Abstract
An agent’s preferences are sometimes formed as a result of her options or, more precisely, her beliefs about her options. It is sometimes claimed that such adaptive preferences are not autonomous, and that, therefore, actions on the basis of such preferences are not autonomous either. Through the examination of some accounts of autonomy and adaptive preferences, I show that the claim that adaptive preferences are not autonomous is highly ambiguous.
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Bruckner, D.W. (2013). Adaptive Preferences, Autonomy, and Extended Lives. In: Räikkä, J., Varelius, J. (eds) Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 10. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38376-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38376-2_2
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