Abstract
We introduce a model for voting under uncertainty where a group of voters have to decide on a joint action to take, but the individual voters are uncertain about the current state of the world and thus about the effect that the chosen action would have. Each voter has preferences about what state they would like to see reached once the action has been executed. That is, we need to integrate two kinds of aggregation: beliefs regarding the current state and preferences regarding the next state.
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Endriss, U. (2013). Voting on Actions with Uncertain Outcomes. In: Perny, P., Pirlot, M., Tsoukià s, A. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8176. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_13
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