Abstract
This paper surveys and extends some recent contributions on the theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour. A model of dynamic economies with heterogeneous optimising agents is presented which encompasses the models used in the literature as special cases. It is shown that the notion of exploitation is logically coherent and can be meaningfully analysed in such a general framework. It is then shown that the axiomatic approach of social choice theory can be adopted to explore the normative foundations of the notion of exploitation. Finally, it is argued that purely distributive approaches to exploitation are not entirely compelling and a notion of dominance, or unequal power is necessary.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For all x, \(y \in \mathbb{R}^{n}\), \(x \geqq y\) if and only if \(x_{i} \geqq y_{i}\) (i = 1, …, n); x ≥ y if and only if \(x \geqq y\) and x ≠ y; x > y if and only if x i > y i (i = 1, …, n).
- 3.
For a slightly different, but related approach based on the notion of “abstract labour”, see Fleurbaey [8, section 8.5].
- 4.
It is worth noting in passing that the vector \(c_{e}^{\nu ^{}}\) in LE may be a function of \(\left (p,w\right )\) and that once \(c_{e}^{\nu ^{}}\) is identified, the existence of \(\alpha ^{c_{e}^{\nu ^{}}}\) is guaranteed by A2 and A3.
- 5.
- 6.
We are grateful to two anonymous referees for bringing this issue to our attention.
- 7.
- 8.
This argument does not apply to the WL definition: the existence of a general monotonic relationship between initial wealth and WL exploitation at a RS where agents save is an interesting issue for further research.
- 9.
Okishio [20] also shows that in a dynamic capitalist economy with neither population growth nor technical change, competition among capitalists may drive profits and exploitation to zero. According to Okishio [20], this profit squeeze derives from the increase in the real wage rate due to capital accumulation. Okishio’s [20] results, however, are based on simulation methods and only hold for a specific choice of parameters.
- 10.
It might be objected that WL exploitation does not disappear, even if ρ = 1, and the relationship between initial wealth and WL exploitation status is preserved. Thus, from a mathematical viewpoint, the model may be interpreted as a generalisation of Roemer’s theory under the WL definition. Yet, this does not affect our main conclusions. First, given the theoretical relevance of the WP definition, Marxian exploitation should arguably be micro-founded as a persistent WP phenomenon. Second, not only is the tendential disappearance of WP exploitation disturbing per se; it also implies that ceteris paribus, WL exploitation, too, is lower in the dynamic model with agents living for T periods than in the T-fold iteration of the static model.
- 11.
This point is also raised by Bowles and Gintis [2].
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Acknowledgements
A preliminary version of the paper was presented at CEPET 2010 Workshop in honour of Nick Baigent, where Nick Baigent, Constanze Binder, Giulio Codognato, Rajat Deb, and Yongsheng Xu provided insightful and useful comments. We are also grateful to Meghnad Desai, Woojin Lee, John Roemer, Ian Steedman, and participants in the “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” conference (Amherst), the MANCEPT Workshops and seminars at the LSE, the University of Siena, and the Institute of Education (London) for comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Special thanks go to Gil Skillman, the editors and two anonymous referees for long and detailed comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Veneziani, R., Yoshihara, N. (2015). Unequal Exchange, Assets, and Power: Recent Developments in Exploitation Theory. In: Binder, C., Codognato, G., Teschl, M., Xu, Y. (eds) Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46439-7_15
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