Administrative autonomy of the German Länder over seven decades of the Basic Law

Zusammenfassung

One distinctive feature of German federalism is the high administrative autonomy of the Länder. The functional allocation of powers to levels of government and the representation of Länder governments instead of directly elected parliamentarians in the Bundesrat underpin the preponderance of the executive for making federalism work. The thesis of the relevance of administrative autonomy for German federalism is elaborated by tracing its evolution through seven decades of German history. This contribution shows that the ‘Bundesrat deal’ hollowed out legislative powers and, through the creation of ever more committees of interlocking policy making and implementation, provoked criticism of decision deadlock. After a brief interlude of disentangling powers, in the past decade, the ‘Bundesrat deal’ shifted from trading legislative powers against influence to trading administrative autonomy against money. An increasing horizontal fiscal gap and an increasing fractionalization of the party system make it ever more difficult for the Länder to form a united position in the Bundesrat and to fend off federal encroachment. If this trend continues, the very ‘raison d’être’ of German federalism is seriously threatened.