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Quantitative Questions on Attack–Defense Trees

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Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2012 (ICISC 2012)

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Abstract

Attack–defense trees are a novel methodology for graphical security modeling and assessment. The methodology includes intuitive and formal components that can be used for quantitative analysis of attack–defense scenarios. In practice, we use intuitive questions to ask about aspects of scenarios we are interested in. Formally, a computational procedure, using a bottom-up algorithm, is applied to derive the corresponding numerical values. This paper bridges the gap between the intuitive and the formal way of quantitatively assessing attack–defense scenarios. We discuss how to properly specify a question, so that it can be answered unambiguously. Given a well-specified question, we then show how to derive an appropriate attribute domain which constitutes the corresponding formal model.

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Kordy, B., Mauw, S., Schweitzer, P. (2013). Quantitative Questions on Attack–Defense Trees. In: Kwon, T., Lee, MK., Kwon, D. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2012. ICISC 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7839. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37682-5_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37682-5_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-37681-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-37682-5

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