Zusammenfassung
Gegenstand der Industrieökonomik ist die Struktur von Märkten mit unvollständigem Wettbewerb und das Verhalten von Unternehmen auf solchen Märkten. Unvollständiger Wettbewerb liegt in aller Regel vor, wenn auf einem Markt nur wenige oder, im Extremfall, nur ein einziges Unternehmen aktiv ist, d.h. auf oligopolistischen und monopolistischen Märkten. Zu den Themen der Industrieökonomik gehören daher die Preis- und Angebotsentscheidungen von Unternehmen in verschiedenen Marktstrukturen, Werbung, das Investitionsverhalten, Marktein- und –austrittsbarrieren, die Bildung von Kartellen, Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse, die Beziehungen zwischen Märkten auf verschiedenen Stufen der Wertschöpfungskette sowie Strategien der Unternehmen, um aktuelle oder potenzielle Wettbewerber zu behindern. In diesem Zusammenhang untersucht die Industrieökonomik auch die interne Struktur von Unternehmen, da diese einen erheblichen Einfluss auf die Risikoverteilung zwischen verschiedenen Gruppen innerhalb eines Unternehmens und damit auf das Unternehmensverhalten haben kann sowie die horizontale und vertikale Ausdehnung eines Unternehmens. So wird ein vertikal integriertes Unternehmen sich in der Regel anders verhalten als eines, das nur auf einer Stufe der Wertschöpfungskette aktiv ist und eines mit einer großen Produktpalette anders als ein Unternehmen, das nur wenige Produkte herstellt. Aber auch Märkte mit spezifischen Besonderheiten, wie z.B. Märkte mit Netzeffekten und zweiseitige Märkte werden von der Industrieökonomik analysiert.
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Schwalbe, U. (2019). Industrieökonomik. In: Apolte, T., Erlei, M., Göcke, M., Menges, R., Ott, N., Schmidt, A. (eds) Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik I . Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-21777-8_2
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