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Banking on Trust as Individual Responsibility: Corporate Finance, Speculation and Global Capital Markets

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German Corporate Governance in International and European Context

Abstract

Overall, it is all about our liberal constitution, which enforces sensible rules of freedom. Globally, fair competition is required (Panama Papers!). The responsible players in economy and politics need to realise: Banking on trust, instead of on failure, is the basis in Germany, Europe and everywhere in the world, in order to prevent a further catastrophe of the ‘corporate’ world and to promote sustainable prosperity in freedom. Worldwide, autocrats, centralism and dehumanization are massively gaining ground: Does freedom have enough responsible friends?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rathenau (1917), p. 13.

  2. 2.

    Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), 7.3.1994 (II ZR 52/93), BGHZ 125, 239, 246 (www.jurion.de/Urteile/BGH/1994-03-07/II-ZR-52_93, recital 19).

  3. 3.

    See detail esp. in Sects. 9.4 (duty of care), 9.5.3 and 9.8 (global aspects).

  4. 4.

    With regard to criminal law, e.g., Ss 400 AktG and 331 HGB, S 266 StGB; see Luttermann (2012), pp. 251–258; on S 245 HGB see Sects. 9.8.2 and 7.8.5. Pitkowitz (2014).

  5. 5.

    Luttermann (2011), pp. 330–333. See below Sects. 9.7.2 and 9.9.

  6. 6.

    See e.g. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 1st Session, Report 101-155, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1989, Oct. 2, 1989, p. 13.

  7. 7.

    See Report pursuant to S 509(5) of the National Markets Improvement Act of 1996, October 1997: www.sec.gov/news/studies/acctgsp.htm.

  8. 8.

    U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Strengthening U.S. Capital Markets: A Challenge for all Americans, March 2008, 2.

  9. 9.

    Michael E. Porter, Jan W. Rivkin, Mihir A. Desai and Manjari Raman, Problems Unsolved and a Nation Divided: The State of U.S. Competitiveness 2016 (Harvard Business School, Sept 2016).

  10. 10.

    Lawrence Summers, Time US leadership woke up to new economic era, Financial Times, 5.4.2015: www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/a0a01306-d887-11e4-ba53-00144feab7de.html.

  11. 11.

    Fed: www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_14986.htm (called up on 31.5.2016).

  12. 12.

    Wilson (1913), p. 175.

  13. 13.

    Stiglitz (2010), p. 109. Overall Luttermann (2010a), pp. 444–448.

  14. 14.

    Time Magazine, September 2008. On Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. see below Sect. 7.5.2.

  15. 15.

    Luttermann (2016b), pp. 397–405.

  16. 16.

    Claus Luttermann, in: du Plessis et al. (2007), pp. 177–204.

  17. 17.

    The World’s Billionaires: #488 Michael Milken (www.forbes.com, 2010-10-03).

  18. 18.

    U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, April 13, 2011, 1.

  19. 19.

    Financial Times (9.12.2015: www.ft.com/intl/reports/ft-year-in-finance).

  20. 20.

    See the preceding footnote as well as below Sect. 9.8.1.

  21. 21.

    Claudio Borio and Hyun Song Shin, BIS Quarterly Review March 2016 (www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1603a.htm).

  22. 22.

    Andy Xie, South China Morning Post (updated: 30.5.2016): www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1919092/dont-listen-ruling-elite-world-economy-real-trouble.

  23. 23.

    See below in Sect. 9.9. Patterson (2012) and Lewis (2014).

  24. 24.

    S. 1206, 114th Congress (2015–2016), 05/06/2015, introduced by for the third time by (presidential candidate) Sen. Sanders (I-VT).

  25. 25.

    Neel Kashkari, Governor Fed Bank of Minneapolis: http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/kashkari-fed-banking-reform-speech. Data on bank balance sums 2001/2015: manager-magazine, 5/2016, p. 68.

  26. 26.

    Credit Suisse, Global Wealth Databook (Oct 2015: http://publications.credit-suisse.com).

  27. 27.

    See Zucman (2015): ca. 7,5 billion U.S. Dollars.

  28. 28.

    See Sect. 9.6.4. European Commission, Regulation on transparency of securities financing trading and of reuse, 29.10.2015 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5931_en.htm). See current European Securities and Markets Authority–ESMA (www.esma.europa.eu). Financial Stability Board (FSB), Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015, and FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking, 29.8.2013 (www.fsb.org).

