real will of the purportedly represented State.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf Harvard Draft 1149–1150 (commentary to Art 32); Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 1.

  2. 2.

    Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 9; Reuter [1966-I/2] YbILC 144, para 30; Reuter (1995), pp. 179–180; Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 1.

  3. 3.

    See Harvard Draft 1149–1150; Probst (2001), pp. 173–237; Zweigert and Kötz (1998), pp. 424–428.

  4. 4.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 1.

  5. 5.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 3.

  6. 6.

    Cf Waldock [1963-I] YbILC 51, para 60. See also Yasseen and Amado [1966-I/1] YbILC 22, para 60; 24, para 80; see also the statements by the representatives of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Poland UNCLOT I 267, para 52; 269, paras 7, 10; Reuter (1995), p. 180 MN 268 (“coercion does not simply affect relations between the parties concerned but also between all the other States or […] the international community as a whole”); Ténékidès (1974), p. 86 (“l’acte de contrainte lèse la société internationale dans son ensemble”).

  7. 7.

    Cf Ago [1963-I] YbILC 312, para 57.

  8. 8.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 3.

  9. 9.

    See with further references the overview in Harvard Draft 1150–1151, 1156–1157 (commentary to Art 32); Tomšič (1931), pp. 36–48.

  10. 10.

    Cf Harvard Draft 1156 (commentary to Art 32); Wenner (1940), pp. 125–143.

  11. 11.

    As to the facts see Wenner (1940), pp. 126–128.

  12. 12.

    See Wenner (1940), p. 127.

  13. 13.

    Cf with further references Harvard Draft 1156–1157 (commentary to Art 32); Tomšič (1931), pp. 36–44; Wenner (1940), pp. 130–139.

  14. 14.

    Grotius (1646/1925 III), p. 805.

  15. 15.

    de Vattel (1758), p. 348.

  16. 16.

    As to the facts, see Wenner (1940), pp. 185–187. See also Harvard Draft 1155–1156 (commentary to Art 32); Tomšič (1931), p. 39.

  17. 17.

    Cf Harvard Draft 1156 (commentary to Art 32). In a proclamation to the people of Holland Louis Napoleon maintained: “The treaty of the 16th March 1810 […] was accepted by compulsion, and ratified, conditionally, by me in Paris, where I was detained against my will” (reprinted in de Bourrienne (1836), pp. 80–81).

  18. 18.

    See Harvard Draft 1157 (commentary to Art 32); Tomšič (1931), p. 57; Wenner (1940), pp. 193–194. The Korean Emperor in a declaration published at the time denied the validity of the agreement: “I, the Emperor of the Korean Empire, declare that this Korea–Japan Agreement has no legal effect because it was concluded unlawfully by force.” (reprinted in Kim (2002), at n 14).

  19. 19.

    See Harvard Draft 1157 (commentary to Art 32); Tomšič (1931), p. 53; Wenner (1940), pp. 188–190.

  20. 20.

    Harvard Draft 1157–1158 (commentary to Art 32); Wenner (1940), pp. 195–200.

  21. 21.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 1.

  22. 22.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 1. See also → MN 23.

  23. 23.

    See Harvard Draft 1151 (commentary to Art 32); Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 1.

  24. 24.

    Waldock [1966-I/1] YbILC 27, paras 29, 36.

  25. 25.

    Waldock [1966-I/1] YbILC 27, para 36.

  26. 26.

    Waldock II 50 (Draft Art 11). As to earlier drafts that inspired Waldock’s proposal, see Harvard Draft 1151 (Art 32); Fitzmaurice III 26 (Draft Art 14).

  27. 27.

    Waldock II 50–51 (Draft Art 12).

  28. 28.

    Waldock II 47 (Draft Art 7).

  29. 29.

    See the discussions in [1963-I] YbILC 46–51, 211, 290–291, 311–312, 317.

  30. 30.

    ILC 1963 Draft [1963-II] YbILC 194 (Art 35 para 1): “If individual representatives of a State are coerced, by acts or threats directed against them in their personal capacities, into expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty, such expression of consent shall be without legal effect.” Draft Art 35 para 2 concerned the issue of reparability which is today dealt with in Art 44 para 5 VCLT.

