Abstract
Very different from models of secularization that are based on the institutional separation of politics and religion, Morocco seems to be following a particular path of implicit secularization. Inherent in this process is a tendency toward political modernization of Islamic ethics within an authoritarian regime that is deeply rooted in public religion. Closely controlled by a rights-oriented monarchy considered as divine, reformist Islamists in the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which has headed the government since the Moroccan uprising of 2011, are engaged in a process of rationalizing and intellectualizing moral and religious values. The PJD’s pragmatic, utilitarian approach, which is inspired by the liberalization of îjtîhad, reveals a development towards an interest-oriented, purposive rationalization rather than a value-oriented, axiological rationalization. Using a Weberian approach, I argue that the PJD’s sporadic and circumscribed attempts of implicit secularization are likely to weaken its political leadership. However, at the same time, it might normalize political Islamism through reform, liberalization and democratization. This is discussed using selected empirical cases such as human rights, Islamic finance, the arts, the consumption of alcohol, and individual liberties such as women’s rights and freedom of conscience.
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Notes
- 1.
According to the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, 98.5% of the population are, like most North Africans, Sunni-Malekite.
- 2.
For this and all other references to the 2011 constitution, see the English translation by William S. Hein & Co. in Constitute. The World’s Constitutions. To Read, Search and Compare. https://www.constituteproject.org. Accessed: 20.12.2020.
- 3.
Against the backdrop of secularization theory, which claims that religion has lost its influence on society, José Casanova (1994) has highlighted the public, political impact of religion in selected case studies (Spain, Poland, Brazil, and the US). He captured the results in the notion of public religion. According to Casanova (1994, p. 216), public religion assumes or tries to assume a public character or function: “religion always transcends any privatistic, autistic reality, serving to integrate individuals into an intersubjective, public, and communal ‘world’”.
- 4.
The Moroccan partisan field has been dominated by monarchic interventionism, which did not hesitate to create so-called administrative parties during the 1980s. By the end of the 1990s, the political parties derived from the nationalist movement had accepted reconciliation with the monarchy by participating in the government of the so-called alternance (attanawoub), led by the socialist leader Abderahmane El Youssoufi (1924–2020). In 2002, Mohammed VI favored a government of technocrats before authorizing the creation of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) by his friend and first adviser in 2008. This party quickly became one of the most dominant political parties in parliament, notably because of the support provided by the administration to the PAM’s candidates in the elections.
- 5.
Omar Balafrej, who is one of the leaders in parliament of the Federation of the Democratic Left (FDL), explicitly defends the idea of secularization in an interview: “The only party that talks about secularism today, is the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), which accepts partial secularism, the true secularists do not dare to talk about it. We are for secularism not against religion, but for its protection. We need it today in order to confront the ‘deep state’ and the Islamists”. https://maroc416.rssing.com/chan-40450030/all_p56.html. Accessed: 30.6.2020.
- 6.
I borrow Talal Asad’s concept of implicit religion summed up in this quote: “we should not assume that every act is the act of a competent agent with a clear intention” (Asad 2003, p. 71).
- 7.
In 1972, Abdelkrim Moti’, a former member of the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), created al-Chabîba al-Islamîyya (Islamic Youth). In 1975, the Moroccan courts sentenced him in absentia for the murder of the socialist leader, Omar Benjelloun.
- 8.
Composed of many people close to the king and of formerly radical left-wing and secular activists, the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) was created in 2008 by Fouad Ali al-Himma, a friend of the king and former minister delegate to the Interior. In just a few years, the PAM has become the second most powerful party after the PJD. During the Moroccan uprising of 2011, the former leader of the PAM, Ilias El Omari, fled abroad to escape the protests of the 20 February movement.
- 9.