  29. 29.

    E.g. for China: Zhu (2016). Cf., e.g. Don Weinland and Gabriel Wildau, China financial regulator clamps down on shadow banking, Financial Times, 2.5.2016 (https://app.ft.com/cms/s/4bb772de-1045-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173.html?sectionid=world). See below Sect. 9.6.4.

  30. 30.

    Data of the BIS (4.5.2016): www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm. See below Sect. 9.6.4. Luttermann (2008a), pp. 737–743. Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder and Stefano Battiston, The network of global corporate control: http://arxiv.org/abs/1107.5728 (19.9.2011).

  31. 31.

    Luttermann (2016b), pp. 397–405. See already Luttermann (2011), pp. 330–333.

  32. 32.

    See below Sects. 9.5.1 and 9.9 (see already in the 2nd ed: 8.4.1).

  33. 33.

    Based on Luttermann (1998).

  34. 34.

    See Chap. 7 and in Sect. 8.2.1.

  35. 35.

    See overall with references in the 2nd edition Sects. 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 (pp. 832–833).

  36. 36.

    Baums (1992), p. 503.

  37. 37.

    In the 2nd edition Sect. 8.3 (at 334–338).

  38. 38.

    Cf. on the practice of the ‘revolving doors’ in the USA Luttermann (1999a), pp. 42–48, 99–100.

  39. 39.

    Wall Street Journal: Treasury Gets a Citibanker (29.1.2013: www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324734904578243932620870510).

  40. 40.

    See details in Chap. 3.

  41. 41.

    Cf. for credit institutions and investment firms Article 91 No. 1(1) Directive 2013/36/EU: ‘Members of the management body shall at all times be of sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties’.

  42. 42.

    OLG Hamm, 28.5.2013 (27 W 35/13), ZIP 2013, 2008 (openjur.de/u/644927.html).

  43. 43.

    Luttermann (2003), pp. 745–750; Bahreini (2012). More details see above in Chap. 7.

  44. 44.

    Reasons given in the draft of the German Federal Government on the Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz (BilMoG, 21.5.2008, Bundestags-Drucksache. 16/10067, 101).

  45. 45.

    Of 16.4.2014, amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, OJ EU (27.5.2014) L 158.

  46. 46.

    Reasons given in the draft of the German Federal Government on the Abschlussprüfungsreformgesetz (AReG, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/7219, p. 56. AReG of 10.5.2016, BGBl. I 1142.

  47. 47.

    15.2.2005, OJ EU (25.2.2005) L 52/51. Cf. also German Corporate Governance Code, Sects. 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 (www.dcgk.de/en/code//foreword.html).

  48. 48.

    See also below in Sect. 9.5.2 (case of IKB).

  49. 49.

    BGH, 26.4.2016 (XI ZR 108/15), ZIP 2016, 1063.

  50. 50.

    Cf. Hoffmann-Becking (2015), S 33, recitals 63 and 65; Spindler (2014), S 76 recital 14.

  51. 51.

    Original version: ‘Eine Pflichtverletzung liegt nicht vor, wenn das Vorstandsmitglied bei einer unternehmerischen Entscheidung vernünftigerweise annehmen durfte, auf der Grundlage angemessener Information zum Wohle der Gesellschaft zu handeln.’

  52. 52.

    On the legal development in the USA: Radin (2009).

  53. 53.

    Basic BGH, 21.4.1997 (Az. II ZR 175/95 – ARAG/Garmenbeck), BGHZ 135, 244. S 93(1)(2) AktG inserted through the Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG), 22.9.2005, BGBl. I 2802; see German Federal Government, Reasoning E-UMAG, 7.1.2005, Bundesrats-Drucksache 3/05, pp. 18–21.

  54. 54.

    BGH, 21.4.1997 (Az. II ZR 175/95—ARAG/Garmenbeck), BGHZ 135, 244 (www.jurion.de/Urteile/BGH/1997-04-21/II-ZR-175_95, recital 22). Cf. below Sect. 9.5.2 (IKB).

  55. 55.

    See examples under Sect. 9.4.3.

  56. 56.

    BGH, 15.1.2013 (II ZR 90/11), WM 2013, 456, and BGH, 4.11.2002 (II ZR 224/00), BGHZ 152, 280, at 284–285.

  57. 57.

    Overall Roth (2001).

  58. 58.

    The regulations for members of the management board also apply for their deputies, S 94 AktG.

