Abstract
Although it is generally known that both the so-called adaptive preference formation and self-deception reduce frustration caused by cognitive dissonance, there is surprisingly little discussion about the relation between adaptive preferences and self-deception. Perhaps people have thought that the connection between them is so obvious that it does not deserve special attention. Or perhaps they have thought that these two phenomena are so clearly unconnected that any discussion is unworthy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Audi, R.: Belief, Intention, and Reasons for Action. In: Timmons, M., Creco, J., Mele, A. (eds.) Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi, pp. 248–259. Oxford University Press, New York (2007)
Baber, H.E.: Adaptive Preferences. Soc. Theory Pract. 33, 105–126 (2007)
Bach, K.: Book Review of Self-deception Unmasked. Philos Psychol. 15, 203–206 (2002)
Bagnoli, C.: Self-deception and Agential Authority: A Constituvist Account. Humanamente, 99–116 (2012)
Balcetis, E., Dunning, D.: Wishful Seeing: Desired Objects are Seen as Closer. Psychol. Sci. 21, 147–152 (2010)
Balcetis, E., Dunning, D.: See What You Want to See: Motivational Influences on Visual Perception. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 91, 612–625 (2006)
Barnes, A.: Seeing through Self-deception. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1997)
Baron, M.: What is Wrong with Self-deception? In: Laughlin, B.P., Rorty, A.O. (eds.) Perspectives on Self-deception, pp. 431–449. University of California Press, Berkeley (1988)
Barry, B.: Culture and Equality. Polity Press, Cambridge (2001)
Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F.: Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th edn. Oxford University Press, New York (2009)
Breakey, H.: Adaptive Preferences and the Hellenistic Insight. Aust. J. Prof. Appl. Ethics 12, 29–39 (2010)
Bruckner, D.W.: Colburn on Covert Influences. Utilitas 23, 451–457 (2011)
Bruckner, D.W.: In Defense of Adaptive Preferences. Philos Stud. 142, 307–324 (2009)
Chetwynd, S.B.: Right to Life, Right to Die and Assisted Suicide. J. Appl. Philos 21, 173–182 (2004)
Cohen, G.A.: Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1995)
Colburn, B.: Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences. Utilitas 23, 52–71 (2011)
Ellees, E.: On a Recent Theory of Rational Acceptance. Philos Stud. 44, 331–343 (1983)
Elster, J.: Sour Grapes – Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants. In: Christman, J. (ed.) The Inner Citadel, pp. 170–188. Oxford University Press, New York (1989)
Elster, J.: Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1983)
Grey, W.: Right to Die or Duty to Live? The Problem of Euthanasia. J. Appl. Philos 16, 19–32 (1999)
Guerra, M.J.: Euthanasia in Spain: The Public Debate After Ramon Sampedro’s Case. Bioethics 13, 426–432 (1999)
Hawthorne, J., Bovens, L.: The Preface, The Lottery, and The Logic of Belief. Mind 108, 241–264 (1999)
Khader, S.J.: Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2011)
Levy, N.: Self-deception and Moral Responsibility. Rati 17, 294–311 (2004)
Lockie, R.: Book Review of Self-deception Unmasked. Philos 78, 296–300 (2003)
Lynch, K.: Self-deception, Religious Belief, and the False Belief Condition. Heythrop J. 51, 1073–1074 (2010)
Martin, M.M.: Self-deception and Morality. University of Kansas Press, Lawrence (1986)
Mele, A.R.: When Are We Self-Deceived? Humanamente 20, 1–15 (2012)
Mele, A.R.: Approaching Self-deception: How Robert Audi and I Part Company. Conscious Cogn. 19, 745–750 (2010)
Mele, A.R.: Self-deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2001)
Moran, R.: Problems of Sincerity. P. Aristotelian Soc. 105, 341–361 (2005)
Nussbaum, M.: Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Belknap Press, Cambridge (2011)
Nussbaum, M.: Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options. Econ. Philos 17, 67–88 (2001)
Ray, G.: Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-deception. In: Laughlin, B.P., Rorty, A.O. (eds.) Perspectives on Self-deception, pp. 264–296. University of California Press, Berkeley (1988)
Richardson, H.S.: Autonomy’s Many Normative Presuppositions. Am. Philos Q 38, 287–303 (2001)
Rorty, A.O.: The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Lairs. In: Laughlin, B.P., Rorty, A.O. (eds.) Perspectives on Self-deception, pp. 11–28. University of California Press, Berkeley (1988)
Räikkä, J., Smilansky, S.: The Ethics of Alien Attitudes. Monist 95, 511–532 (2012)
Räikkä, J.: Self-deception and Religious Beliefs. Heythrop J. 48, 513–526 (2007)
Scott-Kakures, D.: Unsettling Questions: Cognitive Dissonance in Self-deception. Soc. Theory Pract. 35, 73–106 (2009)
Scott-Kakures, D.: Book Review of Self-deception Unmasked. Mind 111, 696–701 (2002)
Sie, M.: Moral Agency, Conscious Control, and Deliberative Awareness. Inquiry 52, 516–531 (2009)
Talbott, W.J.: Intentional Self-deception in a Single Coherent Self. Philos Phenomen Res. 55, 27–74 (1995)
Trope, Y., Gervey, B., Liberman, N.: Wishful Thinking from a Pragmatic Hypothesis-testing Perspective. In: Myslobodsky, M. (ed.) The Mythomanias: The Nature of Deception and Self-deception, pp. 105–131. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah (1997)
Walker, J.D.: Liberalism, Consent, and the Problem of Adaptive Preferences. Soc. Theory Pract. 21, 457–471 (1995)
Zimmerman, D.: Sour Grapes, Self-abnegation and Charatcter Building: Non-responsibility and Responsibility for Self-induced Preferences. Monist 86, 220–241 (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Räikkä, J. (2013). Adaptive Preferences and Self-Deception. In: Räikkä, J., Varelius, J. (eds) Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 10. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38376-2_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38376-2_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38375-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38376-2
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)