Abstract
The classical doctrine of the unity of the virtues is generally rejected today. After arguing that the doctrine is more tenable than is commonly allowed, I consider a new and possibly cogent objection based on the idea that some virtues, in some cultural settings, are of diminished importance, and thus are not necessary for the possession of other virtues. I develop a revised version of the doctrine which maintains that certain central virtues are unified, and that any other virtues are dependent upon them, but allows that an agent might have these central virtues without possessing certain other virtues. The upshot will be that a revised but still quite strong version of the unity doctrine remains interesting and defensible.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Rosalind Hursthouse reports that Timothy Chappell, in a lost manuscript, distinguished something on the order of thirty versions of the doctrine (Hursthouse 1999, 153n9).
- 3.
- 4.
This is a quick summary of the classical argument found in Aristotle, Ethics, VI.13 and more clearly in Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 65, a. 1.
- 5.
- 6.
See e.g. Swanton 2003, 24–25; Russell 2009, 112 f. By using the term “threshold,” I do not mean to imply that there is a sharp boundary between virtuous and non-virtuous – “virtue” may be a vague concept, and if so the threshold will be a fuzzy border area rather than a bright line (I address vagueness and its relevance to the unity of the virtues in Toner 2014).
- 7.
- 8.
This account is indebted proximately to Hursthouse (1999, 123–125) and remotely to Aristotle, Ethics II.4.
- 9.
Although, her reliability may be reduced: Her lack of emotional attunement in one field may lead to reduced sensitivity to the requirements of virtue in a way that bears on her ability to act well in other fields. A person merely continent in the field of kindness, e.g., may be committed to sparing others’ feelings when possible but simply not notice another’s fragile state, and then may state some painful fact in a manner that is, in the circumstances, callous rather than virtuously truthful.
- 10.
- 11.
We may want to say such agents act only “proto-virtuously” (a term borrowed from Sreenivasan 2009), because it may be that the emotional attunement mentioned in (7)(d) should be understood as implying counterfactual reliability – an action that is done “whole-heartedly” (with a reservation concerning danger) seems not really whole-heartedly done. I will not pursue this here.
- 12.
This line of thought is suggested by the discussion at Becker 1990, 131.
- 13.
It might for example be thought that tact would often have enclave-diminished importance. But, it might be replied that tact is not itself a virtue, but rather something like a skill that must often be employed by other virtues. See Bryan 2013, 697 for a discussion along these lines.
- 14.
Summa, I-II, 65.1 ad 1–2.
- 15.
This is obviously a large issue, and “outlining” is all I have space for here. In what follows I am much indebted to Russell’s discussion of what he calls the “enumeration problem” (see Russell 2009, Chapter 5–7).
- 16.
See Russell 2009, 197. By “subjective” and “objective” reasons I take Russell to mean (and I do mean) what is often spoken of in terms of “motivating” and “justifying” reasons.
- 17.
Aristotle uses the same word, philia, for this virtue and for friendship, but says they differ in that friends are “also fond of us” (Ethics, IV.6).
- 18.
Aquinas subordinates affability to justice, maintaining that general agreeableness is a “debt of equity” we owe to those among whom we live (Summa, II-II, 114.2).
- 19.
I am skeptical here. Even if I do not own, will I not be a steward of community possessions? And if so, might I not lend them well or badly? And if so, will I not need a virtue governing this activity? And, would this virtue really be distinct from generosity – in our society, do I really need one virtue to lend my neighbor my stapler, and another to lend my colleague my department-issued stapler?
- 20.
See Aquinas’s distinction between fortitude as a general virtue and as a special virtue (Summa, II-II, 123.2).
- 21.
Kindness is at least a relative cardinal virtue – is it cardinal, simply? Aquinas sees generosity (liberalitas) as subordinate to justice, and perhaps we might say the same of kindness. Heidi Giebel and Benjamin Huff (2016) argue that kindness (benevolence) should instead be seen as on a par with justice, with both being subordinate to what they call fellowship. But even if kindness is only relatively cardinal, it still seems enclave-independent.
- 22.
See Austen 1996, 329. Her uncle’s estate is not really a setting in which generosity is enclave-diminished; instead, Fanny has been denied the opportunity to develop a virtue she will need. But this point does not matter for purposes of the present illustration.
- 23.
We should not think of such a determination as an arbitrary choice; it would more plausibly be thought of as growing out of interest, custom, and reflection (the Spartans, e.g., might set the threshold of physical courage higher than do the Athenians). This line of thought is compatible with the idea that “virtue” is a vague concept, but maintains that the threshold, whether seen as a bright line or fuzzy border, is mobile under social pressures.
- 24.
Many thanks to Joshua Stuchlik for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
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Toner, C. (2020). The Unity of the Virtues Revisited. In: Halbig, C., Timmermann, F.U. (eds) Handbuch Tugend und Tugendethik. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24467-5_6-1
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