  59. 59.

    Pfandbriefgesetz (PfandBG—Mortgage Bond Act), 22.5.2005, BGBl. I 1373, 2.11.2015, BGBl. I 1864. See e.g. Ss 4(1a) and (3), 5(1)(2), 8, 10(2), 19(1) No. 4 and 28(1) No. 3 PfandBG.

  60. 60.

    OLG Düsseldorf, 15.1.2015 (I-6 U 48/14, 6 U 48/14), ZIP 2016, 171 (final, BGH, 23.2.2016 – II ZR 49/15), with reference to BGH, 15.1.2013 (II ZR 90/11), WM 2013, 456.

  61. 61.

    US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, April 13, 2011, 17 (17–26). See also below Sects. 9.5.2 and 9.6.1.

  62. 62.

    Stiglitz (2010), cit. at 6, resp. at 147 and 169–176. Luttermann (2008a), pp. 737–743.

  63. 63.

    Thus explicitly OLG Düsseldorf, 15.1.2015 (I-6 U 48/14, 6 U 48/14), ZIP 2016, 171 (final, BGH, 23.2.2016 – II ZR 49/15).

  64. 64.

    Basic Luttermann (1998).

  65. 65.

    BGH, 29.04.2014 (II ZR 395/12), ZIP 2014, 1166.

  66. 66.

    Luttermann (1998), pp. 135–176 and 486–539.

  67. 67.

    Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, 15.5.2014, OJ EU, 12.6.2014, L 173/190 (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive—BRRD); see in Germany BRRD-Umsetzungsgesetz, 10.12.2014, BGBl. I 2091. Comment by the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Federal Bank), 6.10.2014: www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Kurzmeldungen/Stellungnahmen/2014_10_02_finanzausschuss.html. Rule book on failing banks: Commission, Delegated Regulation (EU) supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, 7.6.2016, C(2016)3356 final. See in the case of Cyprus: ECJ, 20.9.2016 (C-8/15 P – Ledra Advertising/Commission and ECB), under: http://curia.europa.eu.

  68. 68.

    BGH, 29.04.2014 (II ZR 395/12), ZIP 2014, 1166 (http://lexetius.com/2014,1578, recitals 23, 47). Thus already BGH, 5.10.1992 (II ZR 172/91), BGHZ 119, 305, 331; on this Luttermann (1993).

  69. 69.

    BGH, 5.10.1992 (II ZR 172/91), BGHZ 119, 305. Luttermann (1998), 86–134 and 486–539.

  70. 70.

    OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2011 edition, Part I, I.4 (www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf). Instructive for this development is Muchlinski (2007), pp. 3–43.

  71. 71.

    In general see Luttermann (2008a), pp. 737–743. See Sect. 8.5.

  72. 72.

    Davies and Worthington (2012), pp. 21–18, 771; so-called ‘common ownership’.

  73. 73.

    OECD Annual Survey of Large Pension Funds and Public Pension Reserve Funds 2015 (www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/survey-large-pension-funds.htm); current: www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/globalpensionstatistics.htm. Towers Watson estimate the total assets of the 300 largest pension funds at more than 15 billion US dollars (http://pension360.org/worlds-largest-pension-funds-2015-edition-report).

  74. 74.

    Like this, (partly) also noted under the pension funds already. Cf. for the current situation: www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings.

  75. 75.

    Investment & Pensions Europe: www.ipe.com/reports/special-reports/top-400-asset-managers/top-400-asset-managers-2015-global-assets-top-50trn/10008262.fullarticle. Currently under e.g.: www.relbanks.com/rankings/largest-asset-managers.

  76. 76.

    Claus Luttermann in Kropff and Semler (2003), p. 786 (S 264 HGB) para 79.

  77. 77.

    Deutsches Aktieninstitut (DAI), DAI-Factbook 2006 (Oct 2006) 08.5-1, 2006. For 2015 see Table 9.1.

  78. 78.

    16.3.2016: London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Boerse unveil deal (www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7f98cd92-e6e6-11e5-a09b-1f8b0d268c39.html). Deutsche Börse: Preliminary Acceptance, 26.7.2016 (press release: www.deutsche-boerse.com).

  79. 79.

    There Chap. 8 (Sect. 8.4.1), p. 339.

  80. 80.

    Data (without Beiersdorf, ProSiebenSat.1 and Vonovia) by Börsen-Zeitung/EY, 10.5.2016, 9.