  31. 31.

    See Waldock V 14–15.

  32. 32.

    Waldock V 15.

  33. 33.

    See the discussions in [1966-I/1] YbILC 21–28, 117–119; [1966-I/2] YbILC 308.

  34. 34.

    Art 48 Final Draft: “The expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him personally shall be without any legal effect.”

  35. 35.

    See UNCLOT I 266–269.

  36. 36.

    See the amendments submitted by Australia (UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.284), France (UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.300) and the United States (UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.277), reprinted in UNCLOT III 171.

  37. 37.

    UNCLOT I 269.

  38. 38.

    Following a proposal made by the Austrian delegation, the Vienna Conference decided to delete the word “personally”, UNCLOT II 90, paras 63–64 (→ MN 19).

  39. 39.

    UNCLOT II 90, para 64.

  40. 40.

    See Dubai–Sharjah Border Arbitration (1981) 91 ILR 543, 569: “There is still a measure of uncertainty, of course, over the definition and content of ‘coercion’”.

  41. 41.

    Cf Probst (2001), pp. 186–187.

  42. 42.

    See Harvard Draft 1151 (“physical or mental coercion applied directly against [State representatives] for the purpose of compelling them under fear of injury to accept a treaty, when they would not do so in the absence of such compulsion”).

  43. 43.

    Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 31–33.

  44. 44.

    See Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 31; Probst (2001), pp. 176–177; Wenner (1940), pp. 119–122.

  45. 45.

    Probst (2001), pp. 176–177.

  46. 46.

    Wenner (1940), p. 121.

  47. 47.

    Fitzmaurice III 38, para 58.

  48. 48.

    Waldock [1966-I/1] YbILC 27, para 30.

  49. 49.

    Probst (2001), pp. 175, 176–177.

  50. 50.

    See Lauterpacht I 150, para 8; Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 32–33; Napoletano (1977), pp. 39–44.

  51. 51.

    Contra: Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 32; Napoletano (1977), pp. 39–40.

  52. 52.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 2 (“any form or constraint of or threat against a representative”, emphasis added). See also Art 11 para 1 of SR Waldock’s first draft which explicitly referred to “physical or mental” coercion in order “to underline that coercion is not confined to acts or threats of physical force”, Waldock II 50, para 3.

  53. 53.

    Waldock [1966-I/1] YbILC 27, para 30.

  54. 54.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 2; Waldock [1963-I] YbILC 51, para 58; Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 3.

  55. 55.

    Fitzmaurice III 26 (Draft Art 14 para 3); Harvard Draft 1151 (commentary to Art 32).

  56. 56.

    Dubai–Sharjah Border Arbitration (1981) 91 ILR 543, 571.

  57. 57.

    Waldock [1966-I/1] YbILC 27, para 35; Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 26–27; Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 7.

  58. 58.

    Waldock V 15.

  59. 59.

    See in particular Briggs [1966-I/1] YbILC 22, paras 56–58; Yasseen [1966-I/1] YbILC 22, para 61; Ago [1966-I/1] YbILC 23, paras 65–66; Tunkin [1966-I/1] YbILC 23, para 71; Rosenne [1966-I/1] YbILC 24, para 86.

  60. 60.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, paras 1–2; Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 29; Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 5.

  61. 61.

    Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 3.

  62. 62.

    UNCLOT II 90, para 63.

  63. 63.

    UNCLOT II 90, para 64.

  64. 64.

    UNCLOT II 90, para 63.

  65. 65.

    Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 30.

  66. 66.

    As to the question whether under the influence of coercion the representative can still be considered to express the will of the represented State, see → MN 1 with further references.

  67. 67.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 2; Waldock II 50, para 3; Fitzmaurice III 26 (Draft Art 14 para 2).

  68. 68.

    See Waldock II 50, para 3; Fitzmaurice III 26 (Draft Art 14 para 4 cl 2), 38, para 61; Harvard Draft 1152, 1154 (commentary to Art 32); Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 29.

  69. 69.

    See Bartoš [1966-I/1] YbILC 27, para 40; contra: Paredes [1963-I] YbILC 27, para 40.

  70. 70.

