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Big 4 Conservatism Around the World

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Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets

Part of the book series: CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance ((CSEG))

Abstract

Conservatism is a long-established underlying principle of accounting but its implementation has come under the spotlight in recent years following the spate of well-publicized corporate collapses in the U.S. and elsewhere. Previous studies have shown that the Big 4 audit firms are more conservative than the non-Big 4 in the U.S. The current study examines whether the U.S. findings extend to other countries. In doing so, we make use of a relatively new measure of conservatism, namely, the C-score developed by Khan and Watts. We find that the conclusion drawn from U.S. studies, namely that the Big 4 are more conservative, extends to the international setting but only under certain conditions. Specifically, the Big 4 are more conservative in those countries where litigation and reputation risks, broadly defined, are high. This increase in conservatism represents a rational response by the Big 4 auditors to their greater exposure, vis-a-vis the non-Big 4 auditors, to litigation and reputation loss in those countries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The auditors of listed firms are very concentrated. At various times, the largest eight, six, five, and four auditors have dominated audit markets worldwide. Because of mergers and the demise of one auditor, Arthur Andersen, the Big Eight are now the big Four (Big 4). The Big 4 are Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DTT), Ernst and Young (EY), KPMG, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC). When we review prior studies, we use Big 8, Big 6, Big 5, and Big 4, as appropriate. In our analyses, we use the term Big 4 even though at the beginning of our sample period it was the Big 8. The Big 4 is an internationally well-known term for the four largest audit firms.

  2. 2.

    The Basu measure of conservatism has previously been used by Chung et al. (2004) in a study of Big 4 firms using data from around the world. They reported that the Big 4 audit firms had a uniform level of quality across countries, a finding which is opposite to that reported here. This indicates that the correct measurement of conservatism is extremely important. In a later study, Francis and Wang (2008) also use the Basu approach. Francis et al. (2004) use earnings management to examine audit quality differences between Big 4 and other auditors using international data.

  3. 3.

    Litigation costs include fines, penalties, and court and lawyers’ fees. However, auditors also bear costs relating to sanctions from regulators and professional bodies and from loss of reputation.

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Acknowledgement

We thank Jong-Hag Choi, Jere Francis, Annie Qiu, Dan Simunic, and participants at the PhD/DBA Research Seminars at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and City University for constructive comments on earlier versions of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Correspondence to Richard Chung .

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Table 16 Definitions of litigation and other country institutions variables and data sources

Appendix 2

Table 17 Details on auditor litigation risk, legal institutions, security law, political economy, and financial market factor

Appendix 3

Table 18 Classification of auditor litigation risk, legal institutions, security law, political economy, and financial market factor variables: high versus low realization
 

Political economy

Financial market factors

Country

Risk of expropriation

State–operated business

Tax burden

Stock return comovement

Concentrated ownership

Insider trading

Access to equity

Argentina

High

Low

Low

High

High

High

High

Australia

Low

Low

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

Austria

Low

Low

High

High

High

Low

High

Belgium

Low

Low

High

High

High

Low

Low

Brazil

High

Low

Low

–

High

High

High

Canada

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Chile

High

High

Low

Low

Low

High

High

Colombia

High

High

Low

Low

High

High

High

Denmark

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Egypt

High

High

Low

_

High

_

High

Finland

Low

Low

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

France

Low

High

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

Germany

Low

High

High

High

Low

Low

Low

Greece

High

Low

High

_

High

High

Low

Hong Kong

High

Low

Low

High

High

Low

Low

India

High

High

Low

High

Low

High

Low

Indonesia

High

High

Low

Low

High

High

High

Ireland

Low

Low

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

Israel

High

High

High

_

High

Low

Low

Italy

Low

High

High

_

High

High

High

Japan

Low

Low

Low

High

Low

Low

High

Korea

High

Low

Low

High

Low

Low

High

Malaysia

High

High

Low

High

High

Low

High

Mexico

High

Low

Low

High

High

High

High

New Zealand

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Norway

Low

Low

High

Low

Low

High

Low

Peru

High

Low

Low

Low

High

High

High

Portugal

Low

High

High

Low

High

Low

High

Singapore

Low

Low

Low

High

Low

Low

Low

South Africa

High

High

High

Low

High

High

Low

Spain

Low

High

Low

High

High

High

High

Sri Lanka

High

High

Low

_

High

High

_

Sweden

Low

High

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

Thailand

High

High

Low

High

Low

High

High

Turkey

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

United Kingdom

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

Appendix 4

X :

is earnings before interest and taxes deflated by lagged market capitalization.

R :

is stock return, inclusive of dividends, over the fiscal year.

SIZE :

is the natural log of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year (in USD, $million).

MB :

is the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity, measured at the end of the fiscal year.

LEV :

is the total liability divided by total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year.

LNTA :

is the natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (in USD, $million).

CAPINT :

is the fixed assets divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year.

INVREC :

is the sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year.

LOSS :

is equal to 1 if net income before extraordinary is negative in the prior year and 0 otherwise.

CROSS :

is equal to 1 if a company trades ADRs (American Depository Receipts) and 0 otherwise.

BIG4 :

is equal to 1 if a company appoints one of the Big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise.

C-score:

is estimated from Eq. 2 in a pooled regression.

Cdec:

is decile ranking of C-score, estimated from Eq. 2 in a pooled regression.

Industry indicators:

are based on the two-digit SIC code.

FDI:

is the net foreign investment scaled by total GDP for the country in each year.

STK:

is the total market capitalization to scaled by total GDP for the country in each year.

GDP:

is the natural log of Gross Domestic Investment (in thousands of US dollars) for the country in each year.

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Chung, R., Firth, M., Kim, JB., Pang, L. (2014). Big 4 Conservatism Around the World. In: Boubaker, S., Nguyen, D. (eds) Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets. CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-44955-0_8

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