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On the Security of Lv et al.’s Three-Party Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Using One-Time Key

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Advanced Infocomm Technology (ICAIT 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 7593))

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Abstract

In 2012, Lv et al. proposed a new three-party authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol using one-time key which aims to achieve more efficiency with the same security level of other existing 3PAKE protocols. Lv et al. claimed that their proposed 3PAKE protocol is secure against various known attacks. However, this paper points out Lv et al.’s 3PAKE protocol is still vulnerable to off-line dictionary attacks unlike their claim.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Cyber Security, Kyungil University, 33 Buho-Ri, Hayang-Ub, Kyungsan-Si, Kyungsangpuk-Do, 712-701, Republic of Korea

    Eun-Jun Yoon

Authors
  1. Eun-Jun Yoon
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratoire de Cryptologie et Virologie Opérationnelles, École Supérieure d’Informatique d’Electronique et d’Automatique (ESIEA), 9 rue Vésale, 75005, Paris, France

    Vincent Guyot

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Yoon, EJ. (2013). On the Security of Lv et al.’s Three-Party Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Using One-Time Key. In: Guyot, V. (eds) Advanced Infocomm Technology. ICAIT 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7593. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38227-7_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38227-7_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38226-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38227-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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