Abstract
In Regulatory Networks, Population Level Effects and Threshold Models of Collective Action, Mark Fenwick explores the question of whether we might push the network metaphor further and examine whether regulatory networks exhibit “network dynamics”. The study of networks dynamics is an inter-disciplinary field that has emerged at the intersection between sociology, social psychology and economics. The chapter suggests that one form of network dynamic, namely a threshold model of collective action, can be helpful in providing a new conceptual vocabulary for describing various features of regulatory networks. In particular, it allows us to move away from accounts that regard networks as expressing the collective normative preferences of participants and ideas of contractual consent.
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Notes
- 1.
Weber (1968), p. 23.
- 2.
By way of a preliminary caveat, it is worth noting that TGRNs often entail the participation of quasi-public and non-state actors, such as NGOs, trade associations etc., and, as such, are not the exclusive preserve of public authorities, although this is not an issue I shall explore in here. Moreover, such networks often blur the public–private structure.
- 3.
- 4.
For an excellent introduction to this field, see Easley and Kleinberg (2010).
- 5.
See Raustiala (2002).
- 6.
This chapter will draw on the work of Marc Granovetter, in particular Granovetter (1978).
- 7.
See Katz and Shapiro (1985).
- 8.
Moreover, since in the context of a lot of contemporary regulation the objects of regulation—companies or individuals—“voluntarily” submit to that regulation their decisions to “join” a network might also be usefully understood via threshold models.
- 9.
Keohane and Nye (1974), p. 39.
- 10.
See Slaughter (1997).
- 11.
Slaughter and Zaring (2006), p. 1.
- 12.
See Verdier (2009).
- 13.
Katz and Shapiro (1985), p. 43.
- 14.
- 15.
Matza (1964).
- 16.
For example, “[s]haring values makes agreement on common goals easier, and ‘confidence’ in competence and integrity makes commitment to mutual involvement in such goals easier … All these considerations focus mutual trust in the conception or ‘feeling’ of the solidarity of collective groups”. Parsons (1978), pp. 46–47.
- 17.
See e.g. Sztompka (1999).
- 18.
The following discussion draws, in particular, on the work of Granovetter (1978).
- 19.
In the following, I am using “standard” in a broad sense to refer to any routinized rules, policies, or practices.
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Fenwick, M. (2014). Regulatory Networks, Population Level Effects and Threshold Models of Collective Action. In: Fenwick, M., Van Uytsel, S., Wrbka, S. (eds) Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41212-7_5
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