  81. 81.

    Referring to U.S. statistics: Krugman et al. (2015), p. 222.

  82. 82.

    The merger of the former Bayerische Vereinsbank AG and the Bayerische Hypothekenbank AG.

  83. 83.

    Deutsches Aktieninstitut (DAI) Factbook 2006, 08.5–1, 2006 (DAI-Factbook 2010).

  84. 84.

    Successor bank: Portigon AG; on the devolvement process (19.3.2015): www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken-versicherungen/west-lb-abwicklung-portigon-schreibt-tiefrote-zahlen/11528292.html. On the reappraisal of the scandal: Landtag NRW, WestLB-Untersuchungsausschuss: www.landtag.nrw.de/portal/WWW/Navigation_R2010/030-Parlament-und-Wahlen/015-Ausschuesse-und-Gremien/030-Untersuchungsausschuesse/PUAII/Inhalt.jsp.

  85. 85.

    Steve Eisman from the Hedgefonds Front Point. On practice see below in Sect. 9.6.5.

  86. 86.

    Cited according to The Economist, The Bigger Fools, 22.4.2010 (www.economist.com/node/15955490) with reference to Lewis (2010); Lippmann was crown witness for the study of the US Senate (see the following footnote and Sect. 9.6.5). On the situation at the time: www.wsj.com/articles/SB118670471880693703 (10.8.2007); www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/178cbd98-5014-11dc-a6b0-0000779fd2ac.html (21.8.2007).

  87. 87.

    US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, April 13, 2011, at 10 (in detail, e.g.: 318–375). See below Sect. 9.6.5.

  88. 88.

    OLG Düsseldorf, 9.12.2009 (I-6 W 45/09), ZIP 2010, 28; BGH, 1.3.2010 (II ZB 1/10), ZIP 2010, 446. On the result: www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/banken/a-964249.html (14.4.2014); OLG Düsseldorf, 26.11.2015 (I-3 Wx 134/14), ZIP 2016, 1022.

  89. 89.

    E.g. LG München I, 10.12.2013 (5 HK O 1387/10), ZIP 2014, 570 (Siemens/Neubürger), OLG München (7 U 113/14, pending); LAG Düsseldorf, 20.1.2015 (16 Sa 459/14), ZIP 2015, 829. See already above under Sect. 9.4 as well penally against Stefan Ortseifen (CEO, IKB): LG Düsseldorf, 14.7.2010 (14 KLs 130 Js 54/07), openjur.de/u/144615.html; BGH, 20.7.2011 (3 StR 506/10), ZIP 2011, 5.

  90. 90.

    BGH, 13.12.2011 (XI ZR 51/10), BGHZ 192, 90 (IKB). OLG München, 15.12.2014 (KAP 3/10), ZIP 2015, 689 (Hypo Real Estate Holding AG); dazu: BGH, 1.12.2015 (XI ZB 13/14), lexetius.com/2015,4182.

  91. 91.

    OLG Stuttgart, 29.2.2012 (20 W 5/11), ZIP 2012, 970 (Porsche Automobil Holding SE), on this: BGH, 6.11.2012 (II ZR 111/12), ZIP 2012, 2438. BGH, 14.1.2014 (II ZB 5/12), ZIP 2012, 970.

  92. 92.

    On this Luttermann (2012), pp. 251–258.

  93. 93.

    Data by Börsen-Zeitung/EY, 10.5.2016, 9 (for earlier data see 2nd ed, 2012, 340). On the involvement of the German taxpayers in the context of the world debt crisis see Below Sect. 9.6.3.

  94. 94.

    Data by Börsen-Zeitung/EY, 10.5.2016, 9. Compared with 53% in 2010 (see also for earlier data 2nd ed, 2012, 340).

  95. 95.

    Wedel (2009); Mayer (2016). See also Sect. 9.6.3. Cf. for the European Union: Transparency International EU, Access all areas – when EU politicians become lobbyists, 31.1.2017 (www.integritywatch.eu).

  96. 96.

    Overall U.S. Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates, Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, 9.9.2015 (www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download). In detail Luttermann (2016a).

  97. 97.

    Luttermann (2015a), pp. 274–282. Luttermann (2015b), pp. 31–48.

  98. 98.

    Sandrock (2016), pp. 1–94. Cf. among others (restrictively) Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013); European Community v RJR Nabisco, Inc. et al., 783 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir. 2015), US Supreme Court (Case No. 15-138). See also Sect. 9.6.5 (Deutsche Bank AG) and Sect. 9.7.1 (Apple Inc.).