Regarding these types of rationalization, Weber noted as follows: “Social action can be determined either (1) by purposive rationality; through expectations of the behavior of external objects and other people, and employing these expectations as a ‘condition’ or ‘means’ for one’s own rational ends, as sought after and considered objectives; or by (2) value rationality: through conscious belief in the unconditional and intrinsic value—whether this is understood as ethical, aesthetic, religious, or however constructed—of a specific form of particular comportment purely for itself, unrelated to its outcome; or by (3) affect, especially emotion: through actual emotions and feelings; or by (4) tradition: through ingrained habituation” (Weber 2019, p. 101).
- 10.
In his analysis of Protestant ethics in European civilization, Weber (1992 [1930]) highlighted the central role of intellectual rationalism, which is linked to patterns of religious administration and based on scientific reason, individual autonomy, as well as a specific conduct of life and personal salvation.
- 11.
Weber considered ethics as a mark of religious ‘doctrine’: “The marks of doctrine are the development of a rational system of religious concepts and the development of systematic and distinguishably ‘religious ethics’ which are based upon a collected and fixed teaching validated by ‘revelation’” (Weber 1993 [1963], p. 30). Furthermore, Weber associated ethics with the Prophet of Islam. According to Bryan Turner (2011, p. 62), “Weber sought to understand the status of Muhammed as an ethical prophet and how the Prophet articulated a set of revelations in the Qur’an to challenge the traditional values of Arab society”.
- 12.
In this regard, Mohamed Cherkaoui (2006, p. 167) states: “These movements share many common features. The same dogmatic principles underlie their doctrines. The same stock of ideas about the social ideal, similar semantics, are peculiar to them. They develop a similar argument against modernity, disqualified because it is materialistic and scientific, mutilating because it denies the spiritual dimension of man. Their radical rejection of modernity is the counterpart of what they consider to be the radicality of Western thought. Could not the violence of this reaction also be understood by the absence of an alternative project that is humanly feasible, will we move forward? (...) They have certain identical objectives such as the re-Islamization of Muslim societies and are all driven by a messianic expectation”.
- 13.
From the thinkers of the Nahda, the Arab Renaissance in the 19th century, to Mohammed Arkoun and Mohammed-Abed Al-Jabri, to Adonis, Abdallah Laroui, Constantin Zurayq, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and Hassan Hanafi, many intellectuals have sought to interpret the fact that Arab and Muslim societies lock themselves into irrational attitudes, take sides with archaisms, or adhere to solutions that look to the Arab-Islamic past. Elisabeth Kassab (2010) gives an instructive overview of the shifting of contemporary Arab thought.
- 14.
Only the investigation conducted by Al-Ayadi et al.(2007) has tried to tackle the issue of social secularization rigorously. This study concludes that “there is a strong tendency to rationalize religious practice (...) in the form of a double movement: the withdrawal into daily worship and obedience to a standardized repetitive logic, including daily prayers” (Ayadi et al. 2007, p. 231).
- 15.
In Arabic, the term ethics means akhlak. The ulema evoke what they call ideal ethics (makarim al-akhlak) designated and embodied by the Prophet Mohammed. The Quran does not use the term ethics, but speaks in terms of good and evil, of right and wrong (Fakhry 1991, p. 11). Islamic ethical theories fall into two main categories: rationalist ethics and the ethics of divine command. The first, championed by the Mu’tazîlîtes (eighth century) and the Sh’ites, privileges reason to judge good and evil. The second defends the action ordained by God (Esposito 2003, p. 76).
- 16.
In part, the chapter is based on the results of a survey on local political leadership that I conducted as part of my doctoral research (interviews and observations) among the PJD’s elected officials on the Casablanca city council between 2003 and 2007. My work was inspired by results of two qualitative surveys on the MUR based on archive work and non-participant observation of meetings, carried out in 2008 and 2010. The purpose of these investigations was to capture the ideological contribution of the MUR in the emergence of reformist Islamism in Morocco. Finally, I take into account the content analysis of a set of political assessments of the PJD since their participation in government in 2011.
- 17.
The publication of the first results of my survey on secularization in everyday life, carried out by reformist Islamists in Morocco, already dates back to 2014. See for more details Aziz Chahir (2014), “Islamic ethics and political modernization: the secularizing potentialities of reformist Islamists in Morocco”, Moroccan Review of Political and Social Sciences (MRPSS) 7 (X): 123–232.
