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Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 10))

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Abstract

A preference is said to be adaptive if it is formed or changed in response to the agent’s feasible options (Elster 1985, Bruckner 2009). Adaptive preferences are major candidates for being discounted (or entirely dismissed) in welfarist accounts of the good (Elster 1985, Bovens 1992, Nussbaum 2001). In this paper, we refine this basic intuition in two ways. First, we show that not all adaptive preferences should be thus discounted. Second, we provide a general framework for determining which preferences should be discounted due to their adaptiveness, including a set of procedural exclusion criteria to be used for this purpose.

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Correspondence to Till Grüne-Yanoff .

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Grüne-Yanoff, T., Hansson, S.O. (2013). Procedural Exclusion Criteria for Adaptive Preferences. In: Räikkä, J., Varelius, J. (eds) Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 10. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38376-2_11

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