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Die Psychologie der Entscheidung

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Zusammenfassung

Entscheidungen finden oft „unter Unsicherheit“ statt. Im Allgemeinen ist damit gemeint, dass für den Entscheider die möglichen Konsequenzen der Optionen unsicher sind, weil die Konsequenzen auch von anderen, durch ihn nicht kontrollierbaren Ereignissen abhängig sind. Wie Menschen mit dieser Unsicherheit umgehen, wie sie ihre „subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten“ bilden, verändern, direkt zum Ausdruck bringen oder in ihrem Verhalten zeigen, ist ein zentrales Thema der Entscheidungsforschung. Damit werden wir uns in diesem Kapitel beschäftigen.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Experimentelle Wirtschaftspsychologie, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Deutschland

    Hans Rüdiger Pfister

  2. Inst. für Psychologie und Arbeitswissenschaften, TU Berlin, Berlin, Deutschland

    Helmut Jungermann

  3. Hochschule für Angewandte Psychologie, Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz, Olten, Schweiz

    Katrin Fischer

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Pfister, H.R., Jungermann, H., Fischer, K. (2017). Unsicherheit. In: Die Psychologie der Entscheidung. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53038-2_5

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