- 18.
I am adopting this concept, although Weber did not use it (Weber 2015).
- 19.
Weber did not make a clear separation between church and state. He uses quotation marks every time he mentions both institutional arenas (Weber 2013, pp. 408–409).
- 20.
As Talal Asad (2003) has shown from an anthropological perspective, secularization does not necessarily mean the withdrawal of the religious into the private realm, and nor the separation of church and state. The distinctive features of secularity are rather anchored in the reconfiguration of behaviors, sensibilities, and moral attitudes that cause the political governance of religion.
- 21.
Weber defined political organizations by analogy with religious authority. Since “there is no conceivable end which some political association has not at some time pursued”, political authority must be defined “only in terms of the means peculiar to it” (Weber 1978 [1920], p. 55).
- 22.
Accessed from the English translation by William S. Hein & Co. in Constitute. The Worlds Constitutions. To Read, Search and Compare. https://www.constituteproject.org. Accessed: 30.06.2020.
- 23.
For the speeches of Mohammed VI see https://aua.ma/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Royaume-du-Maroc.pdf. Accessed: 30.6.2020
- 24.
Accessed from the English translation by William S. Hein & Co. in Constitute. The Worlds Constitutions. To Read, Search and Compare. https://www.constituteproject.org. Accessed: 30.6.2020.
- 25.
Among them are extreme-left parties such as the PADS and Annahj Adimocrati, which are still boycotting the elections.
- 26.
This is a movement made up of several groups belonging to the Marxist and Maoist spectrum. Several activists are former prisoners or people who had been in exile; they formed a political party (which no longer exists) called the Party of the New Left (PNL) in June 1996.
- 27.
World Values Survey, Maroc, 2001. http: //www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. Accessed: 30.6.2020.
- 28.
“According to 28.9% of the respondents, religion should guide political life”, while “26.3% (…) think that religion should be limited to personal life. Furthermore, 26.1% think that religion does not become dangerous when it interferes with politics and 24.9% think the opposite” (Al-Ayadi, Tozy and Rachik 2007, p. 82).
- 29.
- 30.
The fîqh doctrine of Al-Imam Al-Qarafi (1228–1285) is based on the ‘science of differences’ (al-fourouq). Al-Qarafi distinguished religious acts (spiritual behavior) from political acts (temporal behavior). For example, he differentiated between the function of the imam, the political and religious arbitrator, and the function of the magistrate as the judicial arbitrator, who should distinguish the temporal aspect of civil disputes, even if they are subject to Sharî’â (Al-Qarafî 1998).
- 31.
In the 19th century, the thinkers of al-Islah rejected the idea that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with the scientific spirit and modernity. In my opinion, the term ‘reformist Islamists’ (al-îslamîyîne al-islahîyîne) could be considered as an ideal type represented by PJD/MUR activists, who adopt a paradigm based on reconciliation (al-moussalaha) with the monarchy. On the theological level, the notion of reform (al-isslah) marks an epistemological break with traditional fîqh (the Qur’an and the Sunnah) and orthodox or radical Islam. From the view of îjtîhad, the notion of al-islah is part of a reference frame inspired by the fiqh al-Maqassîdî (purposive) (Abû Is-hâq Ash Shâtibî: -1338), which aims at the utilitarian purpose al-Masslaha al-Morssala (interests) or al-îstîslah (the search of human interest) by the use of axiological means such as al-waqi'îyya (pragmatism) al-i’tîdal (moderation) and al-wassatîya (right medium). From a political view, reformist Islamists try to bring about gradual change (attadarrouj) through ‘institutional participation’ in accordance with Islamic ethics. Finally, from a programmatic or electoral view, the notion of al-islah allows a binary ideological construction (inspired by the theologian Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, 1263–1328): assalah (godliness) vs. fassad (corruption), and assalih al’amm (public interest) vs. al-massalîh achakhssîya (personal interests).