  99. 99.

    See Sect. 7.1 as well as Sects. 9.5.2 and 9.6.4.

  100. 100.

    On the Commerzbank AG Sect. 9.6.3. Reliable data are lacking; for Germany losses for the taxpayers from the rescue of banks are reported to amount to 50 bn. (24.12.2015: www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/bankenrettungsbilanz-50-milliarden-euro-verlust-fuer-steuerzahler-13982985.html); cf. www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/bericht-des-waehrungsfonds-deutschland-zahlt-ueberdurschnittlich-viel-fuer-bankenrettung-1.1796045 (16.10.2013) as well as officially—also on the SoFFin—under: www.fmsa.de.

  101. 101.

    See Sect. 9.6.1. Luttermann (2011), p. 330.

  102. 102.

    Jeff Black (6.2.2016): www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-06/after-17-years-ecb-reveals-547-billion-in-central-bank-assets.

  103. 103.

    See Article 5 EU Treaty: the principle of subsidiarity (see in Sect. 7.10.3). Cf. BVerfG, 21.6.2016 (2 BvR 2728/13 et al.), http://lexetius.com/2016,1547; BVerfG, 28.6.2016 (2 BvR 322/13), http://lexetius.com/2016,1814.

  104. 104.

    See in the case of Cyprus: ECJ, 20.9.2016 (C-8/15 P – Ledra Advertising/Commission and ECB), under: http://curia.europa.eu and NJW 2016, 3291. Cf. Jim Brunsden and Alex Barker, Bank turmoils: are Europe’s new bail-in rules to blame?, 11.2.2016: www.ft.com/cms/s/2/8ad2ed98-d0a0-11e5-986a-62c79fcbcead.html. See on the new European law (BRRD) above in Sect. 9.4.3.

  105. 105.

    Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, 5.12.1996: www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm.

  106. 106.

    Alan Greenspan, Gold and Economic Freedom, 1966/67 (under: www.constitution.org/mon/greenspan_gold.htm); Greenspan after the Brexit referendum (23.6.2016): www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-06-27/greenspan-warns-crisis-imminent-he-urges-return-gold-standard. Cf. Luttermann (2008b), pp. 193–204.

  107. 107.

    Claus Luttermann, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 23.6.2008, 22. See also Depenheuer (2009).

  108. 108.

    See above Chaps. 7 and 8.

  109. 109.

    See already Chap. 7. Particularly urgently Arthur Levitt, The ‘Numbers Game’ 28 Sept 1998, speech at NYU Center for Law and Business, www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt. Luttermann (2011), p. 330.

  110. 110.

    See Sects. 9.2.3 and 9.9 (so-called ‘Goldman Sachs Algorithm’) and in Sects. 7.10 and 8.5. Basic Luttermann (2010b), pp. 1–4.

  111. 111.

    Knight (1971), pp. 11–12.

  112. 112.

    Luttermann (2009), pp. 77–85. See above Sects. 9.2.3 and 9.5.3.

  113. 113.

    Informative Morris (2008).

  114. 114.

    On the rescue measures e.g.: www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/16rescue.html, www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/business/09paulson.html, www.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/business/secrets-of-the-bailout-now-revealed.html; www.businessinsider.com/buffett-tells-country-tarp-gave-over-1-billion-to-goldman-sachs-2011-3?IR=T; on Lehman: www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/business/revisiting-the-lehman-brothers-bailout-that-never-was.html. Cf. Paulson (2010).

  115. 115.

    See, e.g., the abolition of the separation of credit banks and investment banks (Glass-Steagall Act of 1933). Already leading positions in Goldman from 1966–1990. After his time time as Secretary of the Treasury among others with Citigroup Inc. (on this: www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/business/10rubin.html?_r=2&hp) and financial counsellor of U.S. President Barack Obama. Cf. on U.S. President Donald Trump, e.g.: money.cnn.com/2017/02/02/investing/trump-break-up-big-banks-glass-steagall-dimon/.

  116. 116.

    SEC, Litigation Release No. 21489, April 16, 2010: SEC v Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, 10 Civ. 3229 (BJ) (S.D.N.Y.), www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm.

  117. 117.

    With Credit Default Swaps: see SEC (preceding footnote) as well as generally above Sect. 8.5.4. Note: founder of ‘Paulson & Co. Inc.’ is John Paulson (1994).

