Abstract
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria are analyzed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence towards an equilibrium may be exponential.
This work was partially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the Collaborative Research Centre “On-The-Fly Computing” (SFB 901) and by the EU within FET project MULTIPLEX under contract no. 317532.
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Drees, M., Riechers, S., Skopalik, A. (2014). Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions. In: Lavi, R. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8768. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10
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