- 32.
In this regard, I follow Shmuel Eisenstadt’s concept of multiple modernities including multifaceted institutional formations adjusted to different contexts, actors and ideas (Eisenstadt 2000).
- 33.
The PJD’s Electoral program: For a new Morocco (Freedom, Dignity, Justice & Development), Rabat, 2011, p. 116 (unpublished).
- 34.
In this respect, Weber argued that “[t]he full development of religious ethics requires an independent and professionally trained priesthood, permanently occupied with the cult and with the practical problems involved in the cure of souls” (Weber 1978 [1920], p. 426). On this basis, the role of the priests could be assimilated to the ulema or, in the case of the PJD, to the movement’s ideologues such as Ahmed Raïssouni, Mohamed Yatim, and Saâdeddine El Othmani.
- 35.
“The Islamists are not a religious party that holds a monopoly on Islam and, in fact, the party’s interpretive efforts (Îjtîhad) and its choices remain relative and refutable” (Raïssouni 1999, p. 293).
- 36.
According to Mohamed Tozy (1999, p. 246), “[t]he Islamists of Al-Islah have made an ideological upgrade that attempts to clarify the positions of the movement on three main axes: the use of violence in political change, the compatibility of democracy (the people’s sovereignty) with Islam (the sovereignty of God) and, finally, the status of women”.
- 37.
Ahmed Raïssouni (1994) has developed al-fîqh al-Maqassîdî, an approach that takes into consideration the principle of the usefulness of the objective to be achieved in order to solve contemporary problems.
- 38.
Developed by al-Îmam Chatîibî, fîqh al-Maqasîdî endorses the idea of ‘participation’ and denounces the notion of excommunication (takfir).
- 39.
Ahmed Raïssouni was head of the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR) until 2003; he was forced to resign because of his critical stance towards the ‘Commander of the faithful’. In 2018, he succeeded Sheikh Youssef El Qaradaoui as head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS).
- 40.
Interview with Abdelilah Benkirane in the newspaper Asharq al-Awsat on 27 November 2011.
- 41.
Exclusive interview with Abdelilah Benkirane by the Anatolia News Agency (APA) on 1 December 2011.
- 42.
The term Makhzen refers here to an authoritarian style of government embodied by the monarch and his entourage.
- 43.
Darija is the Arabic dialect spoken in Morocco.
- 44.
This decision symbolized the PJD’s attachment to the religious values of clemency (legal practice) and mercy (divine principle). It sends a strong political message to opponents of the PJD, but also to its allies in the party of Istiqlal, including a minister, Yasmina Baddou, who allegedly embezzled funds abroad. This ‘tax amnesty’ contained an implicit warning to business people suspected of misappropriating funds in tax havens, starting with the king, who, according to Swissleaks/Le Monde Journal (08/02/2015), illegally holds many bank accounts abroad (for example, at HSCB, which he opened in 2006).
- 45.
PJD’s electoral program; op.cit., p. 62.
- 46.
Fâtwâ (legal statement) launched by Ahmed Raïssouni in the online information site of “Al’omk Al-Maghribi” on 14 February 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBH86rPjunE&feature=emb_title. Accessed: 30.6.2020.
- 47.
An MUR statement dated 3 August 2005 reads: “This festival is a deliberate policy to spread deceit under the pretext of combating extremism (...). We invite all Moroccans to boycott it because it has nothing to do with noble art and culture; this festival is contrary to good morality”. A document published and distributed by the MUR to the press and the populations in the city of Casablanca
- 48.
Since the 2000s, the regime has faced the rise of ‘protest rap’, whose most radical proponents are persecuted or banned. For example, al-Hakad was imprisoned and then forced into exile in Belgium because of his songs criticizing police corruption.
- 49.
The Boulevard of Young Musicians, Nayda (upheaval), is a competition festival for young musicians. It has taken place annually in Casablanca since 2003 (after the bomb attacks there).
- 50.