    See Waldock II 50, para 3; Fitzmaurice III 26 (Draft Art 14 para 4 cl 2), 38, para 61; Harvard Draft 1152, 1154 (commentary to Art 32); Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 29.

  71. 71.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 1.

  72. 72.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 1.

  73. 73.

    International Military Tribunal Trial of German Major War Criminals, 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (22 August–1 October 1946) 429: “The proposal was made to Hacha that if he would sign an agreement consenting to the incorporation of the Czech people in the German Reich at once, Bohemia and Moravia would be saved from destruction. He was informed that German troops had already received orders to march and that any resistance would be broken with physical force. The Defendant Goering added the threat that he would destroy Prague completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful alternative, Hacha and his Foreign Minister put their signatures to the necessary agreement at 4:30 in the morning”.

  74. 74.

    Waldock [1966-I/2] YbILC 308, para 22. See also the report of 17 March 1939 to the French Ministry of Affairs by French Ambassador Coulondre, reprinted in The French Yellow Book: Diplomatic Documents 1938–1939 (1949) No 77: “The German ministers were pitiless. They literally hunted Dr. Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky round the table on which the documents were lying, thrusting them continually before them, pushing pens into their hands, incessantly repeating that if they continued in their refusal, half Prague would lie in ruins from aerial bombardment within two hours, and that this would be only the beginning. […] President Hacha was in such a state of exhaustion that he more than once needed medical attention […]”.

  75. 75.

    Jiménez de Aréchaga [1966-I/2] YbILC 141, para 90; Briggs (USA) UNCLOT I 267, para 44; Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 34; Reuter (1995), p. 180; Ténékidès (1974), p. 86; Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 7.

  76. 76.

    Reuter (1995), p. 180 MN 269; Ténékidès (1974), p. 86.

  77. 77.

    UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.277, reprinted in UNCLOT III 171.

  78. 78.

    UNCLOT I 269, para 15.

  79. 79.

    Harvard Draft 1151 (commentary to Art 32); Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 30; de Jong (1984), p. 226; Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 7.

  80. 80.

    Yasseen [1963-I] YbILC 50, para 45; Harvard Draft 1151 (commentary to Art 32).

  81. 81.

    Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 30. See with regard to general principles of contract law Probst (2001), p. 222.

  82. 82.

    See mutatis mutandis Probst (2001), p. 222.

  83. 83.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 48, 246, para 3.

  84. 84.

    Reuter (1995), p. 180.

  85. 85.

    See the statement by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR UNCLOT I 269, para 8; Sinclair (1984), p. 176; Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 9.

  86. 86.

    Yasseen [1966-I/1] YbILC 22, para 62; Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 44; Reuter (1995), p. 180; Villiger(2009), Art 51 MN 10.

  87. 87.

    See mutatis mutandis → Art 49 MN 35.

  88. 88.

    Distefano (2011b), Art 51 VCLT II MN 1–7.

  89. 89.

    See Reuter VIII 138 (commentary to Draft Art 51 in conjunction with the commentary to Art 50).

  90. 90.

    Art 51 VCLT II was adopted without a vote, see UNCLOTIO I 17, para 97. As to Art 51 VCLT see UNCLOT II 90, para 64.

  91. 91.

    See the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom UNCLOT I 268, para 2; Distefano (2011a), Art 51 MN 12–23; Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 13. Contra Klabbers (2012), p. 568.

  92. 92.

    See the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom UNCLOT I 268, paras 2–3; Villiger (2009), Art 51 MN 13.

  93. 93.

    Dubai–Sharjah Border Arbitration (1981) 91 ILR 543, 569. See also Iran–United States Claims Tribunal Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran Case No 56, Partial Award No 310-65-3, (1987) 83 ILR 500, para 91 referring in an obiter dictum to Art 51 VCLT as an authentic reflection of customary international law to treaty relations between Iran and the United States despite the fact that neither State had ratified the VCLT.

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  1. Professor of Public Law, International Law and European Law, Faculty of Law, University of Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany

    Thilo Rensmann

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  1. European Legal Studies Institute, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany

    Oliver Dörr

  2. Faculty of Law, Department of Public Law/International Law, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria

    Kirsten Schmalenbach

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Rensmann, T. (2018). Article 51. In: Dörr, O., Schmalenbach, K. (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_54

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