  118. 118.

    See on this New York Times, 15.7.2010: Goldman Settles with S.E.C. for US$550 Million, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/goldman-to-settle-with-s-e-c-for-550-million.

  119. 119.

    Overall Luttermann (2008a), pp. 737–743.

  120. 120.

    Kosowski and Neftci (2015); Chatterjee (2014). Beder and Marshall (2011). Critically already: Taleb (2007).

  121. 121.

    The usual structure of the product: Super-senior tranche (=30–100%, cover system risks, valuated with ‘AAA’), one or more senior tranches (30–10%) or mezzanine tranches (10-3%, for losses, ‘AA’ to ‘BB’) and equity tranche (for first up to 3% losses [idiosyncratic risks], non-valuated—‘toxic waste’). International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2006, 53–54, 62. Rules of valuation: FASB, FAS 157—Fair Value Measurement.

  122. 122.

    This means ‘CDOs from CDOs’; also: leveraged super-senior products and CDOs with asset-backed securities (ABSs).

  123. 123.

    Adonis Antoniades and Nikola Tarashev, Securitisations: tranching concentrates uncertainty, BIS Quarterly Review, Dec. 2014 (www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1412f.htm). Current derivatives statistics: www.bis.org/statistics/about_derivatives_stats.htm. Data on CDSs: International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA): www.swapsinfo.org; for information also The Depository trust and Clearing Corporation (www.dtcc.com).

  124. 124.

    Cf., FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157: Fair Value Measurements (FAS 157); IASB, IFRS 13: Fair Value Measurement. The downfall of the Enron Corp. stands as an example for accompanying accounting fraud: Milhaupt and Pistor (2008), pp. 47–67.

  125. 125.

    Berkshire Hathaway, Annual Report to Shareholders 2002.

  126. 126.

    Statistisches Bundesamt (www.destatis.de). Deutsche Bank AG, Annual Reports: www.db.com/ir/en/annual-reports.htm. See also in Sect. 9.5.2.

  127. 127.

    IMF, Country Report No. 16/191: Germany—Stress Testing the Banking and Insurance Sectors, p. 5 (June 2016: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16191.pdf). Cf. European Banking Authority (EBA), EU-wide stress test results, 29.7.2016 (www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2016).

  128. 128.

    See above Sect. 9.2.3 and below Sect. 9.7.3.

  129. 129.

    On this already in 2008 Luttermann (2008a), pp. 741, 742.

  130. 130.

    Wall Street Journal, 4.5.2011, 17: U.S.: Deutsche Bank lied over loans. However, it did not purchase the mortgage subsidiary until 2007, but the deals in question go back to 1999.

  131. 131.

    US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, April 13, 2011, 7 and 11 (under the heading: ‘Investment Bank Abuses’).

  132. 132.

    US Senate, ibid., 10. See above Sect. 9.5.2. On rating agencies: Luttermann (2011), p. 330.

  133. 133.

    Data according to US Senate, ibid., 333–335.

  134. 134.

    See Sects. 9.6.3 and 9.5.2.

  135. 135.

    State September 2016: $14bn, see FAZ, 16.9.2016 (www.faz.net); state October 2016: $5,4bn DOJ settlement?—cf. www.wsj.com/articles/deutsche-bank-u-s-doj-continue-to-discuss-mortgage-securities-settlement-1475440468 (2.10.2016). Finally civil settlement of 7,2bn (including 3,1bn penalty), see www.nytimes.com, 22.12.2016. Cf. above Sect. 9.4.2 and—esp. on transfer of wealth and law of nations—in Sect. 9.5.3 (last paragraph).

  136. 136.

    See, e.g., on the Deutsche Bank AG: BGH, 22.03.2011 (XI ZR 33/10), NZG 2011, 591 (CMS Spread Ladder Swap).

  137. 137.

    Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation, see: Federal Reserve (Fed), Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR, 2016: www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ccar.htm).

  138. 138.

    A popular strategy seems to be to treat ‘foreign’ clients in a special manner; see, e.g., Siemens AG and Daimler AG under the regime of the US SEC. Cf. above Sect. 9.5.3.

  139. 139.

    Bloomberg, Dec 28, 2010: Banks were ranked on the impact their failure would have on the global financial system’ (www.bloomberg.com). See on ‘systemic risk’ above Sect. 9.6.1.