In 2005, elected PJD counselors in Casablanca accused AMIS (Moroccan Association to Combat AIDS) of “inciting young people to commit debauchery by distributing condoms for free”.
- 51.
Article 489 of the Criminal Code criminalizes “unlawful or unnatural acts with an individual of the same sex”.
- 52.
Interview given to the Arabic-speaking daily Akhbar Al-Youm, February 28, 2012
- 53.
See The PJD/MUR’s statement calling for the boycott of the festival in 2005. A document published and diffused among journalists and populations by the MUR’s activists
- 54.
The Qu’ran, Surah 5 Al-Ma-îdah (The table) 90: “Ô you who believe! Wine, gambling and idols and divining arrows are only an abomination of Satan. Spread yourself that you may prosper”.
- 55.
The dahir (royal legislative act) of July 1967 states in Article 28 that “it is forbidden for any operator (...) to sell or offer free alcoholic beverages to Moroccan Muslims”.
- 56.
Journal Ar-Raya, 6 November 1997 (preaching organ affiliated to the MUR which was called at the time al-Islah wa-Tajdid—Movement of Reform and Innovation, MRI).
- 57.
The term Islamic feminism was coined in the 1990s, among others by the Iranian anthropologist and activist Ziba Mir-Hosseini. The global movement is active in numerous Arab countries, South East Asia and Iran. It has participated with UN women in researching religious frameworks to end discriminatory practices against women. See Heidemarie Winkel’s contribution in this volume.
- 58.
Bassima El-Hakkaoui, “woman and development between authenticity and occidentalization”, workshop organized by the PJD, 31st July 1999.
- 59.
Statement by Abdelilah Benkirane, who will be appointed head of the government in 2011, at a meeting with some leaders of the PJD, working meeting on the strategy of the Islamists in the next decade, 2005.
- 60.
The question of inheritance in Islam is heating up in Morocco. Gender activists organized a petition on 21 March 2018 seeking to abolish certain inheritance practices such as residues (ta’asib). Ironically, Ahmed Raïssouni ex-president of MUR, declared that “the religious doctrine of Islam cannot be changed by the game of petitions” (la tougha yyarou al-farayid bil-‘arayid).
- 61.
The term hijab appears seven times in the Qur'anic and translates, each time, as everything that hides and conceals something. While the hijab only concerned the prophet’s wives, it was quickly transformed into an essential tool for the historical submission of women to the patriarchal order. Following their father, Hassan II, the princesses do not wear the hijab. This is particularly the case for the ex-wife of King Mohammed VI, Princess Lalla Salma. Separated from her husband a few years ago, she is not hesitant to publicly appear in a miniskirt and without a veil.
- 62.
Filmed intervention broadcast on social networks by relatives of Abdelilah Benkirane, dated 13 January 2019, hereinafter the link https://youtu.be/IzBdFUpemrw. Accessed: 20 June 2020.
- 63.
Exclusive statement to the information site, retrieved from https://fr.le360.ma dated 01/02/2019.
- 64.
See the program at https://youtu.be/mBhDbuxL89Y. Accessed: 20 June 2020.
- 65.
The association of Al Adl Wal Ihssan (Justice and Charity), which is not recognized by the regime, is considered as the leading opposition force in Morocco. This politico-religious organization does not recognize the monarch’s status as amir al-mouminin.
- 66.
See the intervention of the president of the MUR during the conference organized by the Movement on October 11, 2019 in Rabat, under the theme "The debate on individual freedoms in Muslim societies". Accessed: https://youtu.be/eKqKYjMHHZU.
- 67.
See the Qur’anic verse: O ye who believe! Strong drink and games of chance and idols and divining arrows are only an infamy of Satan's handiwork. Leave it aside in order that ye may succeed” (Al-Ma’idah: 90–91).
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Chahir, A. (2021). The Elephant in the Room: The Silent Moroccan Path Towards Secularization. In: Gärtner, C., Winkel, H. (eds) Exploring Islam beyond Orientalism and Occidentalism. Veröffentlichungen der Sektion Religionssoziologie der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33239-6_6
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