Abstract
Online privacy provides fresh motivations to generalized auctions where: (i) preferences over bids may be partial, because of lack of knowledge and formalization difficulties; (ii) the preferences of auctioneers and bidders may be heterogeneous and unrelated. We tackle these generalized scenarios by introducing a few natural generalizations of second-price auctions, and by investigating which of their classical properties are preserved under which conditions.
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Bonatti, P.A., Faella, M., Galdi, C., Sauro, L. (2013). Auctions for Partial Heterogeneous Preferences. In: Chatterjee, K., Sgall, J. (eds) Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2013. MFCS 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8087. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40313-2_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40313-2_18
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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