Abstract
Counterfactuals are inherently ambiguous in the sense that the same counterfactual may be true under one mode of counterfactualization but false under the other. Many have regarded the ambiguity of counterfactuals as consisting in the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactuals. This is incorrect since the ambiguity persists even in cases not involving backtracking counterfactualization. In this paper, I argue that causal modeling semantics has the resources enough for accounting for the ambiguity of counterfactuals. Specifically, we need to distinguish two types of causal manipulation, which I call “intervention” and “extrapolation” respectively. To intervene in a causal model M is to change M’s structural equations in some specific ways, while to extrapolate M is to change the value assignment of M’s variables in some specific ways. I argue that intervention and extrapolation offer a natural explanation for the ambiguity of counterfactuals.
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Lee, K.Y. (2015). Causal Models and the Ambiguity of Counterfactuals. In: van der Hoek, W., Holliday, W., Wang, Wf. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9394. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48561-3_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48561-3_18
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