Abstract
Conservatism is a long-established underlying principle of accounting but its implementation has come under the spotlight in recent years following the spate of well-publicized corporate collapses in the U.S. and elsewhere. Previous studies have shown that the Big 4 audit firms are more conservative than the non-Big 4 in the U.S. The current study examines whether the U.S. findings extend to other countries. In doing so, we make use of a relatively new measure of conservatism, namely, the C-score developed by Khan and Watts. We find that the conclusion drawn from U.S. studies, namely that the Big 4 are more conservative, extends to the international setting but only under certain conditions. Specifically, the Big 4 are more conservative in those countries where litigation and reputation risks, broadly defined, are high. This increase in conservatism represents a rational response by the Big 4 auditors to their greater exposure, vis-a-vis the non-Big 4 auditors, to litigation and reputation loss in those countries.
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Notes
- 1.
The auditors of listed firms are very concentrated. At various times, the largest eight, six, five, and four auditors have dominated audit markets worldwide. Because of mergers and the demise of one auditor, Arthur Andersen, the Big Eight are now the big Four (Big 4). The Big 4 are Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DTT), Ernst and Young (EY), KPMG, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC). When we review prior studies, we use Big 8, Big 6, Big 5, and Big 4, as appropriate. In our analyses, we use the term Big 4 even though at the beginning of our sample period it was the Big 8. The Big 4 is an internationally well-known term for the four largest audit firms.
- 2.
The Basu measure of conservatism has previously been used by Chung et al. (2004) in a study of Big 4 firms using data from around the world. They reported that the Big 4 audit firms had a uniform level of quality across countries, a finding which is opposite to that reported here. This indicates that the correct measurement of conservatism is extremely important. In a later study, Francis and Wang (2008) also use the Basu approach. Francis et al. (2004) use earnings management to examine audit quality differences between Big 4 and other auditors using international data.
- 3.
Litigation costs include fines, penalties, and court and lawyers’ fees. However, auditors also bear costs relating to sanctions from regulators and professional bodies and from loss of reputation.
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Acknowledgement
We thank Jong-Hag Choi, Jere Francis, Annie Qiu, Dan Simunic, and participants at the PhD/DBA Research Seminars at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and City University for constructive comments on earlier versions of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
 | Political economy | Financial market factors | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Country | Risk of expropriation | State–operated business | Tax burden | Stock return comovement | Concentrated ownership | Insider trading | Access to equity |
Argentina | High | Low | Low | High | High | High | High |
Australia | Low | Low | High | Low | Low | Low | Low |
Austria | Low | Low | High | High | High | Low | High |
Belgium | Low | Low | High | High | High | Low | Low |
Brazil | High | Low | Low | – | High | High | High |
Canada | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low |
Chile | High | High | Low | Low | Low | High | High |
Colombia | High | High | Low | Low | High | High | High |
Denmark | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low |
Egypt | High | High | Low | _ | High | _ | High |
Finland | Low | Low | High | Low | Low | Low | Low |
France | Low | High | High | Low | Low | Low | Low |
Germany | Low | High | High | High | Low | Low | Low |
Greece | High | Low | High | _ | High | High | Low |
Hong Kong | High | Low | Low | High | High | Low | Low |
India | High | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low |
Indonesia | High | High | Low | Low | High | High | High |
Ireland | Low | Low | High | Low | Low | Low | Low |
Israel | High | High | High | _ | High | Low | Low |
Italy | Low | High | High | _ | High | High | High |
Japan | Low | Low | Low | High | Low | Low | High |
Korea | High | Low | Low | High | Low | Low | High |
Malaysia | High | High | Low | High | High | Low | High |
Mexico | High | Low | Low | High | High | High | High |
New Zealand | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low |
Norway | Low | Low | High | Low | Low | High | Low |
Peru | High | Low | Low | Low | High | High | High |
Portugal | Low | High | High | Low | High | Low | High |
Singapore | Low | Low | Low | High | Low | Low | Low |
South Africa | High | High | High | Low | High | High | Low |
Spain | Low | High | Low | High | High | High | High |
Sri Lanka | High | High | Low | _ | High | High | _ |
Sweden | Low | High | High | Low | Low | Low | Low |
Thailand | High | High | Low | High | Low | High | High |
Turkey | High | High | High | High | High | High | High |
United Kingdom | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low |
Appendix 4
- X :
-
is earnings before interest and taxes deflated by lagged market capitalization.
- R :
-
is stock return, inclusive of dividends, over the fiscal year.
- SIZE :
-
is the natural log of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year (in USD, $million).
- MB :
-
is the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity, measured at the end of the fiscal year.
- LEV :
-
is the total liability divided by total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year.
- LNTA :
-
is the natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (in USD, $million).
- CAPINT :
-
is the fixed assets divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year.
- INVREC :
-
is the sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year.
- LOSS :
-
is equal to 1 if net income before extraordinary is negative in the prior year and 0 otherwise.
- CROSS :
-
is equal to 1 if a company trades ADRs (American Depository Receipts) and 0 otherwise.
- BIG4 :
-
is equal to 1 if a company appoints one of the Big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise.
- C-score:
-
is estimated from Eq. 2 in a pooled regression.
- Cdec:
-
is decile ranking of C-score, estimated from Eq. 2 in a pooled regression.
- Industry indicators:
-
are based on the two-digit SIC code.
- FDI:
-
is the net foreign investment scaled by total GDP for the country in each year.
- STK:
-
is the total market capitalization to scaled by total GDP for the country in each year.
- GDP:
-
is the natural log of Gross Domestic Investment (in thousands of US dollars) for the country in each year.
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Chung, R., Firth, M., Kim, JB., Pang, L. (2014). Big 4 Conservatism Around the World. In: Boubaker, S., Nguyen, D. (eds) Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets. CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-44955-0_8
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