  140. 140.

    In bucket 3, List of global systemically important banks as of Nov. 2015 (www.fsb.org).

  141. 141.

    According to: http://insideparadeplatz.ch/2016/02/10/50-980-000-000-000-die-derivat-bombe-mitten-im-herzen-vom-paradeplatz. Data of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (4.5.2016): www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm. Cf already above Sect. 9.6.5.

  142. 142.

    Speech of March 10, 2009 (federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm); also in his hearing before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, on this: Wall Street Journal, 6.9.2010, 11.

  143. 143.

    E.g., Tomlinson (2016); Paul Craig Roberts, Dave Kranzler, and John Titus, The De-industrialization of America: www.paulcraigroberts.org/2014/08/11/de-industrialization-america.

  144. 144.

    Cf. meanwhile also Financial Stability Board (FSB), Progress and Next Steps Towards Ending ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ (2.9.2013: www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130902.pdf).

  145. 145.

    See above Sect. 9.2.3. Luttermann (2016b), pp. 397–405.

  146. 146.

    State 30.8.2016: European Commission, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm; on this Philip Aldrick, America threatens tit-for-tat retaliation against Europeans, The Times, 31.8.2016, 9. Cf. above Sect. 9.5.3.

  147. 147.

    See above more details in Sect. 9.2.3.

  148. 148.

    S. 1206, 114th Congress (2015–2016), 05/06/2015, already for the third time by the (former Presidential candidate) Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT).

  149. 149.

    Fed and FDIC an JPMorgan Chase & Co., 12.4.2016 (www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/jpmorgan-chase-letter-20160413.pdf); on this: www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/business/dealbook/living-wills-of-5-banks-fail-to-pass-muster.html?_r=0. Cf. already Neel Kashkari, Governor Fed Bank of Minneapolis: http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/kashkari-fed-banking-reform-speech. Cf. also on U.S. President Trump above in footnote 116.

  150. 150.

    Wall Street Journal, 18 of April, 2011, 11 (‘Proxies vs. Profits’).

  151. 151.

    ICB, Interim Report: Consultation on Reform Options (Executive Summary, April 2011), 2. Seminally, Fikentscher (2009), pp. 635–646. Möschel (2009), pp. 129–33.

  152. 152.

    Disapprovingly already Luttermann (1999b) in: (2000) 45 AG 143.

  153. 153.

    In detail Luttermann (2010b), pp. 1–4. Basic Claus Luttermann (1998), pp. 465–485.

  154. 154.

    See in detail Chap. 7. Luttermann (2011), p. 330.

  155. 155.

    Data under 23.2.2011 according to www.handelsblatt.com. See for more Data (Financial Reports): www.commerzbank.de/en.

  156. 156.

    Wall Street Journal, 3.5.2011, 23.

  157. 157.

    Wall Street Journal, 13.4.2011, 1 and 3.

  158. 158.

    Luttermann (2010b), pp. 1, 2.

  159. 159.

    Second Treatise of Civil Government (London 1689), chap. XVIII, sec. 202.

  160. 160.

    COM(2010) 284 final (2.6.2010).

  161. 161.

    See, e.g., also in Sects. 7.8.2 and 7.10 (on financial reporting and auditors).

  162. 162.

    In Chap. 7.

  163. 163.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.7.

  164. 164.

    E.g. Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 537/2014. On the implementation in Germany Abschlussprüfungsreformgesetz (AReG), 10.5.2016, BGBl. I 1142; Abschlussprüferaufsichtsreformgesetz (APAReG), 31.3.2016, BGBl. I 518. Overall Chap. 7.

  165. 165.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 1.

  166. 166.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 1 with reference to: Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (February 25, 2009). Mr. Jacques de Larosiére was chairman of the group.

  167. 167.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 1.

  168. 168.

    On delegated and implementing acts under CRR/CRD IV: ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/regcapital/acts/index_en.htm.

  169. 169.

    See Sects. 7.1 and 7.5.

  170. 170.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.5.

  171. 171.

    See Sect. 8.5; details in Chap. 7. Luttermann (2011), p. 330.

  172. 172.

    See under: ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-single-market. See also EC, Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union, 18.2.2015 (COM/2015/063 final): (eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740&from=EN).

  173. 173.

    See on the Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) in Sect. 7.10.2. Luttermann and Pöschk (2014), pp. 663–668.

  174. 174.

    See on politicians, supervisory authorities, auditors etc. Sect. 8.6.

