Zusammenfassung
Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Gründe, die dafür sprechen, Verantwortung mit den Fähigkeiten des moralischen Denkens und Urteilens in Verbindung zu bringen. Er stellt fünf verschiedene Ansätze vor, die Verantwortung und Rationalität miteinander verknüpfen: die Arbeiten von Susan Wolf, R. Jay Wallace, Angela M. Smith und Pamela Hieronymi sowie die Gemeinschaftsarbeit von John Martin Fischer und Mark Ravizza. Am Leitfaden dieser Autoren wird gezeigt, dass der Begriff des rationalen Vermögens zentral ist für das Verständnis und die Begründung unserer Verantwortungspraxis. Die Debatte über diesen Zusammenhang hat bereits deutliche Fortschritte gezeitigt, doch wirft der Begriff eines rationalen oder moralischen Vermögens nach wie vor erhebliche Verständnisprobleme auf. Ein denkbarer Grund hierfür, der erörtert wird, ist der, dass dieses Vermögen in einem konstitutiven Verhältnis zur Praxis des Zur-Verantwortung-Ziehens und Verantwortung-Übernehmens stehen könnte – und dass dieses Verhältnis noch gründlicher Erforschung harrt.
Übersetzt von Katrin Grünepütt
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Williams, G. (2016). Rationalität und Urteil. In: Heidbrink, L., Langbehn, C., Sombetzki, J. (eds) Handbuch Verantwortung. Springer Reference Sozialwissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-06175-3_21-1
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Rationalität und Urteil- Published:
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-06175-3_21-1