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Institutionelle Theorie

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Handbuch Sozialpolitik

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Zusammenfassung

Wie beeinflussen politische Institutionen Sozialpolitik? Ausgehend von dieser Frage haben sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten unterschiedliche institutionelle Erklärungsansätze entwickelt, deren Bedeutung für die Sozialpolitikforschung in diesem Beitrag dargestellt wird. Hierzu werden drei wesentliche Ansätze vorgestellt, die sich im Hinblick auf ihr Verständnis von Institutionen als (1) Barriere für sozialpolitisches Handeln, (2) als Quelle pfadabhängiger Prozesse und (3) als Rahmen für politische Diskurse unterscheiden. Die theoretischen Argumente der jeweiligen Perspektive werden dabei anhand empirischer Beispiele aus der Sozialpolitikforschung diskutiert, womit auch die Stärke institutioneller Ansätze deutlich wird – ihre Offenheit für Kombinationen mit anderen Theorieansätzen.

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  1. Kaiserslautern, Deutschland

    Georg Wenzelburger

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  1. Universität Bremen Socium, Bremen, Germany

    Herbert Obinger

  2. Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany

    Manfred G. Schmidt

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Wenzelburger, G. (2019). Institutionelle Theorie. In: Obinger, H., Schmidt, M. (eds) Handbuch Sozialpolitik. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-22803-3_9

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