  175. 175.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3.

  176. 176.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3.

  177. 177.

    See, e.g., Sects. 7.1 and 7.3–7.4, 7.8.2. Cf. COM(2010) 284 final, 3.7 and 3.6.

  178. 178.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3, 3.4.

  179. 179.

    ECJ, 9.3.1999 (C-212/97) ECR 1999 I-01459; on this Luttermann (2000), pp. 907–921.

  180. 180.

    In detail Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Philipp Paech and Edmund P. Schuster, Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability (European Commission, DG Markt, London 2013) with Annex (Country Reports).

  181. 181.

    See above Sect. 9.2.3, Sect. 7.7.6 (Chap. 7) and Luttermann (2014), pp. 777–784.

  182. 182.

    Ss 302, 906 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), 107th Cong.: Senate bill S. 2673, H.R. 3763. Citation: Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Report to accompany S. 2673, 3.7.2002, under Title III.B.

  183. 183.

    See Sect. 9.1 and in Sect. 7.3.1. Claus Luttermann in Kropff and Semler (2003), vol 5/1 (S 245 HGB) pp. 452–469. See also Directive 2013/34/EU (Annual and Consolidated Financial Statements) and, e.g.: S 91 AktG (accountancy, risk management system of the corporation), S 289 HGB (directors’ financial review), S 289a HGB (statement on corporate governance). Overall Sects. 9.3.3 and 9.4.

  184. 184.

    See Sect. 7.8. Similarly Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2013), pp. 238–239.

  185. 185.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3. See basically above Sect. 9.3.3.

  186. 186.

    Cf. for credit institutions and investment firms: ‘All members of the management body shall commit sufficient time to perform their functions in the institution” (Article 91 No. 2 Directive 2013/36/EU.

  187. 187.

    Time, 16.6.1967 (www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843981,00.html).

  188. 188.

    At that time, the IG Farben also conducted building projects for Auschwitz and its external camps with the help of forced laborers. Cf. in detail Gall (2005).

  189. 189.

    20 of these at some point as chairman.

  190. 190.

    Special characteristics need to be noted for concerns and for foreign companies. Cf. no 5.4.5 GCGC (July 2016): only 3 mandates instead of 5 mandates (June 2009). Already in favour of only four mandates by law: Luttermann (2003), pp. 745–750.

  191. 191.

    On this for Germany e.g. the analysis of the fees of the members of the supervisory board in the DAX: manager-magazin, May 2016.

  192. 192.

    E.g., Owen Jones, 21.4.2016: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/21/britain-corporate-fatcat-party-till-we-turn-music-off.

  193. 193.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 3.3 (1st en-dash).

  194. 194.

    Ibid.

  195. 195.

    Gordon (2007), pp. 1465–1568. Cf. Guido Ferrarini and Marilena Filippelli, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders Around the World, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Law Working Paper No. 258/2014; see also above Sect. 9.3.3.

  196. 196.

    COM(2010) 284 final, 5.1. Luttermann (2003), pp. 745–750.

  197. 197.

    See S 100(5) AktG (on this see Sects. 9.3.3 and 7.11) and in general Chap. 7.

  198. 198.

    EU Commission, Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance - a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies (COM/2012/0740 final): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740&from=EN. on this Hopt (2015), pp. 139–213. On – current – developments in detail see: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm.

  199. 199.

    See Action Plan (preceding footnotes), under 1. (2nd paragraph).

  200. 200.

    See above Sects. 9.2.1 and 9.7.2. Luttermann (2012), pp. 251–258.

  201. 201.

    Galbraith (1993), p. 71.

  202. 202.

    Erasmus (2003), p. 87.

  203. 203.

    E.g., UK Stewardship Code (www.frc.org.uk). Arsalidou (2012), pp. 342–379; ICSA The Governance Intitute, 2020 Stewardship: Improving the quality of Investor Stewardship (www.icsa.org.uk/assets/files/pdfs/Policy2/2020_Stewardship_Final_L.pdf).

  204. 204.

    Robin Wigglesworth and Eric Platt, Goldman takes spoken word out of US bond trading, 31.8.2016, 13.

  205. 205.

    Claus Luttermann, Die Erosion der Freiheit, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 23.6.2008, 22.

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Luttermann, C. (2017). Banking on Trust as Individual Responsibility: Corporate Finance, Speculation and Global Capital Markets. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54198-2_9

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