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The Agony of a Young Constitutional Democracy. The Hungarian Constitution 1989 to 2019

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Politics and Society in Hungary
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Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of Hungarian constitutional politics since 1989. First, it explains how a constitution for a liberal democracy emerged, which was modeled on the Western European example. The focus is then on an analysis of the current state of the Hungarian constitutional system with a focus on the constitutional amendments during the government period of the Fidesz party since 2010. It becomes clear that the level of protection of fundamental rights has declined significantly, which has led to legal proceedings and criticism at the European level. The erosion of the rule of law and a declining level of protection of fundamental rights is also reflected in Hungary’s assessment in various rule of law indices. In addition, the constitutional amendments are placed in their social and cultural context. Overall, the analysis points to an increasingly departure from liberal democracy and the construction of a hybrid regime.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We would like to thank Lando Kirchmair and Herbert Küpper for their critical comments and useful suggestions.

  2. 2.

    For the history of the National Round Table and the constitutional amendments of 1989/1990, see Kukorelli (2018, pp. 214-229). October 23, 1989 was symbolic: it was the 33rd anniversary of the 1956 anti-Soviet revolution, which was violently suppressed.

  3. 3.

    A peculiarity of Hungarian constitutional dogmatics, the “invisible constitution” (developed by László Sólyom, the first president of the Constitutional Court, in Decision 23/1990 (X.31) AB is defined as the framework of constitutional court decisions.

  4. 4.

    See Sonnevend et al. (2015, p. 39 ff.) for details.

  5. 5.

    For a good reason alarming analysis of the fourth amendment see Collot (2013).

  6. 6.

    See for example Art. L Abs. 1 about the definition of family and Art. VII. Abs. 2 and 3 ungGG about the recognition of churches.

  7. 7.

    For a lack of legal certainty, see Tölgyessy (2016, p. 17); Szalai and Jakab (2016, p. 116).

  8. 8.

    For statistics on the changes to recently enacted laws, see Sebők et al. (2017, pp. 300, 304).

  9. 9.

    However, the intention of Parliament was not fully fulfilled. In its decision 13/2013. (VI. 17.) AB, the Constitutional Court held that it was competent to use the judgments of the decisions taken before the entry into force of the Basic Law if the wording and context of the interpreted provision of the Basic Law are essentially identical to the wording and context of the Constitution of 1989/1990.

  10. 10.

    According to the Law CXIII of 2018, issued in December 2018, these voters were also able to vote in the elections to the European Parliament.

  11. 11.

    See for the exact numbers Nemzeti Választási Iroda (2019) and an analysis by Bodnár and Varsányi (2018).

  12. 12.

    Case C-66/18 European Commission against Hungary. The Hungarian Constitutional Court suspended its proceedings until the decision of the ECJ, see the decisions of the Constitutional Court 3199/2018. (VI. 21.) and 3200/2018. (VI. 21.) AB. See also the chapter of Várszegi in this volume.

  13. 13.

    Case C-78/18 European Commission against Hungary. The Hungarian Constitutional Court suspended its proceedings until the decision of the ECJ, see the decision of the Constitutional Court 3198/2018. (VI. 21.) AB.

  14. 14.

    Four regular judges turned to the Constitutional Court and criticized the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned provision of law: See Reg. Num. III / 01.727 / 2018, III / 01.829 / 2018, III / 01.704 / 2018 and III / 01.628 / 2018. The applications were rejected by the Constitutional Court, see the decision of the Constitutional Court 19/2019. (VI. 18.) AB.

  15. 15.

    For an empirical analysis of government influence on the Hungarian Constitutional Court, see Szente (2016).

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Jakab, A., Bodnár, E. (2023). The Agony of a Young Constitutional Democracy. The Hungarian Constitution 1989 to 2019. In: Bos, E., Lorenz, A. (eds) Politics and Society in Hungary. Springer, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39826-2_3

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